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ABSTRACT 
The primary goal of the United Nations is the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the 
Security Council has been given the specific responsibility to 
achieve this goal. But the Cold War which descended the world 
scene in the post-Second World years prevented the Security 
Council from playing any active role in this all important field 
till the late eighties. However, the end of Cold War coupled 
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union has dramatically 
changed the world's political scenario in the nineties. The 
Security Council which was considered to be redundant till not 
long ago has suddenly become very active. But the reality is 
that the unipolarism has made it an instrument in the hands of a 
particular and powerful state only to be used against the small 
and less powerful states. This situation became more dangerous 
than ever before. Against this backdrop there is demand for 
reform in the Security Council. This study reviews the 
structural and power aspects of this body and tries to find out 
as to what necessary changes it requires. 
Chapter 1 traces the origin of great power recognition in 
the community of nations which resulted in the formation of the 
Concert of Europe, a club of great powers, in the nineteenth 
century and finally led to the creation of a clique of sach 
powers in the twentieth century international organizations. 
The Security Council is a small body dominated by major 
powers within the larger dimension of the United Nations. It 
consists of fifteen members; five permanent and ten 
nonpermanent members, the latter elected for terms of two 
years by the General Assembly. One half of the elected 
members retire every year after completing their two years 
term. An outgoing member can not stand for imi -late 
re-election. Permanent members are Britain, France i^ncd 
States, Russia and China who are the victors o the Ssccnd 
World War. The Charter not only assigns them permanent seat 
in the Security Council but also attributes to them and to them 
exclusively a capacity to veto all but procedural decisions. By 
placing the responsibility of maintaining peace and :> rity on 
the Security Council and by providing that no substantive 
decision of the council can be taken except v h the 
concurrence of permanent members, the authors of the Cliarter 
went far forward assuring that no collective action would be 
taken against a permanent member or without its consent. This 
means that states enjoying the protection of a permanent 
member would be exempted as well. 
In chapter II a general framework of the functions and 
powers of the Security Council has been discussed. Its main 
function is the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Besides, it has to perform several subsidiary function as well, 
such as formulating plans for the regulation of armaments, 
recommending to the General Assembly the admiss'on, 
suspension and expulsion of UN members and the appointment 
of Secretary General, participating in the election of the judges 
of International Court of Justice, and recommending or taking 
action against a state not fulfilling its obligation under a 
judgement of ICJ. For the performance of its primary 
responsibility of maintaining international place and security, 
the Security Council is not restricted to the only powers which 
are explicitly conferred on it under the Charter. It also enjc/s 
implied powers, which are necessary for the fulfillment of its 
duties effectively. It does not, however have unlimited powers. 
Article 2(4) and 2(7) prohibits it from infringing upon the state 
sovereignty and intervening within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the states. 
Chapter III deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Under the Charter the Security Council is granted specific 
powers to facilitate the resolution of a dispute peacefully. 
Article 33 first exhorts the parties to a dispute, the continuance 
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security to settle their differences through various 
pacific methods. Then it empowers the Security Council, if it 
deems necessary, to call the parties to settle their disputes by 
such means. The Security Council may, at any stage of a 
dispute, recommend some appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment. It may also specify such terms of settlement, as it 
may consider appropriate. In order to determine whether the 
continuance of the dispute is likely to endanger international 
peace and security, it has the authority to investigate not only a 
dispute but also a situation, which may lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute. This power of investigation is 
the most important power of the Security Council in the area of 
pacific settlement. 
Chapter IV examines the powers of the Security Council 
with respect to collective security. The Security Council has 
got very comprehensive power in this field. It is these powers 
which make it the most impbrtant orgati of the United Nations. 
It has the sole authority to determine the existence of threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and 
recommend or take coercive action. However, in order to 
prevent the aggravation of the situation, the Security Council 
may before making the recommendation or deciding upon 
coercive measures, call upon the parties to comply with such 
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. For 
example, it may call for a case-fire or an armistice so that there 
is an immediate cessation of fighting while it takes time to 
decide what further measures may be necessary. Coeicive 
measures may be of military nature or of any non-military 
nature generally known as economic sanctions. In case the 
Security Council decides upon economic measures it may call 
upon members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
When it decides upon military measures the Security Council 
has itself to take such action. For this purpose provision has 
been made in the Charter to make the armed forces available at 
the disposal of the Security Council by the member states under 
special agreements. However, no such agreements have ever 
been concluded which prevents the Security Council from 
taking military action in the latter and spirit of the provisions 
of the Charter. In Korean operation the forces were made 
available to the unified command voluntarily by the 
participating states on the recommendation of the Security 
Council. Though the operation control was in American hands, 
no doubt it was a UN action since the Security Council itself 
created the unified command and also authorised the 
use of UN flag. 
In contrast to this, in the Gulf operation neither the 
Security Council created any unified command nor authorised 
the use of UN flag. The forces of participating states operated 
under their own national flags informally led by the United 
States. All these make it clear that the Gulf War was not a UN 
war against Iraq. 
Chapter V focuses on the peacekeeping operation. This is 
an extra Charter device and finds no mention anywhere in the 
Charter. When as a result of continued use of veto by the two 
superpowers the functioning of the Security Council has frozen, 
it was necessary for the international community to have any 
relevance in the area of peace and security to adopt a new 
method for keeping peace, which was ultimately came to be 
known as peacekeeping. Fifty peacekeeping operations have 
been launched so for, about three-forth of this only in the past 
one decade. Since no specific provision is there in the Charter 
for such peacekeeping operations, there was some controversy 
as to the competence of the Security Council to set up such 
operations. But the fact that the Security Council has 
established such a large number of peacekeeping operations, 
excepting two which were set up by the General Assembly, 
without any major opposition by the UN members proves that 
the member states have recognised this power of the Security 
Council. Peacekeeping operations are launched with the 
consent of the state or states concerned. Impartiality and non-
coercion are the two basic principles of these operations. 
However, in the nineties several peacekeeping operations were 
converted into peace-enforcement operations which was a 
marked deviation from past practices. This has put a question 
mark on the legitimacy of these operations. Peacekeeping 
operations in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda were of this 
nature. In all these three cases the efforts of the Security 
Council have been a failure and brought much damage to the 
Council's image in this arena. 
Chapter VI analyses critically the composition and 
powers of the Security Council as studied in the preceding 
Chapters. Despite having extensive powers the Security 
Council has not been able to play its expected role. The reason 
is clear. Instead of great power unanimity on which the UN was 
based, the post war years had brought major rifts and 
disagreements among powerful states of the world. Under the 
circumstances, the Security Council in which five permanent 
members possess an individual veto has been unable to function 
effectively. Korean case was an exception and was the result of 
an extraordinary situation. Even in this case the Council did 
not act in the letter and spirit of the Charter provisions and the 
United States resorted the cover of its resolution, for her own 
ends. With the demise of the Cold War the Security Council has 
allegedly become very active. But in fact with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union it has receded to America's 
pocket and it is only serving the purposes of that country. This 
was evident in the Security Council verdict against Iraq, when 
the US acted as policeman after obtaining a rump sanction from 
the Council and carried out its task to save her economic and 
strategic interests in the region. The action of NATO in 
KOSOVO on the behest of America is another example when 
the Security Council completely bypassed. 
In the field of pacific settlement of disputes the 
performance of the Security Council is very dismal. In a very 
limited number of cases brought before it, the Council has 
become able to provide any solution. Most of the disputes 
remain unsolved for years and decades. To a large extent it has 
become the repository of the world's lost causes. What other 
means of peaceful resolution can not achieve tends to be 
relegated to the Security Council or the General Assembly as a 
place of last resort. 
Peacekeeping operation which was considered to be a 
useful tool in the hands of the Security Council to keep peace 
in the world has also come of late under attack. This is due to 
the blurring of distinction between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. Peacekeeping operations though not provided in 
the Charter may be justified on the ground that they are 
impartial and non-coercive and are launched with the consent 
of the State concerned, thus providing legitimacy to 
intervention within the internal affairs of a state. But peace 
enforcement can never be justified, as the basic conditions of 
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impartiality, non-coercion and consent are missing. Thus they 
are an infringement upon state sovereignty which is prohibited 
under Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter. 
As far the composition of the Security Council is 
concerned the Charter by assigning the major powers permanent 
seat and conferring upon them the right of veto violates its own 
provision of sovereign equality. It is the veto which rendered 
the Council inoperative for a long spell of its life. Even if it is 
assumed that it was the political necessity of the time to 
provide the Big Five a privileged position, it was very 
unfortunate to adopt an amendment procedure that would 
enable any one of them to prevent a constitutional revision of 
her status and the veto power. The world situations have 
radically changed since 1945 while the Security Council still 
reflects the war time realities. Most of the countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America which were once colonies of western 
powers became independent and joined the United Nations 
raising its strength from 51 to 187. Some big countries have 
lost their status. Others like Germany and Japan have emerged 
as the economic giants. Thus the power combination has gone 
under transformation. Also the present structure of the Security 
Council is Europe centric. There is no voice for developing 
countries who form the majority of UN membership. Two 
11 
continents of Africa and South America are not permanently 
represented. There is only one permanent representation from 
Asia, the largest continent from the point of population. Thus 
the representation in the Security Council is totally lopsided. 
The conclusion sums up the study and realises that the 
Charter provisions relating to the Security Council needs 
thorough revision. The Security Council should be restructured 
in a way to make it more representative and democratic and 
reflective of the present day world realities. Some other states 
should be given permanent membership with the present five or 
instead of some of them. Veto power should be abolished or at 
least its scope should be contained. The Council should be 
permitted to raise its own force to avoid the misuse of its 
mandate by the powerful states. For this purpose efforts should 
be made to evolve a consensus on the principles of governing 
the forces so that agreements under Article 43 making the 
forces available at the disposal of the Security Council could 
be concluded at the earliest. The suggestion to incorporate 
peacekeeping provisions in the Charter has also been made. 
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Preface 
The last one decade has unfolded such radical changes in 
the international political environments as, perhaps, never 
before been witnessed since the end of the Second World War. 
The UN Security Council which was previously being referred 
to as irrelevant in dealing with the pressing world problems of 
peace and security has suddenly become very active. But in 
reality, the demise of cold war and the break up of the Soviet 
Union have put the Security Council into the American pocket 
and that country uses it to her full advantage at the cost of 
other states. In these circumstances there is a crying need for 
reform in the Security Council to enable it to serve the 
humanity as a whole and not the covert objectives of any 
individual country. 
The primary goal of the United Nations is to maintain 
international peace and security. The Preamble to the Charter 
sets out in noble words: "We, the people of the United Nations, 
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind...". Throughout the complex Great Power negotiations 
which led to the conference at San Francisco, the emphasis was 
on a particular body within the United Nations - the Security 
Council - performing that role. Though the League of Nations 
on whose ashes the United Nations is built also had a council 
but the Charter gives the Security Council a position which is 
far greater than that which the League Council had held. One of 
the most important differences between them is that while the 
League Council acted only as a kind of standing committee, the 
members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security 
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. They have entrusted it with 
the authority to act on their behalf and obligated themselves to 
accept and carry out its decisions. 
Security Council is the central and most important organ 
of the United Nations. It consists of fifteen members; five 
permanent and ten non-permanent elected members. Five 
permanent members are; the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, China and Russia (previously Soviet Union), 
which dominated both the war efforts against the Axis and 
postwar planning for the new international organization. Their 
concurrence is must for any decision of the council on 
substantive matters. In other words they enjoy veto power and 
I l l 
anyone of them can block a decision of the Security Council on 
any matter if it disagrees with that decision. As an agency 
responsible for the maintenance of the world peace the Security 
Council is so organized as to be able to function continuously, 
and for this purpose every member, permanent and elected, has 
to maintain a representative at the seat of the Organization who 
would be available all the time for consultations, deliberations 
and official meetings. 
The powers of the Security Council are very 
comprehensive and have been given in considerable detail in 
the Charter. These powers extend both to the use of force and 
also to the calling on member states for certain types of action. 
The Security Council alone among the organs of the United 
Nations, is specifically given authority and power to coerce. 
Through this power of coercion it was intended to be in a 
position to enforce peace. This was to be one of the great 
advantages of the United Nations over the League of Nations, 
which was considered to have been weakened in making 
decisions by the fact that it was not able to enforce them when 
made. The fate of the United Nations was to be like that of the 
League of Nations - it could hardly be otherwise - in that the 
IV 
Security Council would try persuasion in case of a dispute and 
next might try economic sanctions, but it was to have both the 
authority and power to use military sanctions - force in the 
most conventional sense. It is this power of the Security 
Council which would have a deterrent effect on any 
possible aggressor. 
Despite these extensive powers, since its inception in 
January 1946 until the end of cold war in the late eighties, the 
Security Council has been the least efficient and effective 
action agency that could be conceived. In the post-World 
War II era parting of ways by the two superpowers shattered all 
hopes of great power unity. Differences of opinions among its 
permanent members crippled the functioning of the Security 
Council and it became almost redundant. Korean case was an 
exception and was the result of an extraordinary situation. Even 
in this case the Security Council did not act in the letter and 
spirit of the Charter provisions and the United States resorted 
the cover of Council resolution for its own policy goals. 
Though the ending of cold war ushered in an era of cooperation 
among the permanent members it gave the Security Council a 
face which is very dangerous to other members of the United 
Nations. While in the cold war period it was serving none and 
harming none, in the post-cold war era it is serving one and 
harming all others. It has merely become an instrument of 
foreign policy implementation of the only remaining 
superpower - the United States. Gulf war is a glaring example. 
When President George Bush wanted to teach Saddam Husein a 
lesson and to safeguard Middle East oil, he used the fig leaf of 
the United Nations imprimatur to cover Operation Desert 
Storm. Security Council's actions against the post Gulf War 
Iraq also justify this fact. If ever the US sees any difficulty to 
achieve its goal through the Security Council it even dares to 
bypass the UN as did it in Kosovo through NATO. 
As far the composition of the Security Council is 
concerned it does not in any way reflect the present day world 
realities. The power of veto for just five members is a relic of 
immediate post-World War II days when the victors decided to 
apportion the geopolitical spoils of war among themselves. The 
world situations have changed unrecognisably since then. Most 
of the states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which were 
colonies of western powers, have got independence during this 
period and joined the United Nations. Some countries, which 
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were once big powers, have lost their status. Japan and 
Germany which were materially destroyed during the war have 
emerged as the two economic giants. Also the present structure 
of the Security Council is Europe centered. There is no voice 
for developing nations who form the majority of UN members. 
Two continents of Africa and Latin America are not 
permanently represented. All these factors demand a change in 
the structure of the Security Council to make it more 
representative and reflective of present day world realities. 
This thesis is devoted to a thorough study of the Security 
Council, its weaknesses and loopholes. It consists of six 
chapters. In the first chapter an attempt has been made to trace 
the origin of great power factor in international politics which 
resulted in the formation of the Concert of Europe, a club of 
great powers, in the nineteenth century and finally led to the 
creation of a coterie of such powers in the twentieth century 
international organizations. Thereafter highlighting the 
structure of the Council of the League of Nations which was a 
counter part of the UN Security Council in the League era a 
detailed account of the composition and structure of the 
Security Council with its voting procedure has been presented. 
vu 
In the second chapter under the functions and powers of 
the security council a general framework of the Council's main 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security 
combined with the limitations imposed on its competence under 
the principle of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction has 
been reviewed. Leaving the important powers for discussion in 
subsequent chapters, here only the less important powers 
relating to the regional agencies and trust territories and the 
implied powers, which the security council must have to 
perform its duties effectively, have been discussed. Besides, 
Security Council's other functions which it has to perform in 
addition to its primary function of maintaining international 
peace and security have also been covered. 
Chapter third deals with the powers of the Security 
Council in the field of pacific settlement of disputes. These 
powers enable the Council to solve the disputes between the 
parties peacefully and reduce the chances of escalating them 
into major wars. While acting under its powers of pacific 
settlement the security council maintains complete impartiality 
throughout its involvement. 
VllI 
Chapter fourth concentrates on the most important powers 
of the Security Council i.e., its coercive powers. They are 
related to the enforcement measures which it may employ while 
dealing with a threat to the peace, breach of the peace and acts 
of aggression. It is these powers which give the Security 
Council a prominent position among the organs of the 
United Nations. 
Fifth chapter sheds light on the peacekeeping power of 
the Security Council. Though the Charter does not specifically 
provide anywhere for peacekeeping operations, the Security 
Council has developed such a power and has effectively used it 
in containing international violence. They are said to be 
derived from the overall responsibility of the Security Council 
in maintaining international peace and security. 
Last chapter critically analyses the composition and 
powers of the Security Council as studied in the preceding 
chapters. The conclusion sums up the study. It is observed that 
the Charter provisions relating to the Security Council needs 
thorough revision for providing this body greater 
representativeness, credibility, legitimacy, authority and 
transparency. 
CH/IPTER 1 
COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
The creation of such a powerful organ as the Security 
Council within the scheme of international organizations is the 
result of the gradual development of powerful states within the 
community of states and their desire to control the affairs of 
the world in their own fashion. The nation states at their 
emergence on the world scene were in a sense as much in a 
state of nature towards each other as human communities at the 
dawn of historyV The philosophers and publicists tried to 
discover the basis of laws which should control the intercourse 
of states. As the contacts of peoples became more systematic 
with the growth of travel, customs established themselves for 
the regulation of their intercourse. Thus a body of what was 
later called "international law" grew up, partly concerned with 
mitigating the nuisance of war, partly with regulating the rights 
of one state over the subjects and ships of other states which 
came within its jurisdiction for the purposes of commerce. 
States began to keep permanent representatives at the seat of 
sovereignty of their principal neighbours. Agreements between 
them in the form of treaties multiplied, and sometimes these 
1. C.K. Webster, The League of Nations in theory and Practice, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., LOTidon, 1933, pp. 12-13. 
were multilateral and dealt with permanent problems. But down 
to the end of the eighteenth century contacts between states 
were after all but few, and affected generally only a small part 
of the inhabitants of each. 
The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution 
transformed the relations between states. The relations between 
the state and their subjects were also changed, and the power of 
the former was immensely increased. The idea of nationality 
born hundreds of years ago, was also much strengthened as the 
state became stronger, the unit of government larger, and the 
contact between people of different race and language more 
important. The art of warfare was transformed and the methods 
discovered by which great armies could be kept in being for 
long periods. Force could be concentrated and used as never 
before. 
During this revolutionary period Napoleon emerged as a 
hero on the political stage of France who led his country into a 
military might and changed the map of Europe .^ Unable to face 
the France individually, all the other principal states of Europe 
combined together to overthrow the Napoleonic Empire, which 
2. . Ibid. 13. 
had been the first state able to utilize the new administrative 
and military organization because it was the house of 
Revolution and commanded the genius of Napoleon himself. 
It was in the course of this struggle when new distinction 
between states was first consciously recognized - that between 
Great and Small powers. Inequalities had, of course, always 
been in existence, but it was only after the new control over the 
resources of the states that made the difference in military 
strength so marked that the term 'Great Powers' arose. By the 
end of Napoleonic wars these had attained so commanding a 
position that they took the reconstruction of Europe in their 
own hands. The smaller powers were excluded from their 
deliberations, and were forced to accept the decisions made by 
the Greats^. 
The Congress of Vienna in 1815 was convoked to lay the 
diplomatic foundations for a new European order upon the 
ruins, which had been created by the disastrous Napolaonic 
wars. It was conceived by its leading participants as the 
forerunner of a series of regular consultations among the great 
powers which would serve as board meetings for the European 
3. Ibid. 16. 
community of nations. It initiated a series of conferences. Four 
major conferences were held between 1815 and 1827. These 
brought the differences in policy and objective among great 
powers to the fore and revealed the fact that Europe was not 
ready for institutionalized management .^ Nevertheless, the 
technique of diplomacy had been changed from bilateral to 
multilateral. The last coalition against Napoleon - the 
European Alliance developed into a post war alliance of the 
four great powers and known as the Quadrupple Alliance. It 
contained a reference to the functions of great powers to take 
measures "for the maintenance of peace of Europe.'" A 
conception of European solidarity of a community of nations 
took root in the nineteenth century and found its expression in 
the operative agency of the Concert of Europe. The Concert 
system gave Europe for the first time since the rise of nation 
states, something imperfectly resembling an international 
parliament, which undertook to deal by collective action with 
current problems. It was a system of de facto great power 
hegemony, which met sporadically some thirty times in the 
course of the century. 
4. Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, Randnn House, New York, 1963, p. 24. 
5. Gerard J. Mangone, A Short History of International Organisation, McChaw Hill, 
New York, 1954, p. 64. 
This development involved a great deal more than the 
mere multiplication of multilateral convocations. A major 
feature of unsystematic system was the frank assumption of a 
special status and responsibilities by the most powerful states. 
The term "Great Powers" took on a definite meaning and 
became something like a formally established category. The 
Concert of Europe was an exclusive club for great powers 
whose members were self appointed guardians of European 
community and executive directors of its affairs. They 
sometimes admitted European small fry (like the non-
permanent members of today's UN Security Council) to their 
splendid presence. No doubt the Concert of Europe was in fact 
a Concert of the Great Powers*. This hegemony of the powerful 
had its seamy side as all dictatorships must. If it is true of 
individuals, it is surely even more true of states, that 
possession of extraordinary power and authority leads to abuse 
and selfish exploitation^. 
The functions which the Concert presumed to exercise on 
behalf of Europe point to a major aspect of the developing 
nineteenth century system. Multilateral conferences became 
6. Claude, op. cit. p. 24. 
7. Ibid. p. 24. 
something more than peace conferences in the traditional 
sense- meetings of statesmen to conclude wars and agree upon 
treaties of peace. The occasions and purposes of consultations, 
and the subject matter of discussions, became more varied. The 
numerous conferences which were held were concerned with 
the maintenance of existing peaceful conditions, the 
substitution of pacific for violent methods of manipulating the 
balance of power, the agreement upon ground rules for playing 
competitive game of imperialism, and the formulation of 
general international legislation applicable to the ordinary 
relations of states. It was this type of multilateral negotiation 
and decision making which permits one to say that "more than 
anything - the Concert system laid the ground work for the 
creation of the executive organ in international organisations", 
which eventuated in the League of Nations' and the United 
Nations' Councils*. 
League of Nations' Council 
The Council of the League was a new edition though 
significantly revised of the Concert of Europe'. The great 
8. Stephen Goodspeed, JTte Nature and Function of International Organisations, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2nd ed. 1967, p. 28. 
9. Claude, q). cit. p. 45. 
power hegemony of the Concert system had left such an 
indelible mark on the world affairs that after all no scheme of 
international governance could be thought of without providing 
them a special and privileged position. General Smuts who first 
gave the idea of a League of Nations a concrete shape in his 
famous Memorandum of December 16, 1918, advocated a 
general conference of representatives of all states members 
meeting at regular intervals in which international affairs 
should be publicly discussed and a smaller executive body for 
the administrative duties of his scheme which should meet 
frequently. This provided the germ for the Assembly and the 
Council of the League.*° Smuts suggested that while in the 
larger body - the conceived assembly - all the powers great 
and small, would have equality, in the executive body - the 
conceived Council - the small powers should be represented 
only by a number chosen from among themselves with the five 
Great Powers who would be permanently represented there. 
This great paper made deep impression on both Lord 
Cecil and President Wilson who are considered to be the 
architects of the League. The former whom the British Cabinet 
10 C.K. Webster, op. cit. p. 36. 
entrusted the work of preparing the League of Nations draft 
incorporated a number of Smuts' ideas especially that of an 
executive Council. Unlike the Smuts he, however, wished it to 
be composed of the Great Powers only. He advocated this 
restriction so that the Council might be at once a reality, being 
representative of those powers which had the main 
responsibility for world peace, and the resources necessary to 
maintain it. 
President Wilson who was already engaged in mustering 
support for the formation of his dream League, when began to 
redraft his own scheme in Paris, also accepted many of Smuts' 
ideas. He was quite ready not only to have a Council, but also 
to admit the small powers to it. After Lord Cecil and President 
Wilson had discussed their differences on this point, it was 
agreed that four of the smaller powers to be elected by the 
Assembly should be represented on the Council. Since the 
Great Powers represented were expected to be five - the United 
States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan - the small powers 
would thus be in a minority of one. Later on, this was 
incorporated into the Covenant of the League. 
The hegemony of powerful few was, thus, strongly 
reflected in the preliminary planning for the League. Their 
nostalgic recollections focussed on the Concert of Europe, not 
on the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907." At the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919, the principal Allied and Associated 
Powers dominated the show and forced the plan of the League 
of Nations to be an integral part of the peace treaties. Having 
won the war, they had the power, the prestige, and the 
inclination to determine the shape of the new regime. Their 
conception of a world organisation effectively under 
oligarchical direction and control was reflected in the Covenant 
provision for permanent membership of five Great Powers in 
the nine member Council. They asserted the right to make the 
settlement and assumed the responsibility to dominate the 
future course of events. 
Although the original size of the League Council as 
envisaged by the Covenant was to be five permanent and four 
non-permanent elected members, the defection of the United 
States produced an equal balance between the two categories. 
This was the minimum size of the Council throughout its 
11. Claude, op. cit. p. 53. 
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history.'^ Anticipating the need for the expansion of the 
Council in future, a clause was introduced to the Covenant to 
allow of other states being given permanent seat on the 
Council. Provision was also made for an increase in the number 
of elected seats for the smaller powers, apparently with the 
idea of maintaining the balance if the number of permanent 
members in the Council was increased. 
Demands immediately arose for an increase in the number 
of seats and rotation of place after a term of years. The first 
demand was provided for in the Covenant and in 1922 two 
places were added. Sweden and Uruguay were added to the 
other four states. But it was found, impossible to fulfil the 
second demand without an amendment to the Covenant. After 
resolutions in favour of rotation had been carried, an 
amendment enabling the Assembly to fix the term of office and 
the regulation for re-election was passed unanimously. But 
before it could come into effect it needed ratification by all the 
powers on the Council which France and Spain failed to give. 
In 1926, at the time of Germany's admission to the 
League, the re-organisation of the Council became necessary 
12. A. LeRoy Bennet, International Organisations: Principles and Issues, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey, 1994, P.31. 
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for giving her a permanent seat which he naturally expected 
and for which the Covenant had established the procedure. But 
when the matter actually came before the Council, Brazil 
vetoed the proposal of giving Germany permanent seat due to 
her personal ambition. This led to a deadlock. The Council 
therefore, appointed a Committee of the states members of it to 
which were added representatives of China, Poland, Argentina 
and Switzerland. The Committee after deliberation, submitted a 
plan to the Council which was ultimately adopted by it and 
subsequently by the Assembly. By this scheme Germany alone 
was to receive a permanent seat. But the number of non-
permanent seats on the Council were to be increased to nine, 
the period of office being three years after which for three 
years the holder was ineligible for re-election. By this means 
the rotation of office was received. But a number not exceeding 
three of the holders of the seats could be declared re-eligible 
by a two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly, thus creating 
what might be termed "semi-permanent" seat.*' The larger 
secondary powers would by this means be able to retain their 
seats on the Council so long as they retained the confidence of 
13. C.K. Webster, op. cit. P. 86. 
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the Assembly. By this means it was hoped to keep them in the 
League while at the same time avoiding the creation of 
permanent seats which could never be taken away from them. 
This satisfied nearly all the members of the League excepting 
Brazil and Spain who refused to accept the compromise and 
withdrew from the League, though the latter returned within 
two years. A number of small powers were also critical, 
disliking both the large increase of seats and the creation of the 
semi-permanent seats. But all the Great Powers and the vast 
majority of small powers accepted the scheme, which was 
easily passed with only some alterations in detail through both 
the Council and the Assembly. 
Thus Germany was unanimously elected to the League 
and to a permanent seat on the Council. Soviet Union was 
identically treated in 1934. The increase of members enabled 
the Council to represent the states of the world much more 
completely. Excepting the fact that there was no representative 
of the United States, the Council had thus at last become the 
machine it was meant to be by the founders. 
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United Nations Security Council 
The influence of past developments in international 
organisation is clearly evident in the United Nations system. 
The major structural outlines which had been evolved in the 
nineteenth century are transmitted to the United Nations 
through the League of Nations with some advances and 
modifications in organisational principles worked out in the 
League's own experience. The concept of the Concert of Great 
Powers and its embodiment in the League Council as discussed 
in the preceding paragraphs could not be overlooked. From the 
start the thinking of the architects of the United Nations 
revolved around this concept. The successful prosecution of 
war had depended on a continuous harmonization of Great 
Powers policies. It seemed only logical, therefore, to build any 
permanent organisation for peace and security upon the same 
cornerstone. Furthermore the requirements of international 
peace and security demanded the collaboration of the military 
giants. The experience of war time cooperation among Great 
Powers offered a potential basis for the creation of the 
coalition of powers which was essential for the future success 
of the United Nations. 
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With this background the United Nations was erected 
upon the fundamental assumption of Great Power unity, an 
assumption which was expressed in the Charter by provisions 
elaborately setting forth special responsibilities and privileges 
for the Big Five.*'* The notion that the future structure of world 
order should rest upon such a foundation prevailed without 
serious challenge throughout the war years. The great three of 
the Allied block, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin held in their 
hands the mighty forces needed to win the war and they could 
not conceive that the unity of their nations would be less 
indispensable as the basis for a peace preserving organisation 
than it had been as the foundation of a war winning coalition. 
Co-opting France and China as formally equal members of the 
international elite, the Great Powers put themselves forward as 
the corporate nucleus of the United Nations.*' No aspect of the 
United Nations has been more subjected to criticism than this 
basic premise of great power unity and its ramifications. In the 
first place, the adoption of Big Five unity as the foundation 
stone has sometimes been regarded as a cynical device to foist 
an international oligarchy upon the rank and file of the United 
14. Articles 24,26,27,108, of UN Charter. 
15. Claude. Op. cit. p. 80. 
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Nations. Instead of accepting international democracy, the 
giants of the earth conspired to establish themselves to global 
dictators. This accusation is not out of truth. Certainly 
innumerable quotations can be adduced to prove that the war 
time leaders of the major powers were resolved to dominate 
post war international decisions and events, and that they were 
impatient of interference by representatives of small states.*' 
Thus the Great Powers were keenly aware of their 
corporate indispensability and were inclined to make the most 
of it. They had functioned as a kind of global executive 
committee in preparing the blue prints for adoption at San 
Francisco and they continued in this role at the Conference. 
Although formal equality and two-thirds voting rule prevailed, 
the informal collegium of the Big Five operating behind the 
scene at San Francisco, had the ultimate decisive voice in the 
structuring of various organs and the formulation of the Charter 
of the United Nations. In the final, the great powers left their 
imprint upon the Charter by negotiating compromises among 
themselves as much as by handling down to their less potent 
allies. The policy of compromises and dictates followed by the 
16. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Harper Publications, New York, 
1948, pp. 710-712. 
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Big Powers, specially the US and the UK, was deliberate 
because they wanted to capitalize on the close association of 
the ideologically hostile Soviet Union, which had been 
assiduously forged during the Second World War. War time 
alliances have a general tendency to come apart with the 
disappearance of a common enemy.*^ The San Francisco 
Conference was timed to take full advantage of the war time 
unity among the Allies and to avoid the history of the League 
of Nations, whose fate was linked with the peace treaty of 
Versailles. Instead of linking up the United Nations with future 
post war treaties, it was decided to set up a new organisation 
though the new organisation was not so completely new. 
Nevertheless the big powers, which dominated both the 
war effort against the Axis and planning for an international 
organisation created the Security Council the prototype of the 
Council of the League of Nations. They visualized it as the 
paramount organ of the United Nations and gave it a shape 
most suitable for the realisation of their dream of future world 
domination. The Security Council originally consisted of 
eleven members with the Republic of China, France, the Soviet 
17. Rai Singh, Historical Background for change in United Nations, India Quarterly, 
i^r-Sq). 1995. Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, p. 6.. 
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Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom and the United States 
having permanent membership and six non-permanent members 
elected by the General Assembly. Later on, when the strength 
of the Security Council was enlarged to fifteen by an 
amendment to the Chanter adopted in 1965, the number of 
permanent members remained the same but the number of non-
permanent members was increased to ten.*' The Republic of 
China was replaced by the Peoples Republic of China in 1971 
and the Soviet Union by Russia in 1991. For the election of 
non-permanent members the Charter provides that due regard 
should be paid to the contribution of members of the United 
Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security 
and to the other purposes of the organisation and also to 
equitable geographical distribution.*' This is a requirement 
which seeks to assure eventual representation to all states that 
are members of the organisation. The decision as to whether 
these criteria are followed is left solely to the General 
Assembly which has determined its selections more on the basis 
of geographical and other representations in all these years 
than on the character of a member's contribution to the United 
18. UN Yearbook, 1965, p.288. 
19. Article 23. 
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Nations' purposes. As per non-Charter agreements and rules ten 
elective seats are distributed as follows: five for Africa and 
Asia, two for Latin America, one for Eastern Europe, and two 
for Western Europe and other states including Australia, 
Canada and Newzealand. 
The non-permanent members are to be elected for a 
period of two years and they are not eligible for immediate re-
election. Half of these members retire every alternate year. 
The Security Council came into existence when the 
General Assembly elected the non-permanent members on 
January 12, 1946. At its first meeting held in London on 
January 17, the Council adopted the Provisional rules of 
procedure which had been drafted by the Preparatory 
Commission. The Council appointed a Committee to formulate 
the rules and procedures to be followed in its further meetings. 
This Committee worked on the rules until June 1946 and 
whenever it recommended changes were approved. 
The Security Council has been organised in a manner as 
to be able to function continuously. Every country elected to 
the Security Council has to maintain a representative who is 
available twenty-four hours a day throughout the year. The 
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reason is that, if there is a breach of the peace anywhere in the 
world, involving actual fighting the Council can be seized of 
the matter immediately and a meeting of the Council can be 
called at very short notice. The rules of the Security Council 
require meetings of the Council at intervals of no more than 
fourteen days, but this rule is not strictly adhered by common 
consent. The frequency of meetings is pragmatically 
determined by such considerations as the existence of disputes 
and threatening situations, the willingness of the states to bring 
these situations before the Security Council, and the nature of 
the dispute and parties involved in relation to any prospects for 
the Security Council to contribute to the resolution of the 
controversy or to provide a propaganda advantage for any state 
or group of states. 
The principal officer of the Security Council is the 
President who, rather than being elected, is appointed monthly, 
in rotation, according to English alphabetical order, thus giving 
each member of the Council (non-permanent as well as 
permanent) a chance to hold the Presidency. The President's 
function range from arranging meetings on his own initiative or 
upon the request of the Secretary General or the Council. 
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Meetings must also be convened by the President when a 
dispiite is brought to the attention of the Council by the 
General Assembly or a member state. 
There are also provisions for participation in the Security 
Council's discussions by states other than permanent and non-
permanent members. The Charter provides that any member of 
the United Nations which is not a member of the Security 
Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any 
question brought before the Security Council whenever the 
latter considers that the interest of that member are specially 
effected. It also provides that a member state or a 
non-member state, if it is a party to a dispute being considered 
by the Security Council, is to be invited to participate without 
vote in the discussions concerning the dispute. The Security 
Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the 
participation of non-members of th€ United Nations.^^ 
Voting Procedure in the Security Council 
The question of voting in the Security Council had 
20. S.D. Bailey, The Procedure of the U.N Security Council, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
2"^ed., 1988,pp.20-22. 
21. Article 31. 
22. Article 32. 
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engaged a lengthy discussion before any agreed formula could 
be reached. This was the single most vexed matter on which the 
conferees at Dambarton Oaks had not been able to reach any 
agreement. Although all the participants did favour the giving 
up of the requirement of unanimity of all members that had 
been observed in the League Council, except among the 
permanent members, differences of opinion persisted as to the 
minimum number of votes required for adopting decisions by 
the Council and the extent of applying the unanimity of 
permanent members. While the Soviet Union suggested a 
simple majority, the United Kingdom favoured a two-third 
majority. The United States was willing for either proposal. 
Also these three powers accepted the need for the unanimity of 
the permanent members on substantive issues to be adopted by 
the Council but they held different views on the question as to 
whether the permanent members should be permitted to vote on 
disputes in which they are directly involved. The British 
delegation maintained that a party to a dispute, whether a 
permanent member or not, should abstain from voting in the 
Council. The Chinese delegation also held the same view. The 
Soviet Union insisted that members should not be debarred 
from voting on any matter whatsoever. The American 
22 
delegation also suggested that the votes of the parties, 
including the great powers to a dispute before the Council 
should not be counted in its decisions on such cases. But later 
President Roosevelt contended this opinion by raising the 
question of the extent of abstention from voting by a party to a 
dispute in the Council. He observed that there was some 
confusion as to whether this abstention from voting should 
apply only to the pacific settlement of disputes, or should apply 
also to the enforcement action. It was doubtful whether the 
United States could have accepted a voting procedure through 
which its military contingents could be commissioned for 
action by the Council without its consent.^^ At the same time, 
he pointed out that public opinion would not have appreciated 
American delegation at Dambarton Oaks, if it permitted an 
alleged violator of law to be a judge in its own case.^^ 
When President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and 
Marshal Stalin came together at Yalta in February 1945, 
President Roosevelt proposed a compromise formula and 
expressed his belief that it would be possible for the world to 
23. M.V. Subbarao, The Use of Veto, New Heights, New Delhi, 1974, P. 10. 
24. Dwight E. Lee, The Genesis of Veto, International Organisation, Vol. 1, 1947, p.36. 
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have peace for fifty years even if not for eternity.** The 
formula provided that parties to a dispute should abstain from 
voting in those decisions of the Council which relate to the 
investigation of disputes, to appeals by the Council for 
peaceful settlement of disputes, and to the recommendations by 
the Council as to methods and procedures of settlement. It 
retained the unanimity rule for decisions relating to the 
determination of the existence of threats to the peace or 
breaches of the peace and to the suppression of such threats and 
breaches. Churchill expressed his complete satisfaction with 
the Roosevelt's proposal and both together succeeded in 
winning Marshal Stalin to the compromise formula. 
The voting formula in the Security Council which was 
discussed at Dambarton Oaks and hammered out in Yalta was 
inserted into the Charter of the United Nations in San 
Francisco. Article 27 of the Charter reads: 
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of mine. 
25. Herbert Fies, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace 
Treaty Sought, New Jersey, 1957, PP.552-553. 
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3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members 
provided that, in decisions under chapter VI, and under 
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall 
abstain from voting. 
Though the much talked "veto" has, nowhere, appeared in 
this Article, it is at paragraph three that this "veto" operates. A 
veto is described as the use of a negative vote by a permanent 
member to prevent the adoption of a proposal which has 
received the required number of affirmative votes.^* A 
permanent member of the Security Council can therefore block 
a decision on any point of substance which is distasteful to 
him, except that it, like ordinary members of the Council, must 
refrain from voting when the Council considers the possible 
means of peaceful settlement of disputes to which it is a party. 
In general, the veto power applies to pacific settlement as well 
as enforcement measures to maintain peace under Chapter VII. 
A great power can veto a proposal for enforcement action even 
if it is directed against itself. A particular great power is 
26. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and 
Documents, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964, p.227. 
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debarred from using its veto only if it is directly involved in a 
dispute which is the subject of peaceful settlement efforts, and 
even in that case the veto power of the other permanent 
members remains effective. A great power can use its right of 
veto to frustrate either pacific settlement or more drastic action 
in cases involving its friends, allies, or satellites.'^ In other 
words it is unlikely that any enforcement action can be taken 
against any of the permanent members or any other state 
securing their support. 
This "veto power" has been fiercely criticized ever since 
it was agreed upon by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at the 
Yalta Conference in 1945. It was attacked at San Francisco, 
during the General Assembly's London debate and in some of 
the earliest meetings of the Security Council itself. The central 
theory behind the right of veto is that since the permanent 
members as Great Powers naturally bear the main burden of 
responsibility for maintaining peace and security, no permanent 
member should be compelled by a vote of the Security Council 
to follow a course of action with which it disagrees.'* 
27. Claude,op. cit.. P.144. 
28. J.G.Starice, Introduction to International Law, Aditya Books Pvt. Ltd. 10* ed. 
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Justifying the right of veto it was pointed out that the Big Five 
have the responsibility of preventing any future aggression, and 
their armed forces would be the Security Council's real 
weapon; that these powers would not adhere to the Security 
Council's resolution, if they were thereby liable to lose control 
of their armed forces, and that it is essential to the very 
existence of the United Nations that the Great Powers should 
not leave it as they left the League. It's opponents contended 
that the veto gives the Powers an implicit right to violate the 
Charter when they please and protects them from the 
consequences. ^' 
Moreover the decision regarding the preliminary question 
as to whether a matter is procedural and thus not subject to 
veto requires the vote of nine members including the 
concurrent vote of five permanent members. It means that a 
permanent member can prevent any matter to be classified as 
procedural. Here comes the concept of "doble veto". The rule 
that a permanent member can prevent a matter from being 
designated as procedural means that anything is vetoable which 
29. Andrew Boyd, The United Nations Organisation: A Handbook, The Pilot Press 
Ltd., London, 1946, P.66. 
27 
a great power wishes to veto"*". This permits the indefinite 
extension of the capacity of negation assigned to the permanent 
members which is open to abuse. 
However there is a way out. The President of the Council 
has the power to rule whether a matter is procedural or not and 
the President's ruling stands unless reversed by a majority of 
nine members. In this way the double veto can be bypassed. In 
1950, on a proposal to invite the Communist Chinese 
authorities to sit in on a discussion of the Formosa question, 
the President declared the proposal adopted even though a 
permanent member (Republic of China) voted against it. The 
Chinese representative claimed that its negative vote had 
constituted a veto, as the question was one of substance. The 
President then asked the Council to vote on the question 
whether the matter was procedural. It was voted 9 to 1 
(Republic of China) with one abstention. At this point the 
Chinese representative alleged that he had completed the 
double veto maneouver. But the President ruled that the second 
vote had established the procedural, non vetoable nature of the 
first question. China's cause was lost, as the President's ruling 
30. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit. p. 227. 
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could only be reversed by an affirmative vote of seven 
members which was not possible in that situation. Great care, 
however, is to be taken by the President while giving his ruling 
because all the Big Powers want to retain veto power and 
misuse of the power by the President may undermine the 
principle of Great Power harmony upon which the Council and 
the Charter is based.'^ 
There has been a tendency in the Security Council to 
squeeze rather than to expand the scope of the veto power. For 
example, the Charter is silent on the question whether the 
abstention by a permanent member on decisions other than 
those under Chapter VI and paragraph 3 of Article 52 would 
constitute a veto. But the Security Council established the 
principle that the abstention of a great power should not 
constitute a veto. This usage has been accepted by all the Big 
Five despite the fact that a strict interpretation of the Charter 
would have required the positive concurrence rather than mere 
acquiescence signified by abstention of the permanent members 
for a Security Council decision on matters of substance. 
31 D.W. Greig, International Law Butterworths, London, 1970, p.544. 
29 
In addition, the Council has adopted the proposition that 
the absence of a great power is analogous to abstention and 
therefore does not have the effect of veto. This occurred at the 
time of Korean crisis in 1950 when the Soviet Representative 
was absent for a period of seven months in protest against the 
seating of Nationalist China, and a number of important 
decisions were taken by the Security Council that were 
undoubtedly non-procedural and came under the provisions of 
Chapter VII, and on which the Soviet Union must have used its 
veto if it had been present. 
Under the Statement of Interpretation at San Francisco 
the states have the right to bring a dispute or situation 
threatening the peace to the attention of the Security Council. 
The veto did not apply to Council decisions to consider and 
discuss matters brought to its attention and to decisions 
inviting parties to dispute to be heard. But under the "theory of 
chain of events" as advanced by the Statement the Council is 
debarred from deciding to conduct an investigation or to settle 
differences or make recommendations to the parties save with 
the concurrence of the permanent members read with the 
important proviso for abstention from voting by parties to a 
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dispute.'^ It is based on the assumption that beyond permitting 
the freedom of discussion, the decisions and actions of the 
Security Council might obligate to take enforcement action, 
and that such action must naturally attract the right of veto. 
32. M.V. Subbarao, op. cit. pp.27-28. 
CHAPTER 2 
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL 
The basic philosophy underlying the United Nations 
Charter is that every effort should be made to maintain peace 
and security. An obvious corollary is that whenever 
disagreements between states threaten to become explosive and 
to endanger peace, the United Nations must step in and diffuse 
the situation. This of course implies that the organisation must 
always watch out for possible cracks in the fragile edifice of 
peace. Put in another way the United Nations must concern 
itself with any dispute which although not posing an immediate 
threat to peace, but might develop into a clash such as could 
jeopardise peaceful relations in the future. The field of action 
of the organisation is thus become very broad, for any 
disagreement may escalate into a major conflict, except a very 
minor and peripheral ones. The novelty of the Charter system is 
aptly stressed by Ross in these words: "the essence of the 
Charter, the point where it breaks with the role of traditional 
international law, is that it establishes the principle that every 
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, is a public 
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matter, so whether the parties wish it or not, they must accept 
the fact that the dispute may be debated in the Security Council 
or the General Assembly, if that organs consider such debate to 
be in the interest of peace. Though the parties are not obliged 
to seek the assistance of the organisation but they are obliged 
to put up with its intervention"*. 
The United Nations system largely closed the gaps, in so 
far as formal security arrangements is concerned. The phrase 
"international peace and security" occurs not once, but 32 times 
in the Charter. Moreover the pharase international peace and 
security under the United Nations Charter is to be understood 
as meaning by "peace" the whole positive state of cooperation 
in every form of peaceful activity, political, economic, social 
or cultural and by "security" the not less essential, though in a 
sense negative conditions of freedom from fear of aggression. 
It must, however, be understood that the security of the 
individual members of the United Nations will depend, not 
simply on the special arrangements which the Charter provides 
for dealing with possible or actual threats to the peace, but also 
and above all on the maintenance and development of the 
1. Cited in Antonio Casses, International Law in a Divided World, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, PP. 207 - 208. 
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organisation as a whole. For example, the provisions for 
economic and social cooperation are based on the principle that 
conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for 
peaceful relations among nations^. 
The Security Council is the central and most powerful 
organ of the United Nations. Throughout the complex great 
power negotiation which led to the Conference at San Francisco 
the emphasis was on this particular body within the United 
Nations. Unlike the Covenant of the League which, instead of 
delineating the spheres of responsibility of the Assembly and 
the Council, authorized both to deal with any matter within the 
sphere of action of the League and affecting the peace of the 
world, the Charter demarcates more precisely the functions and 
responsibilities of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council. Under the principle of separation of powers the 
Charter entrusted the Security Council mainly with the political 
and security affairs and made the General Assembly 
responsible for the remaining subjects.^ This does not mean 
that the General Assembly has nothing to do with peace 
2. B.N. Mehrish, The Concept of Peace in UN Charter, in Sunesh 
Juyal and B. Ramesh Basu (eds.). International Organisation and 
World Peace, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1990, P. 92. 
3. Rai Singh: A Historical Perspective for Change in United Nations, 
India Quarterly, Apr-Sep. 1995, Indian Council of World Affairs, 
New Delhi, P. 7. 
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maintenance. It has powers of discussion and recommendation 
in regard to the subject, but its role is only a subsidiary one 
and the main burden falls on the Security Council. The Charter 
grants very comprehensive powers to enable it to fulfill that 
role. Besides, the Security Council has several secondary 
functions which it performs either exclusively or concurrently 
with the General Assembly. 
Maintenance of Peace and Security 
The primary goal of the United Nations is the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the 
Security Council has been given the specific responsibility to 
achieve this goal and the members of the organisation has 
entrusted it with the authority to act, 'in this respect, on their 
behalf. Article 24(1) states that "in order to ensure prompt and 
effective action by the United Nations, the members confer on 
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security". The members also have 
agreed that the Council shall act on their behalf in carrying out 
its duties under this responsibility. Article 24(2) stipulates that 
"the Security Council shall carry out its functions in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter". 
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Since in law rights correlate with duties, the Security Council 
must exercise its powers in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the organisation/ It is further stated that the 
'specific powers' granted to the Security Council to enable it to 
discharge these duties have been given in Chapters VI, VII, 
VIII and XII. 
The powers of the Security Council under Chapter VI and 
VII relates to pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement 
measures respectively and will be dealt with extensively in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. Powers under Chapter XII is 
related to the administration of the strategic areas in the trust 
territories. With the termination of the last remaining Trust 
Territory of Pacific Island in 1994, this power is now of no 
relevance. Chapter VIII deals with the Security Council's power 
in connection with the regional arrangements. Under its power 
under this Chapter the Security Council may utilize the services 
of regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action 
under its authority as it did in Bosmia-Herzegovina and utilized 
the services of NATO and OSCE. However no enforcement 
action can be taken by any regional agency without prior 
4. R. Narayan Rao, Article 40 of the UN Charter, Indian Journal of 
International Lav (IJIL\, Vol. 37, 1997, P. 63. 
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authorization of the Security Council.' In this way the action 
taken recently by NATO in Kosovo was a blatant violation of 
the Charter provisions as no prior permission of the Security 
Council was existed. 
The distinctive feature between the Council of the League 
and the Security Council is the latter's power of making a 
decision which would be binding upon members. Article 25 
provides that "the members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with te present Charter". 
It is clear that these provisions confer on the Security 
Council powers which for exceed those possessed by any of the 
organs of the League, or by any of the other organs of the 
United Nations. They are powers greater than have ever before 
been exercised by any international body, and they constitute 
the most far reaching of the innovations which the Charter has 
introduced into the international organisation. 
Whether the Security Council for the discharge of its 
duties relating to maintenance of international peace and 
security is only granted those powers which are expressly 
Article 53. 
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mentioned in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII, or whether it had 
further competencies not expressly mentioned in the Charter 
but necessary for the discharge of its functions, was a matter of 
controversy in the beginning. But the practice of the Security 
Council in later years and its gradual assumption of new 
responsibilities and adoption of new techniques like 
peacekeeping operations for maintaining peace proved that the 
authority of the Council is not restricted to its expressly 
mentioned powers. 
This question arose as early as 1946 when in the Free 
Territory of Trieste case the Security Council was called upon 
to assume certain responsibilities for which no specific 
authorisation was to be found in the Charter. Article 2 of the 
Permanent Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste, which was 
annexed to the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty, provided that the 
integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste 
should be assured by the Security Council of the United 
Nations. The Statute also authorised the Security Council to 
appoint a Governor, who would have the status of Council's 
representative, and would have extensive administrative and 
legislative powers. 
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Following a request for the adoption of the 
responsibilities entrusted thus, the matter came up for 
discussion in the Security Council. Some delegates pointed out 
that the Charter provides no specific authority to enable the 
Council to undertake such governmental functions or to ensure 
the integrity and independence of a state. On the other hand the 
Secretariat, which was called upon to clarify the constitutional 
position in a legal memorandum, gave its opinion that the 
words "primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security" constitute a grant of power 
sufficiently wide to enable the Security Council to approve the 
documents in question and to assume the responsibilities 
arising therefrom.' 
However, a majority believed that inspite of the lack of 
specific provision in the Charter enabling the Council to 
assume such responsibility Article 24 is broad enough to 
embrace the desired power. Further it was said that the Council 
should act on the basis of the spirit of the Charter, rather than 
on a definite provision. Ultimately the Council approved 
6. Rahmatullah Khan, Implied Powers of the United Nations, Vikas 
Publications, New Delhi, 1970, P.6. 
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annexes embodying the status of Trieste, thereby accepting the 
responsibilities devolving upon it under them. 
This case brought to light the latent potentialities of the 
Security Council and its powers by implication. The Secretariat 
memo that the responsibility to maintain peace and security 
carried with it powers to discharge this responsibility is 
important in this regard. However, this power is not unlimited, 
but subject to the purposes and principles of the Charter. In 
other words, the peace maintaining powers of the Security 
Council are limited only by purposes and principles of the 
Charter. 
The idea of attributing powers by implication over and 
above those specified or expressed received authoritative 
sanction from the International Court of Justice in the 
Reparation case. In this case the Court emphatically affirmed 
that "under international law, the United Nations must be 
deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly 
provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary 
implication as being essential for the performance of its 
duties"" 
7. Ibid. P.7. 
8. ICJ Reports, 1949, P. 182. 
40 
In the Namibian case, it was contended by South Africa 
that there was no constitutional basis for the Council to declare 
the continued presence of the South African authorities in 
South West Africa (now Namibia) as illegal and that the 
Council resolutions are void. The International Court of Justice 
pointed out that from the text of resolutions of the Security 
Council, which it adopted in the exercise of what is deemed to 
be its primary responsibility, the maintenance of international 
peace and security, which under the Charter, embraces 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, followed 
that Article 24 of the Charter vests in the Security Council 
necessary authority to take action such as in this case.' 
Thus the enumeration of the specific powers under 
Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII, which are granted to the 
Security Council by Art. 24(2) for the discharge of its duties is 
not exhaustive, and the Security Council has general overriding 
powers for maintaining peace and security, not limited to the 
express powers. Like other international organs, it has such 
implied powers as are necessary and requisite for the proper 
9. Samar Sen, United Nations and the Global Challenge, Krishna 
Publications, New Delhi, 1996, P. 128. 
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fulfillment of its functions.^'^ The Security Council's action in 
the Congo crisis is also an example. In the case of Congo 
situation (1960-64), the Council's action was without 
precedent. It resulted in the despatch of a United Nations Force 
to the newly independent Congo, not by way specifically of 
enforcement action against a state under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, but as military assistance for the purpose of preserving 
law and order in relation to, and pending the withdrawal of 
Belgian troops. After the Beligian troops had been withdrawn, 
the United Nations Force was maintained in the Congo for the 
same purpose, and more particularly in order to prevent the 
occurrence of civil war and to reduce inter-tribal fighting. 
Primary responsibility for carrying out the Security Council's 
mandate fell upon the Secretary General. The basis of Security 
Council's action was primarily that the internal strife in the 
Congo might, in the absence of such action, deteriorate into a 
threat to international peace. Thus, it would seem, although this 
is not undoubted, that the Security Council may authorise 
measures with a view to maintaining international peace and 
security, notwithstanding that these measures do not strictly 
10. J.G. Starke, op.cit., P.646. 
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fall within the pattern of enforcement action under Chapter VII, 
and without the necessity of explicit adherence to the 
procedural requirements of the provisions in the Charter.** 
Also the granting of 'specific powers' logically 
presupposes that the organ holding such specific powers also 
has general ones. Furthermore, the competencies of the 
Security Council which are related to the maintenance of peace 
are also described in other articles which shows that the listing 
of powers in Article 24(2) can not be meant to be a final one. 
For example. Article 12(1) - requesting the General Assembly 
to make a recommendation in a dispute with which the Security 
Council is involved. Article 26 - a mandate for the elaboration 
of a system of arms control, and Article 94(2) - concerning the 
enforcement of judgements of the International Court of 
Justice. A restriction on the powers of the Security Council 
based on Article 24(2) is not compatible with the fact that the 
Security Council is charged with the primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of peace and security, and would run counter 
to the purposes of the United Nations Charter. The Security 
Council as the primarily responsible political organ must be 
accorded the widest possible discretion to take prompt and 
11. Ibid. PP.652-653. 
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effective measures for the maintenance of peace. Article 24(1) 
conferring upon the Security Council this responsibility, 
therefore, serves as the basis for comprehensive powers for the 
Security Council, going beyond the enumeration in Article 
24(2) and thereby fulfils the functions of closing any gaps in 
the provision of powers for the Security Council which might 
otherwise exist, considering wide range of tasks to be 
undertaken by the Security Council. 
As to the competence of the Security Council one more 
question arises whether the Security Council's jurisdiction is 
limited by Article 2(4). This Article states that "all members of 
the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". The 
above principle is related mainly with one of the purposes of 
the United Nations, i.e. maintenance of international peace and 
security. This prohibition on the use of force or threat thereof 
by the states in their international relations makes one hope 
that international peace will be maintained effectively, because 
12. Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, PP.403-404. 
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use of force or threat thereof by a state is likely to lead to 
armed conflict, and in that case international peace is virtually 
threatened. 
The 'force' the use or threat of which is here forbidden is 
armed force which is mentioned in the Preamble to the Charter 
where it is expressly stated that one of its aim is to ensure by 
the acceptance of principles, and the institutions of methods, 
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest. 
Nevertheless, Article 2(4) covers resort to force only in 
international relations against another state and does not touch 
a state's legal right to use armed force for the suppression of 
internal disturbances." 
Since Article 2(4) purports to control the use of force by 
stating a norm of international law to which states must 
conform, and the Security Council is concerned with 
maintaining international peace by taking action against states 
using force in contravention of Article 2(4); a corelation 
between this Article and the competence of the Security 
Council can be established. There is a direct relationship 
between threat or use of force under Article 2(4) and a threat to 
13. Brierly, The Law of Nations, Clarendon Press Oxford, e"" ed. 1976, 
P.415. 
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the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under 
Article 39. In other words threat of force corresponds with 
threat to the peace and use of force is equivalent to a breach of 
the peace and act of aggression. However, the competence of 
the Security Council can not be limited only with actual or 
potential breaches of Article 2(4). The determination as to what 
constitutes a threat to the peace is completely within the 
discretion of the Security Council. A situation can be judged as 
a threat to the peace by the Security Council even in cases 
where no obligation stipulated by customary international law 
or Charter law is breached. Therefore the Security Council's 
jurisdiction is not limited by international law.*^ 
Furthermore, Article 2(4) prohibits resort to force only in 
international relations against another state, that is to say, 
threats or breaches of inter-state or international peace. 
However, the practice of the Security Council shows that if an 
internal situation or civil war is serious enough, it will become 
involved, subject of course, to political limitations. For 
instance in 1966 the Council determined that the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace 
14. B.M.McDoughlus and W.M.Reisman, Rhodesia and the United 
Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, American 
Journal of International Law (AJIL), Vol. 62, 1968, P . l l . 
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and security. In this case the only threat or use of force arose 
from the activities of the guerillas infiltrating Rhodesia from 
the frontline African states. Nevertheless, the Council declared 
that the situation in Southern Rhodesia itself constituted a 
threat to the peace.*' 
Closely related to this is the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction which sets severe limitation upon the authority of 
the Security Council. Article 2(7) of the Charter provides that: 
'nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, an 
exception to the application of the domestic jurisdiction clause 
is granted to the Security Council and it is authorised to take 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter without 
restriction by the domestic jurisdiction rule. A question arises 
as to what are the matters which may be deemed as domestic. It 
may be stated that a matter is essentially of domestic concern if 
it is incapable by its very nature of assuming an international 
complexion. In other words, if a matter is not likely to have 
15. N.D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1990, P.34. 
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international repercussion, or if it does not affect international 
peace and security it may be regarded as domestic matter. 
However, the Security Council have certainly not been very 
consistent or clear as to what it regards as matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. In modern age of 
interdependence, many matters which on the face of it are 
essentially domestic have in fact become international and, 
therefore, no clear cut demarcation can be made between 
domestic matters and other matters. Because of this the matter 
is decided by the Security Council itself. Thus a civil war or 
any other situation like human rights violation which may take 
place within a state may be interpreted by the Security Council 
as a threat to international peace and security, and 
consequently, even in such cases, intervention on the part of 
the Security Council would not be prohibited according to the 
express provisions of Article 2(7). 
In practice, the Security Council has developed its own 
interpretation as to what constitutes intervention and domestic 
jurisdiction. The Council has taken the view that any finding 
under Article 39, whether or not combined with enforcement 
measures, is sufficient to internationalize the situation and to 
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escape the grasp of Article 2(7). For example, the Council 
made a finding of a threat to the peace in relation to the 
situation in Congo and authorised the Secretary General to take 
vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force, in 
order to apprehend all foreign troops and mercenaries. The 
Security Council through its resolution also demanded that all 
the secessionist activities which were going on in the province 
of Katanga against the Republic of Congo should cease 
forthwith. This certainly appears to be interference in the 
internal affairs of the Congo, which is the sort of activity 
prima facie prohibited by Article 2(7). But the fact is that when 
a situation is designated as a threat to the peace it is inevitably 
out of the domestic realm into the international sphere, 
effectively rendering redundant the prohibition contained in 
Article 2(7) itself. Any action within Chapter VII, whether 
enforcement or not is not limited by Article 2(7) of the 
Charter." 
The limitations contained in Article 2(7) is circumvented 
not only by a finding of a threat to the peace, but also by the 
finding that the situation is one of international concern. This 
doctrine of international concern has been service in the guise 
16. Ibid. P.51. 
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of a potential threat to the peace. Thus a finding of a potential 
menace can be seen not only as a link between Chapter VI and 
VII, but also as a means by which the Council can utilize the 
provisions of Chapter VI and the power to ask for voluntary 
measures in the face of the provisions of Article 2(7). The 
Council in 1946 established a Commission of Investigation 
under Article 34 in order to report on aspects of Greek Civil 
War. Further, in the Spanish question, the Security Council set 
up a Sub-committee to investigate the situation in Spain. These 
two early examples highlight the facts that an investigation to 
ascertain the facts and, in the latter case, to make substantive 
recommendations do not constitute examples of intervention. 
The sub-committee found the situation in Spain to be of 
international concern and a potential menace to international 
peace. It recommended action under Chapter VI in the form of 
a voluntary termination of diplomatic relations. Although no 
such resolution was adopted due to Soviet veto which was of a 
view that the situation was a threat to the peace and should 
have been dealt with by mandatory measures. The view that 
Article 2(7) was inapplicable in cases of international concern 
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was prevailed.*^ 
The Security Council used its recommendatory powers in 
a superficial domestic situation in South Africa. Though the 
Council did not find a general threat to the peace in relation to 
the system of apartheid in South Africa, yet it adopted many 
resolutions of a recommendatory nature by characterizing 
apartheid as a 'crime against humanity' and recognizing the 
situation as one of sufficient international concern to warrant 
collective humanitarian intervention and did not heed the South 
African objection based on Article 2(7)". 
These are the few cases of cold war period when the 
competence of the Security Council was highly influenced by 
the political environment of the day and its intervention 
occurred only in the areas outside the direct zones of influence 
of the two superpowers. After the end of cold war period with 
the demise of Soviet Union the Security Council has broadened 
its range of competence and intervention in a number of cases 
of domestic jurisdiction on humanitarian grounds. 
In 1990s the Security Council intervened and took 
17. Ibid. P.51. 
18. Ibid. PP.51-52. 
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enforcement action in a number of civil wars on humanitarian 
grounds. It intervened in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 where 
following the break up of the country civil war had broken out 
and massive human rights violation was reported. On 
September 25, 1991, the Council through its unanimously 
adopted resolution called on all states to implement a general 
and complete embargo on the delivery of weapons and military 
equipment to Yugoslavia. Though technically the conflicts in 
Yugoslavia became international wars as they involved former 
republics of the country whose independence was recognised by 
most of the international community, in reality they were civil 
wars that arose from the break up of the country. However, the 
imposition of some wide ranging sanctions on Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 30*** May 1992 under 
Chapter VII was in no way an intervention in civil war or 
domestic jurisdiction as by then the United Nations itself 
admitted most of the former republics to its membership.*' 
The Security Council also took action in the civil wars 
which took place in Somalia (1992) Rwanda (1994) and Haiti 
(1994). In 1991-92 when Somalia was wrecked by wars 
19. H.O. Agarwal, International Law, Allahabad Law Agency, 
Allahabad, 3'" ed., 1995. P. 335. 
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between tribal factions and severe drought due to which 
hundreds of thousands of Somali people had starved and relief 
convey of the United Nations and private relief organisations 
were attacked by irregulars the Security Council on Jan. 23, 
1992 urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and 
decided that all states should immediately implement a general 
and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military 
equipment to Somalia and subsequently established the United 
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). When the irregulars 
continued to attack the deliveries of relief, on December 
3,1992, in response to an appeal from the Secretary General, 
the Security Council sanctioned the use of force to deliver 
humanitarian aid in Somalia and authorised the Secretary 
General to arrange for a United Task Force (UTF) for this 
purpose. 
Security Council's Competence to Issue Binding Decision 
Article 25 of the Charter which declares that 'the 
members agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter' raises 
the issue of Security Council's competence to issue binding 
decisions. Since the immediately preceding Article 24 confers 
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upon the Security Council the responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, a layman 
reading the Charter has no reason not to believe that any 
decision of the Security Council which it takes in fulfillment of 
its duties under Article 24 would be binding on member states, 
no matter under which specific Chapter the decision was taken. 
But it is not so in reality. Though there is no controversy in 
respect of the binding effect of the resolutions of the Security 
Council relating to enforcement measures under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, this is not so in respect of the resolution of the 
Security Council under Chapter VI. This is because of the fact 
that Chapter VI is mainly concerned with recommendatory 
powers of the Security Council, and recommendations cannot 
be put at par with binding decisions. Kelsen argued that if the 
recommendations under Chapter VI are such that their non-
compliance may invoke sanctions by the United Nations they 
are supposed to be binding decisions.*° White said that if the 
Security Council desired to make a recommendation in 
accordance with its powers, this would be clear from the 
resolution and would not constitute a mandatory decision of the 
20. Hans Kelsen, Law of the United Nations, Praeger, New York, 1964, 
P.96. 
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Council within the meaning of Article 25^'. A binding decision 
under Chapter VI may be rare although it is not impossible. 
Similarly a recommendation can be made under Chapter VII 
which is expressly provided for in Article 39. 
In 1947, the United Kingdom attempted to invoke Article 
25 to give jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice over 
the Carfu Channel case on the strength of a resolution of the 
Security Council recommending that the United Kingdom and 
Albania should immediately refer the dispute to the Court. 
Albania met this approach by asserting that there could be no 
doubt that Article 25 of the Charter relates solely to the 
decisions of the Security Council taken on the basis of the 
provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter and does not apply to 
recommendations made by the Council with reference to pacific 
settlement of disputes. The Court found it unnecessary to press 
upon this issue, but three of the judges appended a statement 
that they believed the view maintained by Albanian 
Government to be well-founded, inter alia, on the basis of 
normal meaning of the word 'recommend'. 
21. N.D. White, op. cit. p. 53. 
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The International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion 
on Namibia opined that Article 25 was not restricted in its 
application to Chapter VII. The Court observed that it is not 
possible to find in the Charter any support for the contention 
that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement 
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 25 
is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but 
applies to the decisions of the Security Council in accordance 
with the Charter. Moreover, that the Article is placed, not in 
Chapter VII, but immediately after Article 24 in that part of the 
Charter which deals with the functions and powers of the 
Security Council. If Article 25 had reference solely to 
decisions of the Security Council concerning enforcement 
action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, that is to say, if 
it were only such decisions which had binding effect, then 
Article 25 would be superflous, since the effect is secured by 
Articles 48 and 49 of Chapter VII itself.** But this was an 
advisory opinion of the Court and some members like France 
and the United Kingdom are not ready to adopt it as a rule. 
Though the majority view was in favour, this advisory opinion 
has not been accepted as a definite di^os;^.o£the issue and the 
22. ICJ Reports, 1971, PP.52-53. 
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Controversy as to the scope of Article 25 still persists. 
Sometimes the Security Council to ensure the compliance 
even with its mandatory decisions refers the obligation of 
members under Article 25. In the Southern Rhodesian affair the 
Council in its resolution of 16 Dec. 1966 made specific 
reference to Articles 39 and 41 making the decision explicitly 
binding. To reinforce further its claim to be exercising 
mandatory powers, the Council also reminded the member 
states that 'the failure or refusal by any of them to implement 
the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 
of the Charter'. However, the resolutions of the Council does 
not become binding simply because the Council uses 
appropriate terminology with a view to making it binding, if 
the resolution is not properly subject to the Council's power of 
decision under the Charter." 
Functions of the Security Council Other Than 
Maintenance of Peace and Security 
Apart from its primary function of maintaining 
international peace and security the Security Council is 
required by the Charter to perform certain additional functions 
23. Samar Sen, op.cit. 9, PP. 129-130. 
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either independently or in concurrence with the General 
Assembly. 
The Security Council may recommend the Assembly for 
admission of a state to the United Nations.^^ A recommendation 
on this issue requires the affirmative vote of nine members of 
the Security Council including the concurring votes of 
permanent five. It means any permanent member can block the 
admission of a state to the United Nations. This happened most 
in the 19S0s when the then Soviet Union and the United States 
blocked the admission of a number of states belonging to each 
other's range of influence. 
The Council has been empowered to recommend the 
General Assembly to suspend a member of the United Nations 
against which it is taking preventive or enforcement action, 
from exercising its rights and privileges of membership. It is 
further provided that the exercise of these rights and privileges 
may be restored by the Security Council, that is to say, in 
respect of restoration of rights and privileges of the members 
concurrence of the General Assembly is not required. The 
Security Council has been given exclusive power in this 
24. Article 4(2) of the Charter. 
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connection.*' Moreover, the Security Council may recommend 
the General Assembly expulsion of a member of the United 
Nations which has persistently violated the principles contained 
in the Charter**. All these actions of the Security Council are 
taken through non-procedural vote. The Security Council is 
responsible for formulating the plans for the establishment of a 
system for the regulation of armaments . 
The Security Council is also empowered to recommend 
the General Assembly the conditions on which a state not 
belonging to the United Nations may become a party to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.** 
The Security Council recommends to the General 
Assembly the appointment of the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. This is a substantial matter under the Charter 
and, therefore, affirmative vote of nine members including five 
permanent are necessary. The former Secretary General Boutrus 
Boutrus Ghali was not recommended for his reappointment 
25. Article 5. 
26. Article 6. 
27. Article 26. 
28. Article 93(2). 
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although he has got the positive votes of fourteen members out 
of the fifteen members of the Council. Negative vote of the 
United States, a permanent member, blocked his reappointment. 
The Security Council and the General Assembly elect the 
judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
simultaneously but independently of each other. It is important 
to note that a simple majority of eight votes is enough for 
affirmative Council action on the election of judges." 
The Council lays down the conditions under which the 
ICJ shall be open to non-parties to the Statute.^" 
The Council recommends to the General Assembly 
conditions for participating of states which are parties to the 
statute but not members of the United Nations in the process of 
amending the Statute of the Court.^ * 
If a party fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon 
it under a judgement of the Court, the Council may, at the 
appeal of the other party make recommendations or decide upon 
measures to be taken to given effect to the judgement." 
29. Article 8 of the statute of ICJ. 
30. Article 35(2) of the Statute of ICJ. 
31. Article 6 of the Statute of ICJ. 
32. Article 94 of the Charter. 
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Last but not the least, amendments in the Charter comes 
into force when they have been adopted and ratified by two-
thirds majority of the General Assembly including all the five 
permanent members of the Security Council.'^ Thus no 
amendment of the Charter is possible unless and until all the 
permanent members of the Security Council give their 
affirmative role on it and it is subsequently ratified by them 
through their respective constitutional process. However, it can 
be said that it is not a power of the Security Council as an 
organ but the power of the permanent members. 
33. Article 108. 
CH/IPTER 3 
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
The tension and struggle between the forces for the 
maintenance of status quo are constant and dynamic features of 
international system. This struggle is manifested in the 
frequent occurrence of ferocious and intractable conflict. By 
contrast, but by no means as persistent and powerful as the 
systematic propensity to conflict, are the creation and 
utilisation of international structures, instruments and 
procedures for the containment and resolution of these conflicts 
by political means. The attempt to superimpose peaceful 
regulatory system upon the disordered world are extremely 
hazardous and difficult. The natural political propensities to 
make war are far more powerful than the international process 
of making peace. Nonetheless, the will, determination and 
imagination of peoples and states persist in the quest to make 
order out of chaos and prescribe peaceful measures for 
progressive social change.* 
The oldest and most ubiquitous of the approaches to 
peace which have been formulated and injected into the stream 
of international organisation is that of pacific settlement of 
1. N.D.White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, p. 165. 
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disputes. This approach rests upon the assumption that war is a 
technique for the settlement of disputes which arise among 
nations. It is a traditional method of resolving the quarrels that 
inevitably arise in international as in all other societies. 
However, it has always been an inappropriate method 
undistinguished for the moral quality of the solutions which it 
has produced and unworthy of the character of man, as Cicero 
put it: "Since there are two methods of settling a difference, the 
one by argument, the other by force, and since the former is 
characteristic of men, the latter of beasts, we should have 
recourse to the second only when it is not permitted to use the 
first".* 
The pacific settlement approach has been characterised by 
emphasis upon the problems of discouraging resort to war as a 
means of solving disputes. The problem is to find, develop and 
institutionalize other methods and persuade states to use them 
for the solution of their differences. War can be eliminated 
only by the provision of a functional equivalent. The task of 
international organisation is to make available a variety of 
peaceful substitutes for the technique of violence, and to 
2. Cited in Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, Random House, New York, 1963, 
PP.222-223. 
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encourage their utilisation by the parties to disputes. 
Several methods of peaceful settlement have been in 
vogue in the past for dealing with disputes and the like 
situations. However, negotiation between the parties at various 
levels, through normal diplomatic channels by foreign ministers 
or by heads of states or governments, have always been the 
first course. 
The first Hague Convention of 1899 for Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes and the subsequent 
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in that 
year was the first organised effort in the direction of peaceful 
settlement. The signatories states pledged themselves, as far as 
circumstances allow, to make efforts for pacific settlement. The 
second Hague Conference of 1907 was in a way a continuation 
of the steps envisaged in the first Convention."* Under the 
"Bryan Treaties" popularly known as "Cooling-off Treaties", 
negotiated by the United States in 1913-14, conciliation was 
3. R.B. Chauhan, Peaceful Change - the Concept and the Mechanism for Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes within the Structure of the United Nations in J.N. Saxena, 
Gurdip Sin^ and A.K. Kaul (eds.) United Nations for a Better World, Lancers 
Books, New Delhi, 1986, PP. 61-62. 
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recognised in principle as a method particularly appropriate for 
the settlement of political differences, though very little use 
was made of the various conciliation commissions which had 
been established by the treaties/ 
Twentieth century international organisation inherited a 
list of methods for bringing external assistance to states whose 
own diplomatic resources were inadequate to dispose their 
disputes. These include such devices as good offices, inquiry, 
mediation, and conciliation methods. They varies in the degree 
to which they bring third parties into active participation in the 
substantive discussion of the disputed matter, but they are alike 
in that they all involved the introduction of external parties for 
the purpose of promoting the voluntary acceptance of terms of 
settlement.' 
The Covenant of the League of Nations under Article 12 
obligated the members of the League, in the event of a dispute 
arising between them, to submit the matter either to arbitration 
or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council. It imposed 
upon the members a definite period of abstention from fighting 
while the quest for solution took place. The Council proceeded 
4. Claude, op. cit. P.230. 
5. Ibid. P. 230. 
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energetically to establish for the first time in history a regular 
system of mediation which was something organic and 
fundamentally changed the character of international relations 
and which stroke out a new path towards the attainment of 
peace, a path which had scarcely been thought of before. The 
Council evolved a flexible mode of procedures involving stern 
insistence upon the suspension of acts and threats of violence. 
It invented an important peacekeeping role for its President, 
acting in the capacity of guardian of the global interest. It 
undertook mediatorial functions as a body or entrusted them to 
smaller committees or to individual delegates who consented to 
act as rapporteurs for the Council in dealing with specific 
cases. It developed to a considerable degree the institution of 
the special commission assigned to visit troubled areas in order 
to supervise adherence to provisional arrangements for the 
suspension of hostilities and withdrawal of armed forces, to 
investigate the factual basis of disturbances, to sponsor 
negotiations between disputants, and to formulate proposals for 
solutions. On the whole the League Council displayed 
admirable inventiveness and wisdom in developing the 
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organizational structure and techniques required for pacific 
settlement.* 
The League Council was quite active in the inter-war 
period in dealing with international disputes, chiefly those of a 
political nature. But it did not have the authority to impose its 
views. While it did deal successfully with a number of disputes 
and situations, undoubtedly it failed, perhaps even more than 
its nineteenth century counterparts, in dealing with those 
disputes and situations most likely to lead to war.^  The 
outbreak of the Second World War was the manifestation of 
this failure. 
In the United Nations era pacific settlement of disputes is 
an important principle. Members are obligated to settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice are not 
Q 
endangered. Parties to disputes are encouraged under the 
Charter, to avail themselves of pacificatory devices of their 
own choice and to appeal the United Nations only after they 
have exhausted other resources. The organisation has adopted 
6. Ibid. P.231. 
7. L.M. Goodrich, The United Nations, Stevens and Sons, London, 1960, PP. 193-
195. 
8. Article 2(3). 
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the basic premise of the League system, preventing an 
aggravation of the dispute and keeping the contenders apart 
while the process of international conciliation are set in 
motion.^ It has contributed to the growing stock of pacific 
settlement devices, the concept of UN Mediator or 
Commissioner - the single individual of high prestige, bearing 
exclusive international responsibility and carrying the full 
authority of the United Nations, who performs high level 
political and administrative functions on behalf of the 
organisation. 
Disputes between states may result from conflicting 
claims of legal right or from claims of a non-legal right or of 
political nature. Disputes of the first kind are called "legal 
disputes"*' In the ancient times the most appropriate method of 
setting these disputes has been to submit them to arbitration or 
to courts in order to secure a binding judgement based on 
existing law. This enjoyed a considerable revival in the 
nineteenth century. Then following the two Hague Conferences, 
judicial settlement was the favourite prescription of peace 
advocates. However, appointment of ad hoc arbitration 
9. Claude, op. cit. P.240. 
10. Lincoln Bloomfield, Lew, Politics and International Disputes, International 
Conciliation No.516, 1958, P. 260. 
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machinery every time a dispute arose, were always a problem, 
and the creation of a permanent international tribunal, which 
would be available for the judicial settlement of disputes, was 
necessary. The League succeeded in equipping the world with 
its first such tribunal. The Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ), which has been continued in the United Nations 
era under the title of International Court of Justice (ICJ). Both 
the Covenant and the Charter have required the states members 
to submit their legal disputes to the tribunal for pacific 
settlement whose decision would be binding on them. The 
political organs of the League and the United Nations have 
enjoyed the competence to obtain judicial advice concerning 
their own handling of disputes". Nevertheless, the availability 
of judicial modes of settlement has contributed significantly to 
the flexibility of procedure, which has been a leading 
characteristic of pacific settlement system of the League and 
the United Nations. 
Disputes of political nature are solved by the parties 
themselves through their normal diplomatic channel or any 
other method of their own choice including the reference to the 
11. Articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant and Articles 33 and 96 of the Charter. 
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political organs of the international organisations. Covenant of 
the League did not provide any elaborate procedure to solve 
these types of disputes except a limited provision in Article 12. 
However, in the United Nations scheme a full Chapter i.e. 
Chapter VI of the Charter (Articles 33-38) is exclusively 
devoted to the question of pacific settlement of disputes. The 
Security Council has been given specific responsibility in this 
respect, since it is the organ which is primarily responsible for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. This 
responsibility is regarded as including the entire range of 
adjustment of differences between nations, and the Security 
Council enjoys a large degree of flexibility in handling such 
differences. The Security Council is consequently not restricted 
to legal principles, solutions, or procedures; security is set 
above justice, and the establishment of order is to precede the 
reign of law.*^ The jurisdiction of the Security Council is to 
include not merely formal disputes but also situations which 
may give rise to friction or disputes*"*. 
While the field of action of the Security Council is thus 
12. Clyde Eagleton, International Law and the Charter of the United Nations, AJIL, 
Vol. 39, 1945, P. 715. 
13. Article 13. 
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broad and largely exclusive, its actual authority is stringently 
limited, and the freedom of action of sovereign states is 
carefully protected. The edifice of pacific settlement is founded 
upon the theory that the states have the right as well as a duty 
to settle their differences by agreement among them. The very 
first article of Chapter VI stipulates that: 
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other 
peaceful means of their own choice".'^ 
These provisions obligate the parties to settle their 
dispute peacefully though the choice of the appropriate 
procedure lies with them and they can make use of any of the 
procedures. Besides these traditional methods any combination 
of them or some new arrangement agreed to by the parties is in 
order so long as there is an attempt at peaceful settlement.*^ 
Before proceeding further it is worthwhile to have an idea of 
each of these methods. 
14. Article 33 (i) 
15. Stephen S. Goodspeed, op. cit. P. 174. 
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Negotiation is the most common method for settling 
international differences. It involves direct discussion between 
or among the parties to the dispute with the objective of 
reaching an agreement.'^ No outside party is involved in the 
process. In fact, negotiation is used more frequently in practice 
than all the other methods put together. On occasions when 
another method is used, negotiation is not displaced but is 
directed towards instrumental issues, the terms of reference for 
an inquiry or conciliation commission or the arrangement for 
implementing an arbitral decision.'^ 
Good Offices is the only traditional method of dispute 
settlement not listed in Article 33 of the Charter but one 
frequently used. Good Offices involve the assistance of a third 
party or state not a party to the dispute. The third party in 
adhering strictly to the limits of Good Offices may offer only a 
channel of communication or facilities for the use of the 
partiesbut may not offer any suggestion for terms of settlement. 
But providing a neutral ground for negotiation or by offering to 
carry messages between the disputants, the third party displays 
16. A LeRoy Bennet, International Organisations: Principles and Issues, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey, 1995, P. 105. 
17. J.G. Merrills, The Principles of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in Vaughan Lowe 
and Colin Warbric (ed.) The United Nations and the Principles of International 
Law, Routledge Publications, London, 1994, P.50. 
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a friendly desire to promote a settlement without getting 
1 ft 
involved in the issues at stake. 
Inquiry is a process of fact finding by a neutral team of 
investigators. Often the facts underlying a controversy are in 
dispute, and clarification by an impartial commission may 
facilitate settlement. The report of investigation commission 
does not suggest terms of settlement but may help to establish 
conditions conducive to settlement." 
Mediation is a procedure involving the suggestion of 
terms of settlement by a third party. The mediator enters into 
the negotiation between the disputing parties seeking terms of 
compromise acceptable to the disputants and is expected to 
maintain an attitude of impartiality throughout.^* 
Conciliation is similar to mediation except for the legal 
distinction that the third party is a commission or a body, set 
up by the parties either on a permanent or on ad hoc basis to 
deal with the dispute, whose aid has been sought in finding a 
solution satisfactory to the disputants. Like mediation, its 
object is peace through compromise on terms acceptable to the 
18. Beirnet, op. at. 16, P.105. 
19. Ibid.P.106. 
20. Rumki Basu, The United Nations: Structure and Functions. Sterling Publishers, 
3"* ed. 1997, P.384. 
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parties, not the imposition of terms. While a mediator usually 
makes his proposal informally and on the basis of information 
supplied by the parties, an independent investigation is the 
feature of conciliation. In practice, however, these distinctions 
tend to be blurred. In a given case, it may, therefore, be 
difficult to draw the line between mediation and conciliation or 
to say exactly when good offices ended and mediation began.*^ 
Arbitration is a means applying legal principles to a 
controversy within limits previously agreed upon by the 
disputing parties. A panel of judges or arbitrators is created 
either by special agreement of the parties or by an existing 
arbitral treaty. In agreeing to submit the dispute to arbitration, 
the disputants also agree in advance to be bound by the 
decision. An arbitral agreement known as a compromise 
specifies the methods of selecting the arbitral panel, the time 
and place of hearing, and any limitation upon the facts to be 
considered or the principles of law or inquiry to be applied in 
arriving at a decision.^^ 
Judicial Settlement is a process of submitting a dispute 
to a court or permanent tribunal for legally binding decision. 
21. J.G. Merrills, op. cit. 17. P.50-53. 
22. Bennet, op.cit P.106. 
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Unlike the arbitration the court or tribunal is subject to no legal 
principles to be applied, except those stated in the statute by 
which the statute by which it was created. International Court 
of Justice is there for the judicial settlement of disputes 
between states. This method is also called adjudication.^^ 
At the very primary stage of dispute, however, two 
possibilities may be there; either the parties have felt their 
obligation and exhausted their efforts to settle the disputes 
peacefully but they have failed in their efforts, or they have not 
sought any settlement at all as they or any one of them did not 
agree that the dispute is one which they were obligated to settle 
under Article 33(1). If the parties have failed to settle the 
dispute peacefully they are required to refer it to the Security 
Council under Article 37(1) of the Charter which provides that: 
"should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred in 
Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, 
they shall refer it to the Security Council". 
23. Ibid. P. 106. 
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This provision is mandatory and it contains the obligation 
of the parties to compulsorily refer a dispute to the Security 
Council in that situation.^^ 
When a dispute is so referred to the Security Council it 
deals with it in accordance with Article 37(2). This Article 
empowers the Security Council, if it deems that the continuance 
of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, to recommend appropriate 
procedures of methods of settlement under Article 36 or some 
specific terms of settlement. The Security Council must satisfy 
itself before invoking its powers under this Article that the 
continuance of the dispute may lead to endanger peace. This 
can be better achieved through investigation rather than 
abstracts. Recommendations of the Security Council under 
Article 37 (2) are not binding.^' Kelsen says that they are 
binding, as a refusal by a party or parties to the dispute may 
result in a more stern action under Chapter VII.^^ However, 
members of the organisation are agreed that the provisions of 
Chapter VI are not binding. 
24. Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press, New Yoric, 1994, P.550. 
25. Ibid. P. 560. 
26. Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, Praeger, New York, 1964, P. 445. 
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If the parties are not seeking any settlement the Security 
Council under Article 33(2) has the power, where it deems 
necessary, to call upon the parties to settle their dispute 
through the means provided in Article 33(1). For this purpose 
any member of the United Nations or a non-member, party to 
the dispute or not,^' or the Secretary General" may bring the 
matter to the attention of the Security Council. The Council 
may also act on its own initiative. 
Article 32(2) as such does not confer any power on the 
Security Council except that of its discretion regarding whether 
it deems necessary to make a request to the parties. Its request 
is a mere reminder to the parties of their Charter obligation. 
This provision also does not purport to impose a mandatory 
obligation on the Security Council to enforce in some way the 
provisions of Article 33(1), for it operates only when the 
Council deems it necessary which in theory should be when it 
has found the basic requirement of a danger to international 
peace and security. Thus the Council's role under Article 33(2) 
is one of supervision of the obligation to settle the dispute by 
27. Article 35 
28. Article 99. 
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peaceful means placed on members^'. The most effective use of 
the above power by the Council may be not only as a reminder, 
but also as a warning of future Council action under the other 
provisions of Chapter VI or, if the states concerned continue to 
be in breach of their obligation, of the possibility of Council 
action under Chapter VII.^° 
The Security Council can ask for any procedure to be 
applied by the parties. It is not bound by any restriction in this 
regard. Most frequently it suggests that the contending parties 
enter into negotiation. This happened in the case of the conflict 
between Portugal and the insurrection movements in its 
overseas colonies (1972), the civil war in Lebanon (1973) and 
the situation in Cyprus (1974). In Resolution 502 (1982) the 
Security Council urged the governments of Argentina and 
United Kingdom to strive for a 'diplomatic solution' to their 
conflict concerning Falkland Islands. Iraq and Iran were 
requested by the Security Council Resolution 479(1980) and 
582 (1986) to accept mediation, conciliation or other forms of 
peaceful settlement. In the Gulf War, on the day of Iraqi 
aggression, 2 August 1990, Iraq and Kuwait were called upon 
29. Clyde Eagleton The Jurisdiction o/Jhe^efsuHnf-Council over Disputes, AJIL, vol. 
40, 1946, p. 516. 
30. N.D White, op.cit. P.62. 
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to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution 
of their differences. The Security Council suggested to solve 
the dispute over the nationalization of Suez Canal by an 
arbitral tribunal through its resolution 118 (1956). In the 
British- Albania dispute over the incident in Carfu Channel 
(1974) and in the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea 
(1976) the Security Council recommended judicial settlement 
involving International Court of Justice. 
When the Council has urged the parties to continue 
negotiation, it has frequently attempted to make it certain that 
its recommendations would be respected. It has requested the 
parties to report, on the progress of negotiations, and in so 
doing has indicated that it will continue to examine the 
question after the parties have made an effort to arrive at 
settlement. The Council has also stated that it might employ 
other measures if no agreement appears forthcoming. In this 
manner, the Council seeks to bring pressure on the parties 
without, however, disturbing the delicate balance of negotiation 
underway.^* 
Article 34 of the Charter confers on the Security Council 
very wide powers to investigate any dispute or situation which 
31. Goodspeed, (^.cit. P. 178. 
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Article 34 of the Charter confers on the Security Council 
very wide powers to investigate any dispute or situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in 
order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or 
situation is likely to endanger, the maintenance of international 
peace and security. The Security Council also possesses 
implied powers to acquire information by means of 
investigation/inquiry for purposes other than those mentioned 
above."** 
The General Assembly of the United Nations on Dec. 9, 
1991 adopted a Declaration on Fact-finding by the UN in the 
Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 
In this declaration the General Assembly emphasised that the 
ability of the United Nations to maintain international peace 
and security depends on a large extent on its acquiring detailed 
knowledge about the factual circumstances of any dispute or 
situation, the continuance of which might threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore the 
General Assembly recognises the particular usefulness of fact-
finding missions that the competent UN organ may undertake in 
this respect. These competent organs are, according to para 7 of 
32. Bruno Simma, op. cit. P.515. 
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the Declaration, the Security Council, the General Assembly 
and the Secretary General by which fact-finding missions 
maybe undertaken in the context of their respective 
responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and 
security.^^ 
The objective of Security Council investigation is to 
gather relevant facts and information in order to determine the 
extent of the problem, its general nature and whether the 
dispute or situation may lead to serious consequences. No 
attempt is made at this stage to determine who is right or who 
is wrong. The usual procedure is through inquiry by a sub-
committee or a commission. If the Security Council on the 
basis of investigation report, believes that the matter is not 
likely to endanger peace it may remain passive."*^ 
The Security Council appointed a number of investigatory 
bodies but very rarely with an express reference to Article 34. 
Only in two cases has the Security Council ordered an 
investigation by referring expressly to Article 34 and 
establishing a commission of investigation for that purpose as a 
subsidiary organ. In its resolution of Dec. 19, 1946 regarding 
33. Ibid. P.516. 
34. Clyde Eagleton, op. cit. P. 515. 
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the 'Greek Frontier Incident' case and in resolution of Jan. 20, 
1948 regarding Kashmir, the Council made express reference to 
Article 34. In the Spanish question, without expressly referring 
to Article 34 but partly quoting its wording, the Security 
Council appointed a sub-committee by its resolution of Apr. 29, 
1946 and instructed it to conduct inquiry as it may deem 
necessary. More frequently are the cases of investigation 
formally ordered by the Security Council but not referring 
Article 34. 
One important thing as far as the Council's power of 
investigation is concerned is that the Council can investigate 
not only a dispute but also a situation of like nature, whereas 
Article 33, which places upon members, obligation to settle 
their differences by peaceful means applies only to disputes. 
There are situations which, while not clearly disputes, may 
have serious implications and might endanger peace. The 
insertion of one word 'situation' extended to the Security 
Council powers to play a somewhat quasi-judicial or arbitral 
role.^* It is the Council only which can recognise a 'situation' 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Practically, however, the distinction has been blurred 
35. N.D. White, op.cit.P.61. 
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as states referred situations as well as disputes to the Council 
under Article 35 and the Council has rarely attempted to 
distinguish between a dispute and a situation. In most 
instances, matters coming before the Council have been 
concerned with well defined disputes between parties who have 
put for the definite claims. When cases have come before the 
Council as situations they have customarily been handled as 
disputes. If the matter that comes before the Council is 
identified as situations and not as disputes a member of the 
Council party to the problem can vote. It is only in instances 
where the matter is identified as a dispute that a party must 
abstain from voting.^** 
Whether the Council's power under Article 34 goes 
beyond investigating and reporting on a factual basis is not 
clear from the practice of the Security Council. Sometimes the 
Council uses Article 34 in other senses which often are better 
covered by other provisions of Chapter VI. For example in the 
dispute over Western Sahara (1975) the Council requested the 
Secretary General to enter into immediate consultation with the 
parties concerned. In the Kashmir case the Council established 
a Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in 1948 to 
36. Goodspeed. op.cit. PP.174-175. 
83 
investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34. UNCIP became 
more than a fact finding body when the Council set out the 
modalities for conducting a referendum under its auspices, 
although it could not do that due to certain reasons. 
If the Council determines that the dispute or the situation 
is one which is likely to endanger peace and security, it may, 
utilizing its powers under Article 36, recommend at any stage 
of the dispute or situation appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment. Here the Council is free to utilise any technique or 
procedure or combination of methods which it believed might 
prove useful. Cease-fire and withdrawal resolution can be seen 
as appropriate procedures or methods of settlement. The 
Council may also appoint a mediator or a conciliator. At times 
it recommended the Secretary General to provide his good 
offices or to arrange for one or more agents to offer good 
offices. Mediation and conciliation commissions have been 
used in Indonesian and Kashmir question. Secretary General's 
good offices were used in Cuba and Cyprus. 
Besides all these powers the Security Council has been 
conferred upon very wide powers under Article 38, which 
provides that the Council may, if all the parties to any dispute 
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SO request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to 
a pacific settlement of the dispute. It implies that the parties to 
the dispute can request the Security Council to recommend a 
solution irrespective of the nature of the dispute. The request 
has to be unanimous. However, the Council has discretion as to 
whether to act at all on such request. If it acts it may make any 
recommendations that it finds appropriate. Both 
recommendations on the procedures and on the terms of 
settlement is admisible.^' 
Whenever the Council makes a recommendation for 
settlement it does not state which provision in the Charter it is 
using. In fact in practice, the Council's powers as regards 
settlement have been amalgamated. However, it could be said 
that Article 36 empowers the Council to establish the 
modalities for settlement or the framework within which a 
settlement process may be undertaken, whereas Article 37 
enables it to directly recommend the terms of settlement."*' 
All decisions in Article 34, 36 and 37 are taken through a 
non-procedural vote which requires the unanimity of permanent 
five and any one of them can block the Council's action by its 
37. Bruno Simma, op.cit. P.563. 
38. N.D. White, op.cit. P.68. 
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use of veto. During the cold war period the East-West 
confrontation and geopolitical factors have limited the ability 
of the Council to establish investigatory bodies and at times it 
could not be established due to a negative vote of a permanent 
member. In the Greek case the recommendation of the 
Commission of Investigation was not adopted and it was 
prevented from examining the situation further because of 
Soviet Unions opposition of Commission's finding. Similarly, 
in 1954 Guatemalan request for an impartial investigation was 
not heeded due to perceived opposition of the United States. ' ' 
In fact, in relation to pacific settlement of disputes under 
Chapter VI, the Council has in strictness no powers. Its 
decisions are no more than recommendations to the parties.^'' 
Thus the recommendations of the Security Council under 
Article 36, 37 and 38 regarding procedures and terms of 
settlement are voluntary and does not have any binding effect. 
However, if a decision to investigate a problem is made on the 
basis of Article 34, the states concerned are under a legal 
obligation to accept and carry out this decision, specially to 
permit the entry of an investigative subsidiary organ into their 
39. Ibid. P. 70. 
40. J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, Clarendon Press, Lxmdon, 6th ed., 1976, P.381. 
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territories, because a decision under Article 34 has binding 
effect in the sense of Article 25.** It is binding also due to the 
fact that investigation serves to determine the factual 
prerequisite for the Security Council's competence. 
Due to the non-binding character of the recommendations 
of the Council they were often not complied with. Examples are 
Palestine and Iran-Iraq. In Palestine, Israel continued its illegal 
activities in occupied territories of Palestine despite several 
Council resolutions against this. In Iraq-Iran dispute the parties 
continued fighting for several years unless in 1987 the Council 
used its powers under Chapter VII. Nevertheless, on occasions, 
the Council's recommendations for settlement are so 
comprehensive and detailed that they suggest an intense and 
concerted effort by the Council to achieve a settlement. In 
Indonesian case when the negotiation between the parties broke 
down despite the efforts of the Committee of Good Offices and 
Netherlands made a surprise attack capturing most of the 
principal cities in the territory of the Republic, the Council 
adopted a resolution on Jan. 28, 1949 outlining a more detailed 
recommendation for settlement. By the resolution the Council 
41. Hans Kelsen, op. cit. 26, P.388 
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established the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in 
place of the Good Offices Committee, a move which indicated 
the Council's increased commitment to a more comprehensive 
settlement. The resolution was recommendatory only but it had 
the value of being so comprehensive that it was almost decision 
like in its context. This led to the Dutch Government notify its 
general acceptance of the resolution with a few exceptions and 
consequently Indonesia was freed. In South African Apartheid 
case, though the resolution of the Security Council containing 
comprehensive recommendations, which if not complied with 
would have been backed up by mandatory economic sanctions, 
were prevented by the Western States, nevertheless, the tone of 
Council's resolution representing the mood of the Council made 
them soften their stand and the Council in 1986 became able to 
suggest a 'threat to the peace' in South Africa and demanded 
the immediate eradication of Apartheid as a necessary step 
towards the establishment of a non-racial democratic society 
based on self-determination and majority role through the full 
and free exercise of adult suffrage in a united and non-
fragmented South Africa. Ultimately a democratic and non-
racial government was established in 1994. 
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It is clear from the preceding discussion that the only 
type of dispute which the parties are obligated to settle, and the 
only one with regard to which the Security Council is permitted 
to make recommendations, either of procedures or of terms of 
settlement is one "the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". 
The Security Council may also deal with 'any situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute'. In 
either case decisions as to whether the dispute or the situation 
is of the type stipulated is made by the Security Council under 
Article 34 and must be made by the Council before it is enabled 
to make any recommendations concerning either procedures or 
terms of settlement. 
CH/IPTEK 4 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
Collective security is the primary motivating factor 
behind the establishment of twentieth century international 
organizations. This concept rests upon the assumption that wars 
are likely to occur which ought to be prevented, and that their 
prevention anywhere in the world is the concern of every state. 
In the present world when the idea of a global village is fast 
gaining ground, the fabric of human society has become so 
tightly woven that a breach of peace anywhere threatens 
disintegration everywhere. No state can claim that it is 
peculiarly safe against aggression or regard any specific 
conflict as immaterial to its interest. The geographical 
remoteness of aggression is irrelevant in this era of 
interdependence of states. On the other hand the innovations 
that have taken place in the technique of war have demostrated 
that if wars continue to plague mankind, there is all too 
frightful possibility of actually extinguishing the human race. 
In this situation a world organization to smooth out conflicts 
among nations and tp save mankind from the scourge of war is 
not only desirable but necessary. The League of Nations and 
the United Nations emerged from the chaos and despair of two 
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world wars and both stemmed from this pressing need of the 
time. Both the global organisations were built around the idea 
of collective security. Other objectives also figured 
prominently, but the hope of establishing a successful 
collective security system was the primary motivating force. 
Now the question is what is meant by collective security? 
Security here represents the end, collective defines the nature 
of the means. It is a design for providing the certainty of 
collective action to frustrate aggression; for giving to the 
potential victim the reassuring knowledge, and conveying to 
the potential law breaker the deterring conviction that the 
resources of the community will be mobilised against any abuse 
of national power. In simple terms, it is the principle that, in 
the relations of states, everyone is his brother's keeper; it is the 
proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by one 
nation against another will be met by the combined force of all 
other nations. All will cooperate in controlling a disturber of 
the peace. Their combined strength will serve guarantee of the 
security of each. In other words the collective security system 
would do for the international society what police action does 
1. K. P. Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis, 
D. K. Publishing House, New Delhi, 1974, P. 4. 
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for the municipal community.* Thus in a working system of 
collective security, the problem of security is no longer the 
concern of individual nation to be taken care of by armaments 
and other elements of the national power. Security becomes the 
concern of all nations, which will take care collectively of the 
security of each of them as though their own security was at 
stake. All will act as one for all and all for one.^ 
Collective security is closely to pacific settlement. It is 
necessary because pacific settlement can not always succeed 
and disputes can develop into armed conflict. Collective 
security has a deterrent effect of overwhelming power upon the 
potential aggressor while at the same time its existence 
increases the probability that pacific settlement will succeed 
more of the time. It is at once a second line of defence against 
the wars which are not within the range of the latter. The 
methods available in pacific settlement is negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration and the like equipment for 
inducing rational decision to follow a morally respectable 
course; the methods of collective security is diplomatic. 
2. Kenneth \^. Thompson, Collective Security Re-examined, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 47, 1953, P. 755. 
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, 
Indian ed., Kalyani Pubhcation, New Delhi, 1991, P. 452. 
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economic and military sanctions for inducing rational decision 
to avoid threatened damage to the national self-interest. Pacific 
settlement assumes the moral ambiguity of a situation of 
conflict, avoiding an initial judgement on the moral merits of 
the positions held by disputants, and applies pressure equally to 
both the parties to adopt positive moral attitudes conducive to 
an agreed solution. Collective security, on the other hand, 
assumes the moral clarity of a situation, the assignability of 
guilt for a threat or breach of the peace, and denounces one 
state as the culpable party**. Hence the creators of the League of 
Nations and the United Nations have sought to combine the 
techniques of moral inducement and coercive threat for the 
preservation of peace. 
In contrast to pacific settlement, which is mainly 
concerned to evoke peaceful attitudes from quarelling states, 
collective security depends upon a positive commitment to the 
value of world peace by the great mass of states. It imposes on 
every individual state loyalty to the world community. The 
system works only when the peoples of the world identify their 
particular interest so closely related with general interest of 
4. Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, Random House, New York, 1971, PP. 
250-256. 
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mankind, that they go beyond mere recognition of 
independence to a feeling of involvement in the destiny of all 
nations. The responsibilities of participating in a collective 
security system are so onerous that it can be borne only by 
those peoples who are generally sympathetic for any and all 
victims of a global system of law and order. The operation of a 
collective security system must always be precarious unless the 
conviction that what is good for world peace is necessarily 
good for the nation is deeply engrained in governments and 
peoples. It demands that the leaders and their followers must be 
prepared to subordinate to the requirements of the collective 
security system their apparent and immediate national interest 
to incur economic loss and run the risk of war, even in 
situations when the national interest does not seem to be 
involved, or when this policy seems to conflict with the 
national interest or to undermine established national policies.^ 
Thus the principle of collective security requires that the states 
must renounce both pacifism and the right to use war as an 
instrument of national policy, while standing ready to resort to 
force for the fulfillment of their international obligations, as 
Arnold J. Toynbee has put it: 
Ibid. PP.257-258. 
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"We have got to give up war for all the purposes for 
which sovereign communities have fought since war has been 
in existence, but we have still got to be willing to accept the 
risks and losses of war for a purpose for which hitherto people 
have never thought of fighting".^ 
The idea of collective security is not a twenteeth century 
phenomenon. Its adumbration can be found in old treaties, more 
clearly in that of the seventeenth century. The Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648) obligated all its signatories "to defend and 
protect all and every article of the peace treaty against 
anyone...and to join the injured party, and assist him with 
counsel and force to repel the injury".' The Treaty of Osnabruk 
also of the seventeenth century, provided that "all and each of 
the contracting parties shall be held to defend and maintain all 
and each of the disposition of this peace against whosoever it 
may be". ' However, till the opening decades of this century 
such plans were lonely or haphazard, when the collective 
security idea, which in the past, was confined to a few 
idealists, gained widespread popularity and became the guiding 
6. Cited in Warner Levi, Fundamentals of world Organisation, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1950, P.77. 
7. K.P.Saksena, op.cit. P.5. 
8. Ibid. P.5. 
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thought of many citizens of every advanced political 
community. During World War 1 the "Organisation Centrale 
Pour Une Paix Durable" a broadly international association at 
The Hague functioned as The focal point for groups interested 
in promoting the idea of collective security. In the United 
Nations a number of proposals were put forward which were 
clubbed together and given a certain concreteness with the 
organisation of "The League to Enforce Peace" in June, 1915.' 
In all these schemes one central idea was that powers acting in 
concert could keep the peace, as A. Lawrence Lowell argued in 
1915, that; "if the members of the 'League to Enforce Peace' 
were to pledge themselves with serious intent to wage war 
jointly and severally on any one of their members that attacked 
another before submitting the case to arbitration, it is in the 
highest degree improbable that the 'cacus foederis' would ever 
arise, while any less drastic provision would be far less 
effective".*" 
During the formative years of the League of Nations the 
concept of collective security acquired a special significance 
9. Ruhl J. Bertlett, The League to Enforce Peace, University of North Carolina, 
Chappel Hill, 1944, PP.3^. 
10. Cited in K.P.Sakesena, op.cit. p.6. 
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when President Wilson became its most ardent and articulate 
exponent. He castigated the old balance of power system as 
conducive to war. He asserted that "there must now be not a 
balance of power, not one powerful group of nations set off 
against another, but a single overwhelming powerful group of 
nations who shall be the trustee of the peace of the world".** 
His idea postulated a preponderance of power which would be 
available to everybody for defensive purposes, but nobody for 
aggressive purposes. He further asserted that "peace would 
henceforth be based upon a force so much greater than the 
force of any nation or any alliance hitherto formed or 
projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations 
could face or withstand it".** 
Collective security and balance of power though both are 
alliances yet the two differ from each other in the principle of 
association by virtue of which the alliance is formed. Balance 
of power alliance is formed by certain individual nations 
against other individual nations or an alliance of them on the 
basis of what those individual nations regard their separate 
national interests. It tends to inject into international relations 
11. Ibid.p.9. 
12. Ibid.p.9 
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a concept of advance identification of friends and enemies. It 
takes positive action only against outsiders but not against a 
member of its own even though he is an aggressor. The 
organizing principle of collective security is the respect for the 
moral and legal obligation to consider an attack by any nation 
upon any member of the alliance as an attack upon all members 
of alliance. It recognises no traditional friendships and no 
predetermined enmities. It permits no alliances with or 
alliances against. It functions impartially. It is no respecter of 
states, but an instrument to be directed against the anonymous 
aggressor, on behalf of the anonymous victim. 
Consequently, collective security is supposed to operate 
automatically, that is, aggression calls the counter alliance into 
operation at once and, therefore, protects peace and security 
with the greatest possible efficiency. Alliances within the 
balance of power system, on the other hand, are frequently 
uncertain in actual operation, since they are dependent upon 
political considerations of the individual nations.*"* 
A collective security System, as envisaged by Wilson and 
his contemporaries, made singularly stringent demands upon 
13. Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit. p.213. 
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the nations of the world. Besides, World War 1 seemed to 
challenge man's survival, thereby giving rise to the argument 
that war anywhere was of universal concern. It was, therefore, 
natural that the people organised in different parts of the world 
should express the need to create institutional devices and 
methods for regulating their relations with each other on a 
more wholesome basis than hitherto existed. This involves the 
legal establishment of the prohibition of aggression, the 
commitment of states to collaborate in the suppression of 
aggression, and the endowment of an international organisation 
with authority to determine when and against what states 
sanctions are to be initiated, to decide upon the nature of 
inhibitory measures, to invoke performance of duties to which 
states are committed themselves, and to plan and direct the 
joint action which it deems necessary for the implementation of 
collective security. 
Against this background, in the negotiations at Paris 
leading to the creation of the League of Nations, the concept of 
collective security was recognised as the central element 
of the theoretical foundations upon which the new order 
was to be based. 
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Covenant Provisions 
The League Covenant represented a great stride towards 
the formal establishment of the elements of a collective 
security system and provided for the first pragmatic 
explanation of its applicability. It incorporated in Article 10, a 
classic statement of the collective security concept, the 
obligation of every state "to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of all members of the League". In 
Article 11, it stated the basic principle of collective security 
that "any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting 
any member of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter 
of concern to the whole League....". Article 16 laid down the 
obligations and responsibilities of member states. They 
accepted the principle that resort to war by a state in violation 
of the legal obligations contained in the pacific settlement 
section of the Covenant should be regarded ifso facto as an act 
of war against them all. In response to such an action, they 
undertook to impose immediately a strict embargo on all 
normal personal, commercial and financial relations with the 
offending state. These weapons of economic strangulation were 
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considered truly formidable which any nation could hardly long 
withstand. Article 16 also provided, as a last resort, for the 
possibility of collective military sanctions, to be initiated upon 
the recommendation of the League Council. 
However, the Covenant was far from a perfect design of 
collective security. War could still be waged without violating 
the Covenant, since it limited the scope of collective security, 
that is, only in case of resort to war in violation of the 
provisions for the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
laid down in Article 12,13 and 15. For all other violations of 
international law only the individualized/decentralized system 
of enforcement was available.** Besides, Article 16 which was 
obviously the most important also limited itself to a 
recommendation which the member nations were free either to 
accept or reject at their sweet will. 
Moreover, the interpretation given to the original texts of 
Articles 10 and 16 through a series of resolutions adopted by 
the Assembly of the League in 1921, adversely affected and 
seriously curtailed the possible efficacy of Article 16.The most 
crucial point was that neither the Council nor any other organ 
14. Ibid.p.316. 
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of the League, but each member of the League was to decide 
for itself whether a breach of the Covenant was committed or 
not and what measures it wanted to take against the erring 
state. Further, instead of immediately and fully applying the 
sanctions, the measures were to be taken on a gradual and 
partial basis. Instead of all members participating in the 
application of sanctions some might be excused on account of 
their peculiar position.** However, while the obligation to take 
action under Article 16 remained decentralized, the actions 
decided upon by the individual nations are to be executed under 
the centralised direction of the Council of the League. 
This reformulation of Article 16 by the Assembly 
resolutions amounted to the reaffirmation of the decentralized 
character of enforcement. The practice of the League of 
Nations demonstrated the reluctance of the member nations to 
avail themselves of even the limited opportunities for the 
centralized execution of sanctions which the reformulated 
Article 16 offered. Collective measures of enforcement under 
Article 16 were applied in only one of the five cases in which 
undoubtedly a member of the League resorted to war in 
15. K.P. Saksena, op.cit. p. 17. 
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violation of the Covenant. In all the four cases, i.e., Japan's 
occupation of Manchuria 1931, Chaco War of 1932-35 between 
Paraguay and Bolivia, Japan's invasion of China in 1937 and 
USSR-Finland conflict 1939, though one party was guilty of 
violating the Covenant, no effective collective action of 
enforcement was taken.*' 
The only case where sanctions against an aggressor were 
proposed and applied was the Italo-Ethiopian dispute of 1935. 
Even in this case the measures provided for by Article 16 para 
1, that offered the best chance of success were not taken,*' and 
the attempt was a failure, not for want of machinery or 
administrative technique, but because the will to enforce, 
among member states was lacking, as H. Lauterpacht put it; 
"Although the sanctions of Article 16 para 1, were 
formally put into operation and although an elaborate 
machinery was set up with a view to their successive and 
gradual enforcement, the nature of the action taken was such 
as to suggest that the repressive measures were being adopted 
16. Hans J. Morgenthau. op. cit PP.319-320. 
17. Ibid.p.320. 
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as a manifestation of moral reprobation rather than as an 
effective means of coercion" *'. 
The League's handling of this situation was the climax of 
the events demonstrating that members of the League and in 
particular the Great Powers on whom the main burden of 
upholding the Covenant must necessarily fall, were not 
prepared to resist aggression committed by a powerful and 
well-armed state. After the Ethiopian episode, the security 
system of the League was almost abandoned. During the 
circumstances leading to Second World War in 1939, the 
League was only a passive spectator. 
The League failed but its experiment marked the most 
conspicuous step towards establishing a collective security 
system. 
Charter Provisions 
The failure of the League of Nations to translate the idea 
of collective security into a working system did not discredit 
the idea itself. On the contrary the total collapse of the world 
order during the World War II produced a more vivid awareness 
18. Cited in Claude, op. cit. p.261. 
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of the need for, and a more resolute determination to achieve 
an improved system of collective security. The architects of the 
United Nations made elaborate provisions in this context. They 
attempted to overcome the weakness of collective enforcement 
system of the League. The Charter is a more satisfactory 
constitutional basis for a collective security system than the 
Covenant. For instance, under the Covenant it was not the 
Council nor any other organ of the League but the individual 
nations who have to decide whether a state has resorted to war 
in violation of the Covenant and whether enforcement action 
should be applied and if yes, what measures. In contrast, the 
Charter gives the Security Council wide discretion for 
determining the existence of a threat to peace, a breach 
of the peace or an act of aggression and to 
make recommendations, or decide upon measures to be 
taken to maintain international peace and security.*' Such a 
decision is not a mere recommendation whose execution 
depends upon the will of the individual member state, as in the 
case of the League, but is binding upon them. Again under the 
Covenant action could be taken by member states only in case 
19. William T.R. Fox, Collective Enforcement of Peace and Security, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 39, 1945, PP. 972-973. 
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of a "resort to war in disregard to Articles 12, 13 and 15"; 
under the Charter, no restriction is set to the power of the 
Security Council and it is free to judge any dispute or situation 
as warranting its intervention. Also the Covenant did not 
impose upon the members of the League an obligation to 
refrain from the threat of force or use of force under all 
circumstances. In certain cases, however, the Covenant allowed 
war to be made legally. The Charter not only forbids the use of 
all violence between states but could intervene even when 
violence is merely threatened and confers upon the Security 
Council wide powers in this respect.^" 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
comprising Articles 39-51, constitutes the counterpart of 
Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. All 
specific references to enforcement measures are contained in 
this Chapter, particularly Articles 39, 41, 42 and 43 are 
considered to be the heart of the United Nations system of 
collective enforcement. The Charter lays particular stress on 
collective measures in proclaiming in Article 1 Para 1 as the 
first purpose of the United Nations "to take effective collective 
20. H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, Oxford University 
Press, 5th ed., London, J 976, P.25. 
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measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression and other 
breaches of the peace". 
The power to take action vests in the Security Council 
which has been given the primary responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security. No automatic 
sanctions are mandated. The Council is solely authorized to 
determine the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the 
peace, or acts of aggression and to determine and decide on a 
course of action to restore peace. What particular measures 
the Council may take and how it is to take them has been given 
in considerable detail, although it enjoys wide discretion in the 
evaluation of the circumstances, the choice of measures and the 
timing of its action. The Charter provides for "provisional" as 
well as "enforcement" measures, the latter being of economic 
or military nature. It is not, however, necessary for the Security 
Council to decide upon or take "enforcement measures" only 
after "provisional measures" have failed or for that matter 
military sanctions only after non-military sanctions has proved 
not adequate. Though in most of the cases it goes through these 
three measures progressively, it is the discretion of the Security 
21. Article 39 of the Charter. 
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Council to decide which particular measure it is to employ, 
depending upon the nature of the situation and its perception 
thereof. Even military action under Article 42 can be taken 
directly if the situation so warrants.'^ 
Determination of Threat to the Peace, Breach of the 
Peace or Act of Aggression 
Article 39 empowers the Security Council to determine 
whether there exists a threat to the peace, breach of the peace 
or an act of aggression, and to make recommendations or 
decide upon applying measures provided in Articles 41 and 42 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. But the 
Charter contains no tests for deciding upon such situations and 
leaves it to the discretion of the Security Council to determine 
what constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression. Proposals were made at the San Francisco 
Conference to include a definition of aggression in the text of 
the UN Charter which also received the support of numerous 
states, but some other states, among them the United States and 
the United Kingdom objected that an exhaustive list of acts of 
aggression would not be possible and that binding the Security 
Council so rigidly could lead to a premature imposition of 
22. J.N. Singh, The Use of Force under International Law, Hamam Publication, New 
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sanctions.^^ It was general belief, however, that for practical 
purposes a definition to cover every possible case of aggression 
was impossible, and that the most satisfactory dealing with this 
problem was to give the Security Council unrestricted 
discretion to determine whether a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression had in fact occurred; so that it 
may be able to discharge its primary responsibility effectively. 
It was not considered to be desirable to attempt any such 
definition as it would deprive the Security Council of the 
discretionary power that must be vested in it if it is to deal with 
unforeseeable situations in an effective manner. It was, 
therefore, finally decided to leave the Security Council with 
complete freedom to determine the existence of a threat to or 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression. 
Though a definition of aggression could not be provided 
in the Charter, later the General Assembly considered that a 
satisfactory definition of the term is possible and desirable 
with a view to ensuring international peace and security, and 
adopted a resolution 'Definition of Aggression' on December 
Delhi, 1984, P.72. 
23. Bnino Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1994, P.608. 
24. Samar Sen, United Nations and the Global Challenge, Krishna Publications, New 
Delhi, 1996, PP. 109-110. 
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14, 1974. The resolution defined aggression as: "the use of 
armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations", and enumerated the following acts which, if they are 
committed would be regarded as aggression: invasion or armed 
attack by one state against the territory of another state; 
bombardment and the use of weapons by the armed forces of a 
state on the territory of another state; blockade of ports or 
coasts of a state by the forces of another state; attack on land, 
sea or air forces or marine or air fleet of a state by the armed 
forces of another state; the use of armed forces in 
contravention of conditions provided in the agreement between 
the states; perpetration of an act of aggression from the 
territory of a state against another state though by a third party; 
sending by or on behalf of a state, of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries to carry out grave acts or employ 
armed forces against another state.^^ It was accepted, however, 
that the acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the 
Security Council may determine 'other acts' also as an act of 
25. General Assembly Resolution 3314 of Dec. 14, 1974: See UN Yearbook, 1974, 
also Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind' AJIL, vol. 
83, 1989, P. 153. 
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aggression under the provisions of the Charter. Thus, the 
definition does not curtail or fetter the discretionary power of 
the Security Council as provided under Article 39 of the 
Charter. Nevertheless, the Security Council can take account of 
the definition as guidance in determining aggression.^^ 
The broadest and most distinct concept in Article 39 is 
that of threat to the peace. It is a very flexible concept, 
covering anything from intra-state to inter-state disputes.*' 
Though the Charter makes a distinction between a 'threat to the 
peace' and a danger to international peace and security' by 
putting them in two separate Chapters VI and VII respectively, 
the former being purely recommendatory and the latter 
mandatory, the practice of the Security Council shows that it 
has used them selectively and interchangeably as the political 
factors dictated. The Security Council's resolution against 
South Africa is an example where the difference between a 
danger to peace and a threat to peace was not an increase in the 
level of violence of a dispute or conflict, but the ephemeral 
motives and interests of the members of the Council. In 1963 
the Council called upon all states to cease the shipment of arms 
26. Bruno Simma, op.cit. P.610. 
27. McDougal and Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of 
International Concern, AJIL Vol. 62,1968, PP.8-9. 
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and military materials to South Africa after expressing its 
conviction that 'the situation in south Africa is seriously 
disturbing international peace and security'.^' The call was only 
voluntary with the phrase 'seriously disturbing' seemingly 
equivalent to 'likely to endanger'. This was eventually made 
mandatory in 1977 with a determination that the supply of arms 
to South Africa constituted a threat to the peace.^' Though the 
General Assembly found as early as 1965 that the situation in 
South Africa was a threat to the peace.^" Such a finding by the 
Security Council accompanied by a partial embargo was 
delayed by the intransigence of western states till 1977 as they 
saw the protection of their economic and political interests in 
South Africa as vital, and, therefore, their general aim was to 
stop a mandatory set of sanctions being imposed against the 
Pretoria Regime. 
Rhodesian situation is another example of the influence 
of political factors in finding a threat to the peace. Resolution 
216, adopted on 12 Nov. 1965 condemned the unilateral 
declaration of independence and called upon states not to 
recognize the illegal regime or render any assistance to it. The 
28. Security Council Resolution 181 of November 20, 1963. 
29. Security Council Resolution 418 of November 2, 1977. 
30. General Assembly Resolutions 2054 of December 10, 1965. 
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resolution contained no determination of a danger or a threat to 
the peace, because it was the result of a compromise between a 
British draft resolution which determined that the continuance 
of the resulting situation is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security and a draft resolution 
proposed by the Irory Coast which stated that the declaration of 
independence constituted a 'threat to international peace and 
security'. Due to the United Kingdom's veto power in the 
Council, the resolution reflected the British policy. The 
Council gradually moved towards the finding of a threat to the 
peace with a corresponding move from voluntary to mandatory 
measures which were eventually made comprehensive.^* The 
gross deprivation of human rights by the Smith regime was the 
basis of a finding of a threat. 
It appears that a 'threat to the peace' is the term the 
Council has used in situations of non-traditional international 
violence in which the main danger to peace is not a conflict 
between two or more states, but instead arises primarily from 
the internal events in one state. South Africa and Rhodesia are 
cases of human rights abuses by racist regimes. The crisis in 
the Congo where the Security Council determined that there 
31. Security Council Resolutions 232 of 16 December 1966 and 409 of 27 May 1977. 
in 
was threat to the peace was more akin to a civil war situation. 
The crisis had international repercussions in that civil war 
could suck in outside forces with Belgium and Soviet Union 
already supporting rival factions. 
A breach of the peace exists when hostilities are engaged 
between armed units of two states. Whereas a threat to the 
peace is generally applied to intra-state situations, a breach of 
the peace is applied only to inter state conflicts. A breach of 
the peace has only been identified in four cases;^^ (1) Korean 
conflict, after North Korean troops attacked South Korea on 
June 25, 1950. (2) Argentine invasion of Falklands in 1982. 
(3) In relation to Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) on June 20, 1987, and 
(4) Gulf Crisis, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. As 
aggression also assumes the direct or indirect application of the 
use of force, it is also always a breach of the peace. However, 
the particular designation of aggression labels or condemns one 
of the states involved in the conflict as a guilty party, whereas 
in a breach of the peace it may not be true as in case of Iran-
Iraq war. 
32. Security Council Resolutions 82 of June 25, 1950, 502 of April 3, 1982, 598 of 
June 20. 1987 and 660 of August 2. 1990. 
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While a determination of the Security Council is a 
prerequisite for a decision on further measures under Articles 
41 and 42, it is not necessary that the determination in a 
resolution must also be made with express reference to Art. 39. 
The practice of the Security Council shows that this Article or 
even Chapter VII was expressly mentioned only in some 
resolutions in which determinations were made. Art. 39 and 
Chapter VII were expressly mentioned in resolutions 
concerning Rhodesia. Likewise, Chapter VII had been expressly 
mentioned in resolutions against South Africa which employ 
the wording of Art. 39. Art 39 was expressly mentioned as a 
basis for a resolution of the Security Council in connection 
with Iran-Iraq conflict. Chapter VII was expressly mentioned as 
a basis for Security Council action in the Kuwait conflict, in its 
resolutions concerning civil war in Yugoslavia, in the 
resolution concerning Somalia, in the resolutions concerning 
Liberia and Libya as well as concerning Haiti and Angola. 
A number of Security Council resolutions have 
determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression without expressly referring to 
Art. 39 or Chapter VII. For example, In Korean affair in 
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determining that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea 
by North Korea constituted a 'breach of the peace' no specific 
reference to Art. 39 was made by the Security Council in its 
resolution of June 25 or that of June 27, 1950. Similarly, in its 
resolutions concerning Falklands conflict (1982), mercenary 
aggression against Seychelles (1982), armed attack by South 
Africa against Zambia (1976), and acts of aggression by South 
Africa against Angola (1984-85), the Security Council had 
either determined threat of the peace or breach of the peace or 
act of aggression but without any reference to Art. 39 or even 
Chapter VII. 
Whether the Security Council has acted on the basis of 
Article 39 or Chapter VII of the Charter, acquires particular 
significance when measures have been taken which can have 
binding character with respect to parties to conflict as well as 
to third states. The fact that such binding measures are possible 
under Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII, is a distinguishing 
feature of the system of securing peace under the United 
Nations Charter. On the other hand it is uncertain whether 
binding resolutions of the Security Council can also be issued 
without express mention of Art. 39 or Chapter VII. In its 
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advisory opinion on Namibia, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), took the view that, under Article 25, those resolutions 
which are not issued on the basis of Chapter VII are also 
binding.'*^ However, the majority opinion of the Court, which 
several of its leading judges did not share has not found 
support in practice. During the discussion on the advisory 
opinion in the Security Council many of the permanent 
members rejected such a standpoint in any case. This approach 
does not also appear appropriate in regard to the overall 
structure of the Charter. The prerequisite for a binding effect is 
that it derives from Chapter VII.^ "^  
Now the provision of provisional measures under Article 
40 of Chapter VII, which can be taken before resorting to 
Article 41 or 42 measures in order to prevent the aggravation of 
the situation raises the issue whether it is necessary to take 
Article 39 action before resorting to these provisional 
measures. Kelsen argues that looking at the systematic position 
of Article 40 in Chapter VII dealing with enforcement action 
and its placement in between Articles 39 and 41-42 it is 
obvious that Article 39 determination as to the threat to peace. 
33. ICJ Reports , 1971. PP.53-54. 
34. Bruno Simma, op.cit. PP.613-614, 
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breach of the peace or act of aggression should precede the 
application of Article 40/** The practice of the Security 
Council does not however, provide a clear answer to the 
question of whether Article 39 determination is necessary for 
purposes of Article 40. Yet, in most of the cases, it has 
expressly determined the fulfillment of prerequisites of Article 
39 in order to take measures under Article 40. In its desions 
on the Palestine question (1948) the Security Council did not 
initially made any Article 39 determination or reference of 
Article 40 in calling for provisional measures but later on in its 
resolutions of July 15, and November 16, 1948 it had 
determined a threat to the peace with express reference to 
Article 39 and issued directives after mentioning Article 40. 
The Security Council thereafter followed a practice on the lines 
of the above two resolutions. A clear example of this practice 
is resolution 598 of July 20, 1987, in which a breach of the 
peace between Iran and Iraq was determined. Here the Council 
expressly referred to Articles 39 and 40 as the legal basis for 
its resolution and provisional measures were ordered. 
35. Hans Kelsen, op.cit. P.739. 
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Whatever the practice of the Security Council might be, 
the wording of Article 40 "...The Security Council may, before 
making recommendations or deciding upon measures provided 
in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with 
such provisional measures as it may deem necessary or 
desirable" shows that the framers of the Charter were intended 
to apply the provisional measures only after a determination by 
the Council, of the existence of a threat to the peace or breach 
of the peace or an act of aggression, but before 
recommendations for or decision upon enforcement measures. 
If it meant otherwise, the wording of Article 40 would have 
been "...the Security Council may, before any determinations 
under Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply 
with such provisional measures as it may deem necessary or 
desirable". 
Possible Action of the Security Council 
Once the Security Council decides that there exists a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression it 
proceeds to its next course of action. It can make 
recommendations or decide upon measures provided under 
Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace 
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and security. Since recommendations are also possible within 
the scope of Chapter VI (Articles 36 and 37) which is a 
recommendatory Chapter and does not make any binding 
obligation on members to comply with, it must be clarified 
whether the Security Council is acting on the legal basis of 
Article 39 when it decides on recommendation. Before 
recommending or deciding upon measures under Articles 41 
and 42 the Security Council may, under Article 40, call upon 
the parties to comply with provisional measures and take 
account of a failure to comply with such measures. 
There is however, nothing in the UN Charter as to what 
exactly are the provisional measures. From the practice of the 
Security Council a list of the following has been drawn,^ *^ (a) 
call for the withdrawal of armed forces,(b) call to the parties to 
refrain from further military action and acts of violence, (c) 
call for cease-fire, including cessation of all hostilities, (d) 
demand for immediate cessession of armed invasion, (e) 
demand that the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of a country be respected, (f) setting up of an interim 
demarcation line, (g) the establishment of a demilitarized zone 
36. R Narayan Rao, Article 40 of the UN Charter. IJIL, Vol. 37, 1997, P.74. 
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or a buffer zone, (h) demand for the release of detained 
personnel of an embassy, (i) demand that the illegal expulsion 
of elected officials be rescinded and their return to their 
functions be facilitated, (j) call for payment of full and 
adequate compensation for the acts of aggression, (k) call to a 
party to rescind certain measures in an occupied territory, etc. 
The call given by the Security Council under Article 40 
and addressed to the parties could be either recommendatory or 
mandatory. A call for provisional measures coupled with a 
formal finding under Article 39 is undoubtedly a mandatory 
one. This call can also be a decision of the Council which shall 
be binding under Article 25, specially with the expressed 
intention to take enforcement action in case of non-
compliance.^' Provisional measures can be binding without 
references to Articles 39 or 25 if the language of the resolution 
IS peremptory and the discussions in the Council so indicate. 
However, the last sentence of Article 40 "the Security Council 
shall duly take account of failure to comply with provisional 
measures" makes it clear that the non-compliance of Council's 
call for provisional measures will lead it to think for harsher 
37. Hans Kelsen, op. cit. p.740. 
38. O. Schachter, Legal Aspects of UN Action in Congo, AJJL. vol. 55, 1961, P.7. 
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measures provided in Articles 41 and 42. Thus a call for 
provisional measures can be neglected only at the cost of 
inviting more severe measures, This confirms that the call is 
mandatory and there is no scope of it being voluntary. 
However this conclusion can only be drawn when the prior 
determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression is considered necessary. 
Thus the sanctions under Articles 41 and 42 can be 
applied against a state which does not comply with resolutions 
under Article 40. The Security Council has also persistently 
expressed warnings in such resolutions that, in case of non-
compliance further measures would have to be considered, 
thereby sometimes also expressly referring to Chapter VII, 
without the basic resolution having been clearly based on 
Article 40. On Palestine question the Security Council adopted 
several resolutions between March 5 and July 7, 1948 calling 
for a cessession of hostilities and a truce. These were viewed as 
recommendatory and were ignored by the parties, because the 
Security Council did not make any special reference to Article 
39. Later on July 15, 1998 the Council classified the situation 
39. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and 
Documents, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, P.275. 
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as a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 and 
also referred Article 40 in ordering a cessession of hostilities 
not later than three days from the day of resolution. Pursuant to 
this resolution a truce was established within the specified 
time. 
In Korean question the Security Council applied Article 
39 and 40 without citing them. In its decision of 25 June 1950 
the Council determined that the action by North Korean forces 
constituted a breach of the peace, and called for immediate 
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces 
to the north of 38*** parallel. Since there was an implied finding 
under Article 39 in the Council's resolution when it clearly said 
that the attack constituted a 'breach of the peace', there was no 
question of it being voluntary. That is why when the call was 
ignored the Council proceeded for enforcement action. 
A resolution calling for provisional measures was quickly 
adopted in Falklands conflict (1982) when Argentina invaded 
the Islands. The Security Council's resolution of April 3, 1982 
determined that there was a breach of the peace. Though this 
explicitly binding decision was not complied with, the Council 
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did not make any effort to propose enforcement measures due 
to the fear of Soviet veto. 
In Iran-Iraq conflict, for many years the Security Council 
called on the parties to establish a cease-fire, without any 
reference to Article 39, which went unheeded, due to the 
parties treating the call merely recommendatory. On July 20, 
1987, the Council finally made a mandatory demand for a 
cease-fire after expressly referring to Articles 39 and 40 of 
Chapter Vll, as well as determining that there existed a breach 
of the peace. Consequently a cease-fire was established in 
1988. 
In the Gulf crisis when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 
1990, the Security Council on the same day, after determining 
that there was a breach of the peace in the area, demanded that 
Iraq should withdraw all its forces from Kuwait and both the 
governments should immediately enter into negotiation. Iraq 
did not comply with the resolution which resulted into the 
enforcement action against it. 
Often the lack of unanimity over the question whether to 
make a determination under Article 39 or not and consequent 
delay encourages the parties to a conflict to ignore the call 
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whether mandatory or recommendatory. However it appears 
that when the Council does place it squarely under Articles 39 
and 40, the call is heeded, whereas a mere recommendatory call 
is often ignored by the parties/" 
Though the Security Council is not bound to apply 
provisional measures in a situation and enjoys complete 
discretion in this regard, in most of the cases where the Council 
has applied enforcement measures, it did so only when its call 
for provisional measures has been ignored, specially where it 
has already made a finding of a threat to the peace, bread of the 
peace or act of aggression. 
When the Security Council comes to take enforcement 
action it has to decide whether to take action under Article 41 
or Article 42. Article 41 of the Charter grants to the Council 
power to decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. They 
may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and 
other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic 
relations. It further empowers the Council to call upon 
40. N.D. White, op.cit. PP.77-76. 
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members of the United Nations to apply these measures. 
Member states are duty bound to carry out the call of the 
Security Council. These measures may be as effective as the 
use of armed force if they are applied with true intent. An 
economic boycott can be particularly severe and shake the 
economy of a state and seriously weaken its military 
establishment.^' 
Measures under Article 41 have been applied in many 
cases in different names such as economic sanction, trade 
sanction, trade embargo, arms embargo, aerial embargo and 
diplomatic sanction etc. During the Cold War period, due to the 
peculiar political situation and East-West confrontation these 
measures were applied only twice. Firstly, following Southern 
Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, the 
Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the White 
minority regime of that country. Secondly, in connection with 
the situation in South Africa, the Council imposed arms 
embargo against the racist regime. 
After the end of cold war measures under Article 41 have 
been taken in several cases - against Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia, 
41. Motilal Setalvad, The Role of the United Nations in the Maintenance of World 
Peace, Asia publishing House, Bombay, 1969, P.49. 
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Combodia, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti and Rawanda. They are the 
result of increased unanimity among permanent member in the 
post Cold War era. 
The recommendatory / mandatory dichotomy persist also 
here. Enforcement measured confined in Article 41 were 
intended to be mandatory following a finding of a threat to or 
breach of the peace or act of aggression under Article 39. 
However, on occasions the Council is unwilling to take 
mandatory action and make on express finding under Article 
39, with the consequence that it settles for a call for voluntary 
measures or sanctions. Such actions is viewed as merely a 
recommendation under Chapter VI or a recommendation of 
enforcement action under Article 39. In cases where voluntary 
measures have been called for one or more of the permanent 
members of the Security Council have objected to a finding 
under Article 39 combined with mandatory sanctions and the 
resulting resolution have been a political compromise. 
Voluntary sanctions, as the term implies, are breached with 
impunity and are relatively ineffective."*^ 
In fact the United Nations' role in the maintenance of 
42. N.D. White, op. cit. p.80 
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international peace and security is premised on the power of 
the Security Council, under Article 42, to take military action 
to enforce the peace. This Article empowers the Security 
Council, if it considers that measures provided for in Article 41 
are not adequate or have proved to be inadequate, to take 
necessary military action to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Military measures as provided in this 
Article may be demonstration, blockade or other operations by 
air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations. 
Powers of the Security Council under Article 42 are 
dependent upon the conclusion of agreements provided for 
under Article 43. Under this Article the members of the United 
Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, have undertaken to make 
available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance 
with the special agreement or agreements, armed forces, 
assistance and facilities including the rights of passage 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security. These agreements are to govern the number and types 
of forces, their degree of readiness and their location. Besides, 
Article 47 provides for the constitution of a Military Staff 
Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent 
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members or their representatives, which will be responsible for 
the direction and control of military forces made available at the 
disposal of the Security Council. Due to the inability of the 
permanent members to agree on the principles governing the 
special agreement, no agreement or agreements under Article 43 
have ever been concluded. No member state is therefore, 
obliged to participate in military operation nor can the Security 
Council order member states to participate. The absence of 
agreements has precluded the placing of armed forces at the 
disposal of the Security Council. This has made the Security 
Council unable to initiate measures of the kind envisaged in 
Article 42. The only method by which a military action can be 
taken by the Council is by recommending it under Article 39. 
The actions taken in Korea (1950) and Gulf (1991) fall in this 
category. Though they are examples of collective military 
actions used with considerable effectiveness, they are not 
ordered military actions since the Security Council had only 
recommended and in the latter case authorised. The effect of the 
Security Council in both the cases was to legitimize rather than 
obligate in a legal sense.'*"* Further, while the action in Korea 
was a centralised one under the United Nations banner, in the 
Gulf operation each individual country acted on its own in 
43. Sambhavi Vedantam, United Nations: Putting Words to Work, Vikas Publishing 
House, New Delhi, 1996, PP. 67-68. 
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coordination with others under an umbrella sanction by the 
United Nations. It is to be noted that there is no provision of a 
decentralized military action and only collective action can be 
taken and that too by the Security Council, to which members 
have pledged to make the forces available except when it has 
specially authorised to a regional arrangement to take action or 
in self defense by a state or a group of states till the 
Security Council has taken action itself. Thus if the action in 
Korea was nearer to Article 42, the action in the Gulf falls 
outside Article 42. 
The whole structure of Chapter VII for its ability to work 
is based upon the voting system given in Article 27 paragraph 3 
which stipulates that ' the decision of the Security Council.... 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members'. This means that 
the unanimity among five permanent members is essential for 
any decision in Chapter VII. Dissent by anyone of them is 
sufficient to make the execution of any enforcement measures 
impossible even when all the other fourteen members' of the 
Security Council have consented. In other words each of the 
permanent members has a veto with regard to any enforcement 
measure to be taken in pursuance of Chapter VII of the Charter. 
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Since the veto makes the operation of the enforcement 
system dependent upon the will of each of the permanent 
members, it is unlikely that any enforcement action can be 
taken against any of the permanent members or any other state 
securing their support. A permanent member would simply veto 
the determination, required of the Security Council under 
Article 39 that any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression exist and that any legal ground exist for the 
application of enforcement measures. It is for this reason above 
all others, that the measures envisaged in Chapter VII are 
virtually useless in situations in which there is a conflict of 
interest among the permanent members'*'*. Hence there have 
been few occasions prior to 1990 on which the Security Council 
effectively used its power under Chapter VII. During the cold 
war years, East-West conflict destroyed the principle of 
unanimity as intended in the Charter. Collective military 
measures in Korea was made possible by the fortuitous absence 
of the representative of Soviet Union, who, if present, would 
have caste a negative vote. The Congo crisis appeared at the 
outset to be a unique example of a situation which called for 
44. Morgenthau, op. ch. p. 140. 
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UN action but did not involve the East-West conflict, hence 
the major resolutions of July 14 & 22 and August 9 came from 
the Security Council authorising the Secretary General to 
provide military assistance to the Government of Congo to 
suppress the cessessionist movement in the Province of 
Katanga. Economic sanctions against Rhodesia and South 
Africa were imposed only half-heartedly*'. 
Case Studies in Enforcement Action 
Korean Crisis : 1950 
Korea was the first test of the Security Council's ability 
to maintain international peace and security. On June 25, 1950 
North Korea invaded South Korea. In a hurriedly convened 
meeting on the same day the Council declared the attack a 
breach of the peace and called for the cessession of hostilities 
and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38*** parallel. As 
the North Korean authorities failed to comply with these 
directives, the Security Council on June 27, 1950 by a 
resolution recommended that the members of the United 
Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as 
may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
45. Joachin Muller, Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997, P 612. 
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international peace and security. No doubt it was a 
recommendation of the Council and not a decision^'. However, 
the US had already ordered its forces to give air and sea 
support to the South Korea. This was a violation of the 
Charter*'. After June 27 resolution, it informed the Council that 
it had ordered a naval blockade of the Korean coast and 
authorised the use of ground forces as a further response to the 
resolution. Fifteen other countries furnished military units, but 
the bulk constituted that of United States and the Republic of 
Korea itself. By its resolution of July 7, 1950, the Council 
recommended that all members providing military forces and 
other assistance make such forces available to a unified 
command of the United States. The resolution also requested 
the US to designate the commander of such forces. It further 
authorised the unified command at its discretion to use the UN 
flag concurrently with the flag of various nations participating 
in the operation. Unified command was accordingly constituted 
and General McArthur was appointed by the US as 
Commanding General. 
46. F.A. Vallet, Tlie General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, 
British Yearbook of International Law (BYIL), Vol. 29,1952, P. 74. 
47. Ibid. p. 76. 
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all Iraqi forces from Kuwait^". When Iraq did not comply with 
this resolution, on August 6, 1990, the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII Article 41 adopted another resolution^' 
whereby it imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq 
following which the American President George Bush ordered 
the deployment of American troops in the Gulf. Ten days after, 
the US President ordered a naval blockade of Iraq as part of the 
economic embargo which was described by the Secretary 
General, Javier Perez De Cuellar as a breach of the UN 
Charter'". Though Article 42 of the Charter permits the 
Security Council to take action involving the use of force, 
including a blockade, yet there had been no Security Council 
resolution of this type till then. However, to provide legitimacy 
to its unilateral blockade, the US got passed a resolution on 25 
August, 1990 in the Security Council that allowed the use of 
necessary naval force in the Gulf region to enforce the 
economic embargo on Iraq'*. A number of other resolutions 
were passed by the Security Council in the ensuing three month 
48. Security Council Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990. 
49. Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990. 
50. Documentation, Cuellar Accuses US of Violating UN Charter, Defence Journal, 
Vol. 16, 1990, P. 38. 
51. Security Council Resolution 666 of August 25, 1990. 
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which were aimed to step up the pressure against Iraq, but 
without much positive result. 
After the measures under Article 41 were found 
inadequate to restore the political independence and 
sovereignty of Kuwait, the Council moved to take action 
involving use of force under Article 42 of the Charter. The 
Council on November 29, 1990 adopted resolution 678 which 
authorised the member states 'to use all necessary means' to 
derive the invading Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, unless Iraq 
withdrew from Kuwait on or before January 15, 1991. 
When Iraq did not withdraw its troops on the expiry of 
the deadline set by the Security Council, the coalition forces, 
constituted of the contingents of 28 states initiated military 
action against Iraq. The troops of the participating states 
operated under their national flags, but their operation was led 
by the US. On 27, February 1991, Kuwait was liberated from 
Iraq and the US led coalition forces suspended their offensive 
combat operation against Iraq, after it agreed to honour all 
resolutions. However, throughout the period of war the Council 
did not meet to discuss the situation, nor was it kept informed 
of what was happening in the Gulf in terms of pare 4 of 
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Resolution 678. In fact, the UN during the Gulf War was 
reduced to being a hapless witness to its own delegated 
authority. Also the force did not operate under the UN flag and 
the direction of the Security Council. The Council did create 
unified as in Korea, and the forces of the participating states 
acted in coordination with each other though informally led by 
US. All these lead one to conclude that though the action was 
based on the UN Security Council 678, but the Gulf War was 
not The United Nations war against Iraq. Security General 
Javier Perez De Cuellar himself remarked that the Gulf War 
was on US rather than a UN war. 
After the war was over the Security Council through its 
resolutions of March 2, 1991 and April 3, 1991, the Security 
Council imposed strict peace terms on Iraq. These included 
provisions for border demarcation, a plan for deployment of 
UN observer unit to monitor the demilitarized zone established 
between Iraq and Kuwait, provision for disarmament of Iraq 
and the establishment for this purpose of a UN Special 
Commission. However, in the terms of international law, the 
Council's competence to impose on states a border demarcation 
is questionable, which was also strongly opposed by India's 
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icpresentative in a speech on the resolution . In an 
insignificant development at the end of Gulf war the air forces 
of the US and UK intervened in certain parts of Iraq on the 
pretext of protecting the Kurdish and Shiite population from 
tte alleged repression by Iraqi regime. Later in its resolution 
OB April 5, 1991 the Security Council legitimised the action, 
relating the matter to the protection of human rights and the 
maintenance of peace and security. Iraqi complaint that the 
resolution violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Iraq fell on deaf ears. Yet it expressed its readiness to receive 
UN fact finding mission. Soon the US unilaterally imposed a 
'No fly Zone' above the 36*'' parallel in the North inhabited by 
Kurds and bellow the 32"** parallel in the South inhabited by the 
Shiites. This action was iniquitous and unlawful with no basis 
in any UN resolution". 
All the UN Security Council resolution were passed under 
pressure from the United States which had intensely lobbied to 
get the Council's authorasation. In fact in the post cold war 
phase, the US has acquired such a preeminent position that the 
52 M.S. Rajan, The UN Security Council and the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, IJIL, Vol. 37, 
1997, P. 598. 
53 Ibid. p. 604 
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objective effect of Security Council resolutions have been to 
provide something of a cover for American actions. Both the 
Soviet Union and China did not use the veto due to their own 
compulsions. Hence due to this unprecedented consensus, 
collective action against Iraq became possible during the Gulf 
crisis. 
Over eight years has passed since the war in Gulf, but 
during all these years the Security Council has been concerned 
essentially to maintain or reinforce the sanctions rather than 
lifting them, except a limited 'oil for food program', by 
periodically reviewing the developing situation and by pulling 
up Iraq for its alleged non-compliance or inadequate 
compliance. During the period the US unilaterally launched 
missile attacks on Iraq several times on one pretext or the 
other. Recently in December 1998 US launched missile attacks 
on Iraq after the UN Special Commission's Chairman, Richard 
Butler in a report submitted to the Secretary General 
complained of the uncooperative attitude of Iraqi authorities. 
US contended that its action is fully in line with the SC 
Resolution 687 while the popular opinion including that of 
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Rassia was that any military action required a fresh Security 
Council authorisation^^. 
The unique and disgraceful Security Council's role during 
tikese eight years savours of blatant vindictiveness against a 
state. All this under pressure from its most influential and 
perhaps most tyrannous member the US which had exploited 
resolution 687 for political and economic reasons. This 
vindictiveness would disregard any nation much more so the 
world organisation with high sounding and noble purposes. For 
much of the SC actions there is no potential source of authority 
IB the Charter nor even under Chapter VII, nor there is any 
precedence in the five decades old history of the UN. The 
comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq 
which has made amends for her wrongs long before, is contrary 
to all norms of law and morality and humanity and 
disproportionately severe not just to the regime, but to its 
innocent people. 
Rhodesian Situation 
Following the unilateral declaration of independence by 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) the Security Council in 1965 called 
54 Hindustan Times 'Editorial', Dec. 20, 1998. 
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for an arms, oil and petroleum embargo against the White 
minority Smith regime**. Since the Security Council failed to 
make a finding under Art. 39, the western powers viewed this 
as a voluntary call, although others thought that it was only 
under Chapter VII a mandatory Chapter, that the economic 
sanctions are mentioned. The sanctions proved ineffective. 
Next year the Council turned the voluntary measures into 
mandatory ones following an express finding under Article 39 
to that 'the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat 
to international peace and security' and imposed selective 
mandatory sanctions in Dec. 1966 under Article 41 which was 
later, in 1968, made comprehensive.** The Council had 
extended its sanction of 1965 beyond the purely voluntary stage 
even before the resolution of December 1966. In April 1966, it 
called upon the United Kingdom 'to prevent by use of force if 
necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels bringing oil supplies 
to Rhodesia. Implementation of the Council's policy was thus 
left primarily to the UK. Although there may well have been no 
obligation imposed on the UK to carry out the policy, once it 
did so, its action could only be justified as an enforcement 
55 Security Council Resolution 217 of November 20, 1965. 
56 Security Council Resolutions 232 of December 16,1966 and 253 of May 29,1968. 
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procedure sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the Charter." Mandatory economic sanctions on 
Rhodesia was the first of its kind in the history of the United 
Nations. The Security Council passed a number of resolutions 
making the sanctions more severe but of no avail. All sanctions 
were revoked in 1980 with the emergence of a democratic state 
of Zimbabwe in 1979. 
South Africa 
Declaring the policy of Apartheid perused by the South 
African Government as a blatant violation of human rights and 
crime against humanity, the Security Council placed arms 
embargo on South Africa in 1963. However the United 
Kingdom and the United States prevented the application of 
mandatory sanctions and the call remained merely voluntary 
which was proved ineffective. Fourteen years later in 1977 it 
was made mandatory. However it did not change the behavior 
of Pretoria regime since by then it had worked out alternative 
supply roots. The sanctions would have been effective if they 
were mandatory from the beginning.'* Sanctions were 
57 Samar Sen, Op.cit. P. 118. 
58 N.D.White, op.cit. PP.7-9. 
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terminated after an all party election and the establishment of a 
non-racial government in 1994. 
Yugoslavia 
After the disintegration of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 intense fighting broke out first 
in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina which resulted 
in the humanitarian dilemma in the region. The Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter on 25 September 1991 by its 
resolution 713 imposed a general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. In 
another move the Council on May 30, 1992 imposed wide-
ranging economic and diplomatic sanctions on the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which was 
mainly responsible for the problem in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in order to help achieve a peaceful solution to the 
conflict. Further by adopting another resolution on November 
16, 1992 the Council widened the existing sanctions to include 
all inward and outward maritime shipping. It also established 
*no fly zones' and 'safe area' in Bosnian territory. In a 
significant and unprecedented move the Council established 
International Criminal Tribunal for prosecuting persons 
143 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of former Yogoslavia. All these 
decisions were taken by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII. After the conclusion of peace agreement of 12 Nov. 1995 
at Dayton sanctions were lifted.*' 
Somalia 
On January 22, 1992, the Somalian Government requested 
the Security Council to consider the deteriorating human 
dilemma prevailing in the country, due to the civil war, which 
was worsening day-by-day. The Council on January 23, 1992, 
unanimously adopted a resolution by which it decided that 
states should, for establishing peace and stability in Somalia, 
immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to that country 
until it decided otherwise.'" 
, The UN arms embargo and the intense negotiations 
involving the United Nations resulted in the signing of the 
cease-fire agreement of March 3, 1992 by the opposing 
factions. Though cease-fire was established in Mogadishu, 
intense fighting continued in the North of Somalia and tension 
59 Ibid. PP. 487-525. 
60 Security Council Resolution 733 of January 23, 1992. 
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prevailed in South. To monitor the cease-fire and provide 
urgent humanitarian assistance in that country the Security 
Council established United Nations operation in Somalia 1 
(UNOSOMl). But when the situation did not improve, in 
response to an appeal by the Secretary General, the Council 
adopted a resolution on Dec. 3, 1992 authorizing the member 
states to use 'all necessary means' to establish as soon as 
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation 
in Somalia. In the next week the US led Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) consisting troops from twenty countries began its 
operation called 'Operation Restore Hope' in order to disarm 
the warring factions and protect relief convoys. UNITAF 
quickly established security in most Somalia. But the killing of 
24 Pakistani troops of the UNITAF by Somali, irregulars made 
the Security Council to think further. Acting under Chapter VII 
of the Charter the Security Council established UNOSOM II in 
March 1993 replacing the UNITAF. It authorised the UNOSOM 
II, for the first time ever in a domestic situation, to use force if 
necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
throughout the country. However the UN forces were not able 
to establish their authority in Mogadishu, the Capital. When 18 
American soldiers were killed in an attack, the US withdrew its 
troops in Mach 1994. By the fall of 1994 the situation had 
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deteriorated. The Security Council in November 1994 decided 
to withdraw UNOSOM II till March 31, 1995. Following this 
decision of the Council the rival factions in Mogadishu began 
to work together. Finally, peace was established in Somalia 
with the efforts of Somali leader themselves.** 
Rwanda 
The Security Council on May 17, 1994 imposed arms 
embargo on Rwanda, which was facing a major humanitarian 
catastrophe due to the civil war which erupted in 1990. By the 
same resolution it also expanded the already established United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda's mandate to enable it 
to contribute to the security and protection of refugees and 
civilians at risk, through means including the establishment and 
maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of 
security for relief operations to the degree possible. After the 
UNAMIR failed to prevent massacre of civilians and provide 
security to humanitarian operation, the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter authorised member states, 
through its resolution of 22 June 1994, to conduct operation 
using all necessary means to achieve their humanitarian 
objectives, including the protection of displaced persons. 
61 The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd. ed. 1996, 
PP.287-314. 
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refugees and civilians in the country. In accordance with this 
resolution the French military launched "Operation Turquoise" 
on 23 June 1994. Military operation whose mandate was for 
two months was withdrawn in the end of July. Meanwhile the 
establishment of a new government on July 19, 1994 paved the 
way for the solution of the humanitarian miseries, and 
UNAMIR with the cooperation of the government became able 
to bring lasting peace in the country. Acting under Chapter VII 
the Security Council by its resolution of 8 November 1994 
established International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to 
prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda 
between 1 January and 31 December 1994." 
Haiti 
In a military coup in Haiti the democratically elected 
President Mr. Jean Bertrand Aristide was ousted by General 
Cedras on 30 September 1991. Efforts of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) and the United Nations to restore the 
legitimate government failed. On 16 June 1993, the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter unanimously 
adopted resolution 841 by which it imposed an oil and arms 
62 Ibid, pp.341-370. 
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embargo against Haiti as part of the continuing international 
efforts to restore constitutional rule. After an agreement to 
restore the political crisis was signed by the exiled President 
Aristide and General Cedars in July 1993, the sanctions were 
suspended. But when the de facto authorities in Haiti did not 
respect some parts of the agreement, the sanctions were 
reimposed in October 1993. The Council also warned that it 
would consider additional measures if the agreement was not 
fully implemented. When the military leader continued the non-
compliance of the agreement and human rights situation 
deteriorated in the country, the Council on 31 July 1994 
adopted a resolution wherein it authorised the member states to 
form multinational force under a unified command and use all 
necessary means to remove the military leadership and 
facilitate the return of legitimate government. Before the 
military action was taken the de facto regime agreed, with the 
diplomatic efforts of former US President Jimmy Carter, to 
leave power by October 1994. Accordingly, President Aristide 
was reinstated and military action was averted. 
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Haiti is the first country ever to face UN sanctions 
because a democratically elected president was unseated by a 
military coup." 
Libya 
When Libya failed to comply with the Security Council 
resolution in which it asked Libya to hand over two of its 
nationals suspected to be responsible for the Lockerbie 
incident, the Security Council ordered an arms embargo and a 
complete air blockade on 31 March 1992. When Libya 
continued to disregard the Council's call despite this embargo, 
more stringent sanctions were imposed against it in 1993 
including the freeze of Libyan foreign funds and financial 
resources. After several years of diplomatic negotiations Libya 
handed over the suspects in April 1999 following which 
sanctions were terminated." 
Arms Embargo on Liberia 
A complete embargo on the delivery of weapons and 
military equipment to Liberia was imposed by the Security 
Council on 19 November 1992, after condemning the cease-fire 
63 Ibid. PP. 613-624. 
64 Mainstream, Weekly, New Delhi, April 1995, PP. 13-20. 
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violations and attacks on West-African peacekeeping forces. 
However, the peacekeeping forces of Economic Community of 
West African States were exempted from the embargo. 
Trade Sanctions Against Khmer Rouge in Combodia 
When in some parts of Combodia controlled by Khmer 
Rouge, the Paris Peace Agreement ending the 13 year conflict 
in the country, was not given effect and when they refused to 
disarm themselves under the terms of the Treaty and put 
obstacles in the way of United Nations Mission, trade sanctions 
were imposed by the Council against them on 23 Oct. 1991. 
Embargo Against Angolan Rebel Group 
The Security Council on 25 Sept. 1993 imposed oil and 
arms embargo against the territory not controlled by the 
government, i.e., on the Angolan Rebel Group UNITA. It asked 
the member states to prevent the supply of such goods to the 
territory of Angola other than the points of entry named by the 
Angola Government. 
CHHPTER 5 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Peacekeeping is one of the major ways through which 
the United Nations helps to maintain international peace and 
security. It is an invention of the United Nations and does 
not appear anywhere in the Charter. The concept of peace-
keeping evolved after the United Nations was founded, as a 
largely improvised response to the times, and in a situation 
where the peace and security mechanism, as envisaged in the 
Charter, became frozen as a result of the Cold War. In the 
given circumstances the United Nations developed pragmatic 
steps for the observance of cease-fire and for keeping 
combatants apart, so that negotiations for peaceful 
settlement could be successfully resorted to. The concept is 
unique in the sense that military forces are deployed not to 
serve the interest of any state but to serve as a non-partisan 
instrument of peace and to prevent conflict between 
peoples.' 
Adopted during the cold war period as a substitute for 
collective security and in response to the stalemate in the 
Security Council, Peacekeeping was also used as a means to 
1. K.P. Saksena, Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Relevance, 
Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1993, P. 148. 
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prevent the two superpowers from being embroiled in 
localized disputes.^ As Peacekeeping developed, it became 
clear that it did not refer to the authoritative or forceful 
maintenance of peace. Instead, peacekeeping came to 
describe the help provided by the international community to 
disputing states to minimize violence. It supplements the 
self-help system of international politics with an element of 
disinterested outside assistance that can help the parties to a 
conflict disengage themselves from it. As an activity 
peacekeeping is essentially responsible for bridging the gap 
between the will for peace and its actual achievement. Going 
beyond peaceful settlement, but stopping short of 
enforcement by collective might, these procedures have been 
dubbed "Chapter six and one half'.^ 
The development of peacekeeping function is probably 
the most significant achievement of the United Nations in its 
attempt to maintain international peace and security. The 
Security Council, as the central element in the UN Collective 
Security regime, has played a key role in developing this 
practice. In the Council's hands peacekeeping operations 
2. Stephen M. HilJ and Shahin P. Malik, Peacekeeping and the United Nations. 
Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd. England, 1996, P.M. 
3. William J. Durch, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies 
and Comparative Analysis, St. Martins Press, New York, 1993, P.3. 
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have become an effective means of exercising its primary 
function of maintaining world peace, since its record in 
taking enforcement action is disappointing. They have 
proved to be a useful instrument of de-escalation and 
conflict control and have extended the influence of the 
Security Council in the field in a unique way/ Peacekeeping 
technique has been applied both to disputes between states 
and to internal situations threatening peace like civil wars. 
Peacekeeping operations are of military, paramilitary 
or non-military character conducted by the United Nations 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
They interpose the presence of the United Nations trying to 
mitigate the conflict in a situation likely to lead to a breach 
of the peace. They are qualitatively different from the 
expedition of a military force as envisaged in Chapter VII. 
They are politically impartial and essentially non-coercive. 
Political impartiality is the 'sine qua non' for whatever 
effectiveness, authority and leverage peacekeepers have. 
Political impartiality means that peacekeepers' policies, 
attitudes and demeanour must not be tended to further the 
4. Xu-Xiao Bing, The Role of the Security Council in Respect of Peace 
Operations, in Suresh Juyal and B. Ramesh Basu (eds.) The United Nations and 
World Peace, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1990, p. 101. 
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interest of any contestant in the dispute, nor must they seem 
to non coercion is a norm, a policy intended to be 
controlling in the absence of sufficient cause for departing 
from it. Peacekeepers have relied on coercion, including the 
use of armed force, only when necessary. Their formal 
authority to employ force has always comprised self defense. 
United Nations commanders are under order always to rely if 
possible on peaceful rather than forceful methods for 
securing compliance, always to use minimum force when it 
is needed, and always to use armed force with the greatest of 
care. Peacekeepers employ measures short of armed force to 
damn down local violence, to reduce risks of escalation and 
outside military intervention, and to ensure an atmosphere as 
conducive as possible to constructive negotiations.* 
The objectives of Peacekeeping operations are not to 
defeat an aggressor, but to prevent fighting, act as a buffer, 
keep order or maintain a cease-fire. Peacekeeping forces are 
deployed with the consent of the parties to the crisis. Their 
mission is to keep the peace using measures short of armed 
force, a role more closely resembling that of police then of 
5. B.N. Mehrish, The Concept of Peace in the UN Charter in Suresh Juyal and B. 
Ramesh Basu (eds.). The United Nations and World Peace. Sterling Publishers, 
New Delhi, 1990, PP. 98-100. 
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military.^ Peacekeeping operations have advantages over 
enforcement action. They require no finding that which one 
is guilty of aggression, no application of armed forces by the 
United Nations against a delinquent state, and no 
enforcement of a political settlement on disputants not 
voluntarily acceptable them. 
Though the concept of Peacekeeping came about in the 
eaily cold war years, it was Dag Hamerskjold who had 
exercised the utmost influence in refining the concept and 
applying it. By elaborating the doctrine of 'preventive 
diplomacy', the central component of which was the 
proposition that the United Nations might find an alternative 
to peace-enforcement in the peacekeeping function that had 
been and was being undertaken in the Middle East and the 
Congo, Hamerskjold made himself the official theorist of the 
movement, pulling doctrinal meat upon the pragmatic bones 
of field operations in progress. Peacekeeping as Hamerskjold 
envisaged it, is a matter of preventing engagement or 
facilitating disengagement on the part of superpowers, when 
and where they are rational enough to see the advantage of 
6. A. LeRoy Bonnet, International Organisations: Principles and Issues, Prentice 
Hai\,New 5cTsey, 1995, PP. 154-155. 
7. Larry L. Fabian, Soldie; v Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for 
Peacekeeping, The Brooking Institution, Washington D.C. 1972, P.3. 
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mutually standing back or preemptive and neutralizing 
collective intervention, designed to establish dominance, or 
a competitive intervention destined to raise the temperature 
of Cold War.* Dag Hamerskjod and the policy that was 
developed even before he had assumed the stewardship of 
the United Nations has laid the ground for the deployment of 
consensual Peacekeeping in which UN peacekeepers were 
deployed, with the consent of the parties concerned and 
sought to perform a politically impartial non-coercive role.' 
There is no general consensus among states as to what 
constitutes a Peacekeeping operation. Measures taken for the 
maintenance of peace and security either for pacific 
settlement of disputes or for pacific adjustment of a situation 
likely to jeopardise friendly relations among nations are 
brought under the canopy of peacekeeping operations. 
According to Arthur M. Cox, Peacekeeping is "an 
extraordinary military art because it calls for the use of 
soldiers not to fight or win, but to prevent fighting, to 
maintain cease-fire and to provide order while negotiations 
8. B.N. Mehrish, op. cit. P. 102. 
9. Aran Kumar Banerji, From Peacekeeping to Blood-letting : The Travails of the 
United Nations, India Quarterly, Apr.-Sep. 1995, PP.22-23. 
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are being conducted".'" The United Nations' own definition 
of peacekeeping is; 
".... a peacekeeping operation has come to be defined 
as an operation involving military personnel, but without 
enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to 
help maintain or restore international peace and security in 
areas of conflict. These operations are based on consent and 
co-operation. While they involve the use of military 
personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, 
thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the 
United under Article 42".** 
A useful insight into the concept of peacekeeping has 
been provided by Allan James. He begins by stating that 
peacekeeping is composed of four essential elements which 
when taken together distinguish peacekeeping operation 
from enforcement and other forms of action. First the 
personnel deployed as part of any peacekeeping operation 
have to be of a military nature. The Second characteristic of 
peacekeeping is concerned with values of the operation 
itself. Obviously for a peacekeeping operation to be 
10. B.N. Mehrish, op. cit. P.98. 
11. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Publication, 
2™'ed. 1989, P.4. 
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successful it has to gain the trust of all the disputants. For 
this reason, despite the fact that a peacekeeping operation is 
military in nature, it has to be non-threatening. This is 
crucial for the simple reason that, if the operation, for some 
reason or the other, abandons its non-threatening posture 
then it will inevitably become party to the dispute and hence 
lose its claim to be a peacekeeping body. In such 
circumstances the mission will have crossed the five lime 
which separates peacekeeping from enforcement. A second 
value of the importance is that all peacekeeping operations 
can only employ force for the purpose of self defense. As 
long as the host or hosts know that the Peacekeeping 
mission's arms will only be used in self defense then the 
value will successfully complement the non-threatening 
stance adopted by the mission. Thirdly, Peacekeeping 
missions are distinct from enforcement measures in the 
'content' of their mandate. Impartial peacekeeping forces or 
military observers are well placed to potentially be able to 
defuse tension in areas of crisis. Once defused they are 
responsible for the stabilization of the situation which may 
then enable political negotiation to take place. Finally, the 
characteristics of peacekeeping operations have to do with 
'context' within which they take place. Together with the 
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two values of peacekeeping, they constitute the very core 
and essence of the activity. The context include the 
following provisions: Firstly, the decision to establish a 
peacekeeping operation must be taken by a competent 
authority be it an international organisation such as the 
United Nations or a regional body. Second, the operation 
must have support in the form of finances, personnel and 
equipment. Third, the operation can only be established if 
the host state or states has / have granted their consent to the 
presence of foreign troops on their territory. It has to be 
accepted that the withdrawal of this consent effectively 
signals the termination of the operation which was the case 
in 1966 when President Nasser of Egypt withdrew his 
consent, thus prematurely bringing United Nations 
Emergency Force T' (UNEF I) mandate to an end. Finally, a 
peacekeeping operation must have the political cooperation 
of all the parties to the dispute otherwise it is unlikely that it 
will complete its mandate successfully.*^ 
The functions of peacekeeping forces are diverse and 
multifaceted. They have to play a role of an honest broker 
between the two warring parties. They are mostly concerned 
12. AUam James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, Macmillan, London, 
1990, PP 1-7. 
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with the task of implementation of cease-fire agreements, 
observations of cease-fire, non-violation of border by the 
two groups and to function as an impartial intermediary 
between the two armies facing each other across 
the border.*^ William J. Durch states that peacekeeping 
operations may involve: uncovering the facts of a conflict, 
monitoring of border or buffer zones after armistice 
agreements have been signed, supervision of disarming and 
demobilization of local forces, maintenance of security 
conditions essential to the conduct of elections, and even the 
temporary, transitional administration of countries.** 
Summing up them multi dimensional functions of 
peacekeeping forces Larry L, Fabian has rightly said that the 
United Nations peacekeeping is "a process involving multi-
layered responsibilities"'^. 
Peacekeeping forces are composed of contingents of 
troops made available by member states who have taken a 
neutral stand in the dispute. Prior to 1990, the practice was 
to insulate each situation from major power involvement, 
13. Rup C. Hingorani, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces: An Overview, in 
J.N.Saxena et al (eds.) United Nations for a Better World, Lancers Books, >Jew 
Delhi, 1986, P. 52. 
14. William J. Durch, op. cit. p. 3. 
15. Larry L. Fabian, op. cit. p. 5. 
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influence or confrontation. That is why forces were mainly 
accepted from medium and smaller powers whose neutrality 
was unquestionable by disputants. The major powers 
contributed transport and other forms of technical services. 
But since 1990 with the advent of expanded and complex 
role assigned to large scale Peacekeeping operations in such 
places as Western Sahara, Yugoslavia, Combodia and 
Somalia the direct involvement of major powers have 
increased. Participation by military contingents of the 
permanent members of the Security Council became feasible 
in the new era of consensus among these states on the 
dispute management role of the United Nations in the post 
cold war period.*' 
Most of early peacekeeping operations responded to 
inter-state conflict. In recent years, however. Peacekeeping 
has more often than not addressed conflicts within states, 
sometimes where governments no longer function. Soldiers 
serving under United Nations command as peacekeeping 
observers or troops, wearing their familiar blue berets or 
blue helmets have been given ever more challenging 
mandates. They have helped promote national reconstruction 
16. Bennet, op. cit. p. 155. 
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and respect for human rights, and organized and monitored 
elections. Humanitarian tasks have been brought within the 
purview of peacekeeping. Peacekeepers have also 
participated in the reconstruction of state institutions.*^ 
Since peacekeeping operations were not originally 
envisaged in the Charter as among the measures to preserve 
world peace, the issue of where the powers to organise them 
came from has always been a debatable point. One group 
holds that Peacekeeping operations can only be established 
by the Council. Others counted that when the Security 
Council fails to fulfill its obligations, the General Assembly 
is entitled to provide for peacekeeping operations. Some 
even argue that the United Nations Charter does not speak of 
such operations and, hence, any such operations slack 
validity under the Charter and, therefore, are inadmissible. 
Those who oppose the powers of the Security Council 
in this regard argue that the Security Council can take 
enforcement action either under Article 41 involving use of 
economic or other non-military sanctions or under Article 42 
involving use of armed force against erring state or states. 
Peacekeeping operations do not come under any of the above 
17. The Blue Helmets, 3"* ed. 1996, P. 3. 
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provisions. The International Court of Justice has also held 
that Peacekeeping operations can not be called enforcement 
action.*' 
Those who are of the view hat the Security Council 
does have this power relied on various Articles of Chapters 
VI and VII. Some relied on Article 39 where the Security 
Council can make recommendation to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Others have relied on 
Article 40 which empowers the Security Council to call upon 
parties to comply with provisional measures to prevent an 
aggravation of the situation. Security Council can also take 
action under Articles 36 and 37 (2) of Chapter VI by 
recommending appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment as may be warranted by the situation. Article 29 
empowers the Security Council to establish any subsidiary 
organ as it may deem fit for the efficient performance of its 
functions. Arguments are also advanced that the Security 
Council has inherent, assumed or general powers to establish 
peacekeeping force. For instance, the ICJ in the Free 
Territory of Trieste case opined that the organisation must 
be deemed to have those powers, which, though not 
18. ICJ Report, 1962, (in Certain Expenses Case of the United Nations) P. 166. 
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expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance 
of its duties." As far the general power is concerned the 
idea is drawn from the opinion of ICJ in the case of legal 
consequences for states of the continued presence of South 
Africa in South West Africa (Namibia) in which, 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), it 
is stated that "Article 24 of the Charter vests in the Security 
Council the necessary authority to take action such as taken 
in this case. The reference in paragraph 2 of this Article to 
specific powers of the Security Council under certain 
Chapters of the Charter does not exclude the existence of 
general powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred in 
paragraph one".^" 
With regard to powers of the General Assembly to 
establish peacekeeping force, its powers are said to have 
been derived from Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter 
coupled with Uniting for Peace Resolution. Articles 10 gives 
omnibus powers to the General Assembly to discuss any 
question within the scope of the Charter. Article 11 
empowers the General Assembly to discuss any question 
19. ICJ Report, 1949, p. 182. 
20. ICJ Report, 1971, P.52. 
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regarding the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Article 14 endowed the General Assembly with 
powers to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment 
of any situation. Uniting for Peace Resolution could also be 
the enabling factor to establish peacekeeping forces in strife-
torn regions to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. There is also Article 22 which empowers the 
General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs for efficient 
performance of its functions*'. 
In response to a memorandum issued by the Security 
General in 1964 to ascertain the views of member states on 
peacekeeping operations the various governments held 
different approaches. The Government of the then Soviet 
Union held the view that the exclusive competence over the 
United Nations armed forces lies with the Security Council. 
It said: under Article 39 of the Charter, it is specifically the 
Security Council which shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, bread of the peace or act of aggression**. 
The Government of the United Kingdom recognised the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the 
21. Rup C. Hingorani, op. cit. P. 50. 
22. UN Yearbook, 1964, PP. 6-7. 
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maintenance of international peace and security, but in 
situations, where the Security Council did not or could not 
act because of want of concurrence, it supported the joint 
action for the maintenance of peace and security. It was of 
tiie view that no permanent member under the Charter has 
the right to prevent the United Nations from fulfilling its 
peacekeeping role". The Government of the United States 
categorically denied any basis for the contention that the 
Security Council has the exclusive rights as to peacekeeping. 
It contended that Article 24 of the United Nations Charter 
gave the Security Council 'primary responsibility' for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, primary but 
not exclusive authority The United States held the view that 
Article 10 of the Charter authorised the General Assembly to 
discuss and make recommendations on any question or 
matter within the scope of the Charter and Article 11 
authorised the General Assembly to discuss and make 
recommendations with regard to any question relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Article 14 
authorises it to recommend measures for the peaceful 
adjustment of any situations likely to impair friendly 
23. Ibid. P. 7. 
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relations among nations. Article 35 makes provision for 
bringing to the attention of the Security Council or General 
Assembly any dispute or situation which might lead to 
international friction or give rise to a dispute. Further the 
ICJ in its advisory opinion of July 10, 1962 observed - "the 
Security Council does have the sole authority under Chapter 
VII to make binding decisions, obligatory and compulsory on 
all members for coercive or enforcement action, but that 
does not mean that the General Assembly can not make 
recommendations (as opposed to binding decisions) as to the 
preservation of peace^"*. 
The General Assembly in 1965 established a Special 
Committee to undertake a thorough study of all questions 
relating to the constitutionality of peacekeeping operations 
including the problem of its financing. Regretably over the 
past 35 years, the Committee has failed to make any formal 
suggestions. Further more, its work has been at complete 
standstill for several years. However, in the light of the 
United Nations practice in this field, one can easily say that 
it is the Security Council and not the General Assembly 
which has established all the peacekeeping operations except 
24. Ibid. P. 8 
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two. And often the practice of an institution, on matters 
which are not expressly provided in its statute book, 
especially with the implied consent of its members becomes 
the established convention, an unwritten law. Dan Giobann 
has also stated that the power of the Council is more 
properly based on the 'general acceptance' of member states 
of the United Nations, including the permanent members of 
the Security Council, no matter whether it is the general 
acceptance of a given interpretation of the Charter or the 
general acceptance of a subsequently emerging practice . 
As an international organisation the international 
personality of United Nations is different from states. All 
functions and powers should be based on its rules. According 
to Article 2(J) of the Vienna Constitution on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organisation or 
between International Organisations inters se "rules of the 
organisation means in particular, the constitutional 
instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance 
with them and established practice of the organisation"^'. 
Since we can not find generally accepted legal bases in the 
25. Dan Giobann, The Power of the Security Council to Organise Peacekeeping 
Operations, in Antonio Casses (ed.) United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal 
Essays, 1978, PP. 27-27. 
26. Xu Xiao Bing, op.cit. P. 103. 
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Charter or decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance 
with the Charter, there is now only established practice of 
the United Nations we can rely on. From 1948 upto now the 
Security Council established 48 peacekeeping operations and 
states have not challenged this practice as members of the 
United Nations. In other words the member states have 
acknowledged the Council's power to organise such 
operations. Thus the Council's practice can be regarded as an 
established practice of the United Nations, which constituted 
the legal basis for peacekeeping operations. In contrast the 
only two exceptional peacekeeping operations organised by 
the General Assembly (United Nations Emergency Force 1, 
1956 and United Nations Security Force in West Irian, 1962) 
can not be said to reflect an established practice. Therefore, 
Council's power to organise peacekeeping operations is 
above doubt. The General Assembly's power to set up such 
operations is, nevertheless, valid only when there is an 
stalemate in the Security Council over the matter as is the 
case in the application of enforcement measures 
The Security Council authorises the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation, and determines its mandate. Such 
decisions are substantive matters and require at least nine 
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votes in favour and are subject to a veto by the negative vote 
of any of the Council's five permanent members. The 
Secretary General makes recommendations on how the 
operation is to be launched and carried out, and reports on 
its progress to the Security Council. The Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations in the Secretariat is responsible for 
day-to-day executive direction, management and logistic 
support for United Nations peacekeeping operations 
worldwide. The Secretary General chooses the force 
commander and asks member states to contribute troops, 
civilian police or other personnel. During this process, 
intensive contacts take place among member states, the 
Secretariat and the parties on the ground. Members of the 
Security Council particularly permanent members and 
countries contributing personnel play a particularly 
important role. Regional organisations may also be involved. 
Consultation begins with the planning stage of an operation 
and continues throughout its duration . 
Peacekeeping operations fall into two broad categories: 
(1) Military Observer Missions - composed of relatively 
small numbers of unarmed officers charged with such tasks 
27. UN Peacekeeping: 50 Years (1948-1998), UN Publication, 1998, P. 6. 
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as monitoring cease-fire, verifying troop withdrawals, or 
patrolling borders or demilitarized zones; 
(2) Peacekeeping Forces - composed of national 
contingents of troops deployed to carry out similar tasks 
such as those of military observers and often to act as a 
buffer between hostile parties and to prevent any shooting 
across an agreed line. Armed troops are made available by 
(3) member states voluntarily. They use their weapons 
only in self-defense. A peacekeeping force is a much more 
expensive operation than a mission. 
Serving under the United Nations flag, military 
personnel of various countries wear their own uniform. They 
are recognised as UN peacekeeping force with their blue 
helmets or berets and UN badge. Because of their distinctive 
headgear they are widely known as 'Blue Helmets'. 
The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations go 
back to the very early days of the Organisation. The earliest 
experiment in peacekeeping were the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) established by the 
Security Council in the Middle East in 1948, and United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP) in Kashmir in 1949. In the last half a century 
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since then 50 peacekeeping operations have been launched. 
The above two operations were not peacekeeping forces but 
peacekeeping missions consisting of unarmed observers. The 
first peacekeeping force was set up by the General Assembly 
after a stalemate in the Security Council in 1956 in the same 
Middle East region in connection with the Suez crisis. 
Surprisingly both the earliest observer missions UNTSO and 
UNMOGIP are still in existence. Although the Government 
of India tends to take the position that there is no longer any 
need for UNMOGIP but it has not been withdrawn. Observer 
missions police a cease-fire line or demarcation-line and 
report on infractions of the peace across this line. Their 
presence itself acts as a deterrent to avert acts of aggression 
by either side^". 
The easing of the East-West confrontation in the 2"** 
half of eighties enhanced cooperation in the Security Council 
and provided opportunities to solve long standing conflicts. 
But the end of the cold war also saw the emergence of new 
problems in many parts of the world. Long dormant ethnic, 
religious, cultural and linguistic conflicts as well as the 
28. C.V. Narasimhan, The United Nations: An Inside View, Vikas Publishing 
House, New Delhi, PP. 98-9. 
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demand for self-determination have suddenly erupted into 
violence threatening international peace and security. There 
has been an increase in the scale and cost of UN 
involvement. While a total of 50 peacekeeping operations 
have been launched till date, out of this only IS operations 
were established in 40 years between 1948 and 1988; the rest 
35 have been set up since 1989. The costs of peacekeeping 
operations aggregated to some $18 billion till 1998 of which 
almost $4 billion was that of 1993 when the Security Council 
launched the largest and most complex peacekeeping 
operations in UN history with more than 80,000 military and 
civilian peacekeepers deployed^". The increase in the cost of 
peacekeeping operations has worsened the financial position 
of the United Nations, especially because of the mounting 
arrears. 
Peacekeeping operations undertaken during the cold 
war years between 1948 - 1988 were, with the exception of 
ONUC, of a modest nature and comparatively of longer 
duration. They needed the approval of belligerents for 
deployment of civilian officials and lightly armed military 
29. UN peacekeeping: 50 years (J 948 - J988), P. 1. 
30. Ibid. P. 7. 
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personnel. They were launched only after cease-fire 
agreements had been signed. Their purpose was to monitor 
the movement of troops, to maintain an agreed upon buffer 
zone or to act as observers for troop withdrawal and 
ultimately to preserve peace settlement agreed upon between 
sovereign nations. 
But as the things have changed dramatically in the post 
cold war years, the nature and composition of peacekeeping 
operations have undergone a significant change and they 
were known as second-generation peacekeeping operations. 
These operations are multifunctional with political, 
humanitarian, social and economic components requiring 
specialists to work in parallel with soldiers. Though military 
personnel and structure of the traditional peacekeeping 
operations remain the backbone of most operations, civilian 
police officials, electoral experts and observers, delniners, 
human rights monitors, and specialists in civil affairs and 
communications are among the many faces of peacekeeping 
in the 1990s. Their responsibilities range from protecting 
and delivering humanitarian assistance to helping former 
opponents carry out complicated peace agreements; from 
assisting with the demobilization of former fighters and their 
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return to normal life to supervising and conducting 
elections; from training civilian police to monitoring respect 
for human rights and investigating alleged violations. They 
have helped in national reconciliation, democratic 
reconstruction and institution building. 
As the post cold war period has been characterized by 
a proliferation of civil wars and other armed conflicts within 
states threatening international peace and security and 
causing massive human sufferings. Peacekeeping initially 
developed as means of dealing with inter-state conflict, has 
been increasingly applied to intra-state conflicts and civil 
wars, sometimes where governments and state institutions no 
longer function and what has come to be known as the 
"failed state". These are often turning into situations which 
require interjection of force to ensure the safety of 
humanitarian operation. Consent by definition would not be 
available in the case of failed states. Somalia and Rwanda 
stand out as examples^*. 
Progressive erosion of the institutions in a country 
with or without external interference, often lead to the failed 
31. Jasjit Singh, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Challenge of 
Change, in M. S. Rajan (ed.) United Nations at Fifty and Beyond, Lancers 
Books, New Delhi, 1996, PP. 45-46. 
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State. The basic reality is that the state system still provides 
the best organising principle for peoples. Notwithstanding 
the frequent occurrence of intra-state conflicts and civil 
wars, the state is hardly obsolete. These are situations which 
have posed the greatest challenges especially where the local 
authority has substantively disappeared or has totally 
collapsed. United Nations intervention has often started with 
humanitarian assistance. Somalia is a classical example. 
While consent and cooperation is a basic prerequisite for 
successful peacekeeping operations, in such situations, and 
unlike even in civil wars, there may be no identifiable 
parties to an internal conflict. More often than not the 
number of parties claiming rights are numerous but their 
authority is dubious^^. 
Fundamentally, the United Nations has no role in 
internal conflicts and civil wars, and hence the level of 
legitimacy remains very low or questionable. But the UN 
intervention in intra-state conflicts or civil wars arises out of 
the very logic of the organisation. Its primacy purpose is to 
maintain international peace and security. Though this 
primarily meant the peace and security between and among 
sovereign states and not within states and the principle of 
32. Ibid. P. 46. 
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domestic jurisdiction reinforces the limitation or UN 
competence, the world community can not simply remain 
mute spectator of fratricidal or genocidal killings within the 
states, as the former Secretary General Perez de Cuellar said 
in his final report: "The principle of non-interference with 
the essential domestic jurisdiction of states can not be 
regarded as a protective barrier behind which human right 
could be massively or systematically violated with 
impurity". What is involved he added "is not the right of 
intervention but the collective obligation of states to bring 
relief and redress in human rights emergencies"." 
Another significant change in peacekeeping operations 
in recent years is their working with other inter-
governmental and regional organisations. United Nations 
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was the first 
peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a 
peacekeeping operation already established by a sub-regional 
organisation, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) which from the very outset of the conflict 
undertook various initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement. 
ECOWAS efforts led to the conclusion of a peace agreement 
33. Cited in Anin Kumar Baneiji, op. cit. P. 27. 
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among warring Liberian factions in 1993. UNOMIL was set 
up in 1993 and worked to implement that agreement leading 
to the successful joint monitoring of the 1997 elections, 
which marked the end of Liberia's vicious civil war. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Nations Mission in Bosnia 
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) worked in close cooperation with 
High Representative of European Union, with the NATO let 
forces and with the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In Georgia, United Nations 
Observe Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) works in close 
cooperation with the OSCE and the peacekeeping force of 
commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In Tajikistan, 
United Nations Military Operation in Tajikistan (UNMOT) 
too works closely with CIS peacekeeping forces. In most of 
peacekeeping operations that were launched in Africa, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) reinforced the United 
Nations' role. 
In Kosovo, after the peace plan drafted by NATO and 
Russia was accepted by Yugoslav President Solobodan 
Milosevich on June 9, 1999, and the NATO forces suspended 
their air strike (which was unlawful in itself), the Security 
Council through its two separate resolutions of June 11, 
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1999, adopted under Chapter Vll established the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
and authorised the deployment of NATO-led Peacekeeping 
Forces in Kosovo (KFOR). The UNMIK under the charge of 
the Secretary General has been given the responsibility of 
civil administration till a permanent political settlement is 
made in the territory. KFOR is responsible for maintaining 
law and order, provide conducive environment for the return 
of refugees and disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA). KFOR is not a UN peacekeeping operation and it 
differs from other operation in the sense that it is established 
under Chapter VII of the Charter the Security Council has 
only authorised to be launched under operational control and 
direction rather than the Secretary General. 
The history of the UN peacekeeping operations present 
a mixed story of both successes and failures. During the first 
phase of forty years of its existence, if UN Security Force in 
West New Guinea (West Irian) has been a complete success, 
there are instances when peacekeeping operations have failed 
to fulfill their mandates, such as The United Nations Yemen 
Observer Mission (UNYOM). In the first case the UN 
mission succeeded because there was complete political 
agreement in the terms of settlement between Indonesia and 
179 
the Netherlands before the UN forces went into action. In the 
Yemen Operation (1963) the Observer Mission had a very 
restricted mandate; to supervise the implementation of 
Disengagement Agreement between Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Republic. Soon after its arrival and working 
with its limited mandate the UNYOM complained the non-
compliance of disengagement agreement by the disputants. 
Without the mandate to enforce the settlement on the parties 
UNYOM's function could not be performed and it was 
withdrawn. Another example is provided by the Congo 
situation in 1960. Initially there was a danger that the United 
Nations operation in Congo (ONUC) would not be able to 
fulfil its mandate due to the unique problem posed there. The 
situation deteriorated to such an extent that there was 
effectively no peace to keep. So peacekeeping gave way to 
more forceful methods which were no different from 
enforcement actions^". Ruth B. Russel has rightly said that 
"the success of a given peacekeeping operation would be in 
direct proportion to the degree of political accord that 
underlies it".^ ^ 
34. Stephen M. Hill and Shahin P. Malik, qj.cit. P. 17. 
35. Ruth B. Russels, Commentary on the Peacekeeping Forces, in John M. Paxman 
and George T. Boggs (eds.). The United Nations: A Reassessment, Verginia 
Universit> Press, Verginia, 1973, P. 79. 
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The second generation UN peacekeeping operation 
which began in 1988 after the end of cold war with an 
increased enthusiasm has not necessarily brought reputation 
to the UN. Indeed in the last few years the prestige of the 
United Nations in this field has suffered most. If on the one 
hand the UN operation have aided transition to peace in 
Namibia, Combodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Mozambic and few 
other countries offering their people the possibility of 
development and stability, on the other it failed miserably in 
Afganistan, Somalia, Rowanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 
which was sent to Namibia in 1989 to ensure the early 
independence of the country through a free and fair election 
completed its mandate within one year. In Combodia the UN 
Mission ended civil war, supervised elections and 
established a broad based coalition government. The efforts 
of UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) brought 
the decade long civil war to an end. It verified elections 
which was carried out in 1994. The UN peacekeepers also 
helped to bring peace in Central America, Angola and 
Mozambic. 
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defined objectives which, in tern, led to uncertain mandates 
and the blurring of distinctions between peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcement and the unwillingness of the parties to 
establish peace as in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The US 
led multinational operation in Somalia in 1992, the French 
intervention in Southern Rowanda, both actions supported by 
the UN Security Council resolutions, or the NATO air strike 
against the Bosnian Serb positions in 1995 also sanctioned 
by the Security Council, indicated the failure of UN 
peacekeeping missions, for they compromised the very 
principle of peacekeeping that evolved over the years. A 
political neutral and non-coercive role as observers or 
monitors to help preserve accord already agreed upon. 
Moreover the peacekeeping missions are supposed to be 
based on the consent of all the parties concerned. This 
happened neither in Somalia when "Operation Restore Hope" 
was launched nor in Bosnia. In Haiti the UN peacekeeping 
mission was suspended until a separate multinational 
enforcement operation was authorised by the Security 
Council. Fortunately the crisis was resolved peacefully with 
the efforts of the former US President Jimmy Carter. 
However, one can not deny the fact that in cases where UN 
peacekeepers did not fulfil the mandate given to them they 
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helped save countless lives. They defeated famine in 
Somalia, and eased the suffering of millions in Former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whenever 
the peacekeeping operations failed they failed not because of 
the inherent flaws in the system but the way and the 
circumstances in which they were launched. As Boutros 
Ghali writes, "the UN peacekeeping operation can serve as 
catalyst, framework and support mechanism for parties to 
seek peace and can help when hostile factions are prepared 
to work towards this common goal. No instrument can bring 
about peace without the will of the parties to the conflict to 
achieve peace""*'. The initiative for resolution of conflicts 
must emerge from within the state. The world community 
may act as a facilitation for negotiation that may lead to the 
resolution of conflicts, but it can not enforce a settlement on 
recalcitrant disputants. 
In his "An Agenda for Peace" in 1992 the former 
Secretary General Boutros Ghali suggested a number of 
measures to strengthen the United Nations capacity in 
peacekeeping. One of them is the idea of creating standby 
force, different from peace enforcement unit, that would be 
36. The Blue Helmets, 3"" ed. 1996. P. 7. 
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available to serve under UN command at short notice. The 
central theme of this report was that the role of UN should 
be to assist in a progression from conflict prevention to 
peace-building. He used different terminologies like 
preventive diplomacy, peace making, peacekeeping and 
peace-building. Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent 
disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing 
disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the 
spread of the latter when they occur. Peace-making is action 
to bring hostile parties to agreement including such 
traditional activities as mediation and negotiation. 
Peace-building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It 
involves integrated and coordinated action aimed at 
addressing the root causes of violence, identifying and 
supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace 
and build trust and avoid a relapse into conflict. This task 
includes disarming and demobilizing ex-combatant and 
facilitating their socio-economic reintegration. Such peace 
building operations were set up in Guatemala, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. 
Note;- The Security Council on 16 September 1999, 
mandated the deployment of an Australian-led multinational 
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peacekeeping force in East Timor where, following a UN 
supervised referendum on August 30, in which the people 
of the island overwhelmingly voted for the independence 
from Indonesia, anti-independence militia went on a rampage 
* 
forcing thousand of people fled their homes. This created 
grave humanitarian situation, which led the Security Council 
to intervene. 
CHAPTER 6 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
The Preamble to the United Nations Charter states 
.... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small". Despite 
such lofty ideals, in more than 50 years of existence, the 
reality is that only five UN members have any real power or 
control. These are the permanent members of the Security 
Council or the victors of World War II. Britain, France, 
Russia (the successor state of the Soviet Union), the United 
States and China. They are also the only acknowledged 
nuclear powers. By historical accident, and such accidents 
invariably follow the same pattern the winners of war 
assumed the role of guardians of peace. They not only 
became the permanent members of the Security Council, but 
also bestowed upon themselves a special status. A formula 
was adopted for making the Council in a special sense the 
preserve of these major powers. While the Big Five were to 
share the Council chamber with six (at present ten) elected 
members, and at least two (at present four) votes from the 
latter group were to be required to produce a decision 
making majority of seven (at present nine), these provisions 
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do not radically qualify the proposition that the Council was 
to be, in essence, an instrument of great powers. It was, 
however, by no means pure happenstance that the Council 
was designed as the dominant political organ of the United 
Nations, and that the great powers were granted a dominant 
position within the Council. Big powers had already come to 
possess the predominant power and the Charter only 
acknowledged the existence of that powerV It only reflected 
the existing power structure in international relations. 
As the dominant organ of the United Nations primarily 
responsible for maintaining international peace and security, 
the Security Council, with a view to fulfill this 
responsibility effectively, was enabled to make decisions 
which were binding on the member states. It was impossible, 
however, to give this binding effect to the Security Council's 
decisions without making a method by which its decisions 
were to be reached a matter of crucial importance. Some 
great powers did not concede to be bound by decisions which 
were arrived at without their concurrence. They refused to 
accept a system of voting under which they might be 
outvoted, as the US delegate to the San Francisco 
1. Rai Singh, A Historical Perspective for Change in United Nations, India 
Quarterly, Apr. - Sep. 1995, P. 17. 
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Conference stated that "if there was no veto there would be 
no United Nations".* Consequently in the system which was 
eventually adopted and embodied in the Charter they were 
given privileged position. 
Thus the Council was designed as a mechanism by 
means of which the great powers could exercise a joint 
directorate over international political affairs, in so far as 
they could agree upon joint policy and action. By the same 
token it was designed to be inoperative in the absence of 
such agreement. This is called role of unanimity or veto rule. 
The central implication of this rule is that the Council 
should be incapacitated for use as an instrument of some 
great powers against, or in opposition to the will of, one or 
more great powers. More concretely, this means that the 
Council was to be constitutionally disabled for service to 
either side in a clash of policy or purpose between the 
powers. The veto says that one cannot outvote a great power, 
and one must not treat the explicit opposition of a great 
power as something that can be safely ignored or prudently 
overridden. In the scheme of the Charter and the theory of 
founding fathers, this negative aspect of Council's 
Ibid.9 
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functioning loomed as no less important than the positive 
responsibility ascribed to that body. The Council could 
contribute to the maintenance of peace and order if served as 
a vehicle for joint action by the Big Five, but it might 
disrupt the peace if it lent itself to the cause of one side or 
the other in a conflict among those powers. 
The veto is the price that UN members has paid in 
obtaining an organ invested with power to decide and act in 
a corporate capacity, and it is already clear that the price has 
been a high one. A body that has power to act on behalf of 
all members of an organisation is more likely, other things 
being equal, to ensure as the Charter says, "prompt and 
effective action" than one which can only recommend the 
members to act in a certain way. The founders of the UN 
seem to have assumed that the reason why the League had 
not been strong enough for its task was that the Covenant 
had based it on a wrong principle; it was essential they 
thought, to have an organisation which could act as a 
corporate body. If so, this was to misunderstand the cause 
of the League's weakness. It was not the Covenant that made 
it weak, but the frailty of the bonds that hold the society of 
states together, and the Covenant merely reflected this 
unfortunate fact. 
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The insistent of great powers on their veto was not 
altogether unreasonable. Power should be commensurate 
with responsibility, and it is on the great powers that the 
Charter places the main responsibility. It is not 
unreasonable, therefore, that when a decision of the Security 
Council may have major political consequences, specially 
when it may lead to enforcement measures to give it effect -
and it was probably assumed that only in such cases would 
the veto actually be used the great powers should refuse to 
allow this burden to be thrust upon them by some majority of 
less interested smaller powers. The fault lies not in the veto, 
but in the effect that the Charter has given to the decisions 
of the Security Council. If its decisions were to have the 
effect that the Charter give them, the veto was inevitable and 
reasonable. But to think that only a body that has a power to 
make binding decisions can act effectively is a wrong 
notion."* Security Council never made a binding decision on 
military action in Korea and Gulf, and both the time the 
operation has been successful. 
It is generally believed that the Security Council had 
failed in fulfilling its primary responsibility of maintaining 
3. J.L. Briefly, The Law of Nations. Clarendom Press, London, 6* ed. 1976, 
P.114. 
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international peace and security during the first forty years 
of its life. But this convicts the Council of failure to do what 
it was never intended to do. The Council's main weapon is 
its power of enforcement action, but for the purposes of 
enforcement action the Council had been conceived as the 
instrument of great power collaboration; and under the 
political conditions that rapidly developed in the post-war 
era, no such collaboration was forthcoming. In fact, when it 
becomes imperative in cases of disagreement among the 
great powers, the Security Council functions as it was 
designed to function. In these instances, its paralysis 
represents the fulfillment not the frustration of the scheme 
formulated at San Francisso."* 
Although the political circumstances in which the 
United Nations was established necessitated the grant of 
privileged position to the great powers, and no doubt, it was 
the best course to avert war if not to establish peace, it was 
highly unfortunate to provide a system through which these 
powers could maintain status quo for an indefinite future. 
The world has never been static. Changes take place. So the 
fortunes of nations. Post-war world saw a rapid change over 
4. Inis L. Claude, The Security Council, in Evan Luard (ed.), The Evolution of 
International Organisations, Thomas & Hudson, London, 1996, P.74-75. 
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the globe. Most of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America which were once colonies of western powers got 
independence. Colonial powers like England reduced to a 
non-power entity. Nationalist Chinese government was 
overthrown by the Communists who got over hold nearly the 
whole China. The Soviet Union, one of the superpowers of 
the yesteryear has extinguished from the map of the world. 
Germany and Japan who were materially destroyed during 
the war has emerged as the two economic giants. Thus, in 
reality, the combination of great powers has changed while 
the Security Council still reflects the geopolitical realities of 
1945. Though the Republic of China (Nationalist China) was 
replaced with the Peoples Republic of China (Communist 
China), it was done only after two long decades and till 1971 
one-fifth of the world's population living in Communist 
China was not even represented in the United Nations while 
the so called Nationalist China (Taiwan) was a permanent 
member of the Security Council. The question that should 
now be asked to the permanent members are, as to why they 
should remain permanent members in the Security Council, 
the decision making body of world affairs? Why should the 
entire continent of Africa and Latin America be excluded 
from being permanently represented? Why a permanent 
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member which proved to be no longer a great power should 
be left to stultify the Council by abusing the veto? What 
about Japan (World's biggest creditor nation and second 
largest contributor to the UN Budget), and Germany 
(Europe's biggest economic power and third largest 
contributor to UN budget)? Why Britain and France should 
retain the veto power which is above their weight and who, 
while claiming independence from US foreign policy have 
generally been pro-US in their voting behaviour in the 
Council? The dubious qualification of a nuclear capability is 
no longer valid. India and Pakistan have joined the nuclear 
club whether they are acknowledged or not 
It is argued that the veto acts as checks and balances in 
international politics which promotes peace in the world. 
This was true to some extent in the cold war period as none 
of the superpowers could impose its will in the face of 
other's vote. But the cold war equations are no more valid. 
The emergence of weak kneed Russia as a successor to the 
Soviet Union ruined the reasonably efficacious system of 
checks and balances that worked in the cold war period. The 
world has become unipolar. America has emerged as the only 
superpower and is acting like a cop, as evidenced by its 
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actions in Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and action of NATO (a 
military wing of US) in Kosovo. Britain is still toeing the 
US line. France also does not dare to go against unless its 
own self interest is at stake. Likewise China is a self-
centered country. In these circumstances the Security 
Council has receded to the pocket of the United States. The 
reality is that the Security Council does not in any way 
reflect a universal purpose. It is serving the purpose of one 
superpower today. It has become an enforcement wing of US 
State Department. If the US does not want to do something, 
it does not get done. If it did not want a Secretary General to 
be reappointed he was not reappointed. 
In these situations there is need to reform the Council. 
It is time to review the membership of the Security Council 
to reflect the world as it is today. As it stands at present the 
permanent members of the Security Council in no way 
represent the developing countries which make up two-thirds 
of the UN membership. There is no voice for the developing 
countries of Asia, Africa and South America. If the Council 
is to reflect the realities of today, it should be expanded. 
Other states should have permanent membership as well as 
the present five or instead of some of them. It should be 
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expanded in a way that strengthen its capacity and 
effectiveness, enhance its representative character, 
legitimacy and credibility, and improve its working 
efficiency and transparency. It would be in conformity with 
the principle of democratization if the veto system is 
abolished. If it is not possible, at least the scope of veto 
should be limited to a smaller number of issues considered 
of wider ramification, such as the approval of enforcement 
measures under chapter VII or other decisions involving the 
use of military force, thereby discounting the right to veto 
for a number of issues, such as the admission of new 
members to the UN or the election of Secretary General. It 
would be even more appropriate if the status of permanent 
membership is abolished in order to democratise the Council 
while making it more representative. 
As far as the powers of the Security Council is 
concerned the Charter grants it comprehensive powers to 
enable it to discharge its duties of maintaining international 
peace and security effectively. Most of these relate to pacific 
settlement of disputes (Chapter VI) and with respect to 
threat to the peace (Chapter VII). Besides the explicit 
powers which the Charter confers on it under different 
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Chapters it also possesses implied powers which are 
necessary and requisite for the proper fulfillment of its 
functions.' But from the inception of the United Nations in 
1945 until the end of cold war the Security Council had been 
redundant. The United States and Soviet Union were fighting 
their own ideological wars within its framework. Even now 
it is, in fact, powerless against permanent five specially 
America which is its most powerful member. 
Under Chapter VI the Security Council has the powers 
of calling upon the parties to settle disputes by peaceful 
means (Article 33), recommending procedures or methods of 
adjustment (Article 36) and recommending terms of 
settlement (Articles 37 and 38). But in fact, in relation to 
pacific settlement the Council has in strictness no powers; 
its decisions are no more than recommendations to the 
parties to disputes. Even recommendations are limited to 
disputes which are likely to endanger peace and security. 
The only area where the Council has power, is the 
investigation of the dispute or even situations giving rise to 
such dispute (Article 34). It can appoint an investigative 
agency to find out the facts of the problem which is brought 
5. ICJ Reports, 1949, P. 182. 
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before it. But even in this case the appointment can only be 
made with the concurrence of permanent five and anyone of 
them can block the Council's move by its use of veto. During 
the cold war period East-West confrontation and geopolitical 
factors limited the Council's ability to establish such 
investigatory bodies. In 1954 Guatemalan demand for an 
impartial investigation was not heeded only due to the 
perceived opposition of the United States. Even if an 
investigatory commission is appointed and it submits its 
report it may not be acted upon, as the report can be adopted 
again only with the concurrence of permanent members. In 
the Greek case the recommendations of the Commission of 
Investigation was not adopted and it was prevented from 
examining the situation further because of the Soviet 
Union's veto.' Whatever the Council can do in this area is 
only in relation to the disputes or situations where the 
interest of none of the permanent members is involved. 
Though the Security Council has been able to solve 
some of the disputes brought before it, in most of the cases 
it has failed to provide any solution. A number of cases 
which the Security Council has not been able to solve have 
6. N.D. White, United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, P. 65. 
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better been solved outside the United Nations. Sometimes 
the matters brought before the Council lurk in the Council 
for years and decades. Examples are Palestine and Kashmir. 
Gulf War was the cause of the Security Council's failure to 
help the parties to find out a peaceful solution of their 
differences, as the Iraqi president Saddam Hussain had made 
several complaint to the Council expressing his grievances 
before he invaded Kuwait. Often the conflict between the 
parties becomes more complicated with the involvement of 
the Security Council because of its strict adherence to the 
fundamental principles of law while the political expediency 
of the situation requires otherwise. Neither the Security 
Council has tried to strengthen its effectiveness in the field 
of pacific settlement nor member states are willing to give 
weightage to its recommendations. In the post cold war 
period disputes are increasingly solved outside the United 
Nations particularly with the intervention of the United 
States. 
In the field of collective enforcement the powers of the 
Security Council enshrined in chapter VII of the Charter far 
exceed those possessed by any of the organs of the League 
or any other organ of the United Nations. They are powers 
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greater than have ever before been exercised by any 
international body, and they constitute the most far reaching 
of the innovations which the Charter has introduced into the 
international organisation. Despite this the Security Council 
has not been able to make use of these powers because of the 
conflict and non-cooperation among the permanent members. 
The whole mechanism of collective enforcement was based 
on the assumption that the permanent members of the 
Security Council would cooperate in the same manner as 
they did during the war period. But this hope of great power 
unity did not take long to fade. The result has been the most 
abysmal performance of the Security Council in this all 
important area of maintaining peace and order. 
The Security Council has been empowered to take 
coercive action in case of a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or an act of aggression. But no test nor any definition 
of these terms have been given, and the Security Council has 
to determine in each individual case separately based on the 
merit of the case. These are very ambiguous terms and are 
open to abuse, particularly in this era of unipolar world 
when a particular power musters automatic majority votes on 
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any resolution. It might have not been possible to define 
there terms at the time of drafting of the Charter but now in 
the light of more than 50 years of experience of the 
organisation, it may be very useful to elaborate and 
eventually define the notion of the "threat to the peace", and 
use the definition of "aggression" adopted by the General 
Assembly as early as 1974.' 
Korea was the first test of the Security Council's power 
of collective enforcement as envisaged in the Charter. There 
the North Korean aggression over South Korea was termed 
as a breach of the peace and was met with armed forces 
under the aegis of Security Council's authority. It is doubtful 
whether the Security Council action in Korea was in 
conformity with the provisions of the Charter, as the 
condition of concurrence of five permanent members was not 
complied with. Soviet Union was not present in its seat when 
the decision regarding military action was taken by the 
Security Council, though later it was interpreted that the 
absence of a permanent member does not constitute a veto. It 
can also be said that in the absence of the special agreements 
provided for under Article 43, the Charter machinery for 
7. General Assembly Resolution 3314 of Dec. 14, 1974. 
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taking enforcement action by the Security Council simply 
does not exist. It is argued that the action in Korea was not 
under Article 42 of the Charter instead Article 51 which 
provides for individual or collective self-defence. If it is so, 
why the use of UN flag. Also, though the unified command 
was created by the Security Council and it permitted the use 
of UN flag concurrently with the flags of participating states 
it did not have any control over the operation. The Chief of 
the unified command General Mac Arthur took orders and 
directives from Washington and not from New York. 
Undoubtedly the Security Council resolution was only a 
political cover to legitimize the US action in Korea which 
was determined to contain the Communist's influence in 
order to further its own global interests. 
In any event, the successful use of the Security 
Council for initiating action in Korea was due to the lucky 
chance of the absence of the Soviet delegate from the 
Council table who must have vetoed the resolution if 
present. As it is given each of the permanent members, by 
the use of veto, may block the application of any 
enforcement measure by the Security Council against any 
state including itself, and so, for example, the Soviet Union 
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in the Hungarian incident and France and UK in the Suez 
incident were in a position to block completely the adoption 
of any resolution by the Council for taking measures under 
Chapter Vll of the Charter. Yet the only event which can 
seriously endanger the general peace of the world is an 
aggression or intervention undertaken or organised by a 
great power, and a system of collective security, like that of 
the Charter, which does not propose to deal with aggression 
or intervention by a great power is clearly something of a 
sham. If no enforcement action can be taken against a great 
power even if it is an aggressor, it is not easy to see the 
reason for the elaborate machinery provided in Chapter VII. 
It does not make sense to provide that all members are to 
make armed forces available to the Security Council on its 
call, that they are to hold air forces immediately available 
(Article 45), that the Military Staff Committee is to advise 
the Security Council on all questions relating to its military 
requirements (Article 47), and so on, if the only purpose of 
these formidable plans is to deal with a small power when it 
misbehaves. Small power aggression can never be a serious 
problem to the peace of the world if the great powers are 
agreed among themselves to deal with it. 
8. Briefly, op.cit. P.385. 
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The Security Council has applied enforcement 
measures not involving the use of force only in two instances 
during the cold war period; against Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) and against South Africa. In both the cases, the 
delay in determining the situation as a threat to the peace 
and consequent delay in the application of enforcement 
measures resulted in the ineffectiveness of the Council 
action. Many countries violated the Security Council 
resolution of mandatory sanction but it could do nothing 
against those states. 
With the ending of cold war, due to the increased 
cooperation among its permanent members the Security 
Council allegedly became active in utilizing its powers of 
enforcement. Trying to contribute to the solution of 
international disputes and conflicts the Security Council 
resorted to Chapter VII more than before. It adopted 
decisions which are of controversial character. In this 
respect, undoubtedly, the action against Iraq, because of its 
occupation of Kuwait, intervention in armed conflict in the 
territory of former Yugoslavia particularly Bosnia-
Herzegovina, military operation in Somalia and Rwanda all 
that put the Security Council in very awkward position. In 
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all these cases the action was undertaken under Chapter Vll 
and decisions concerning the implementation of collective 
measures were adopted on different legal considerations. 
In the case of the Gulf crisis, it was stated that it was a 
"violation of international peace and security" because of 
invasion by Iraq and its occupation of Kuwait. After the 
economic sanction did not seem to yield result, military 
action was authorised setting a deadline for Iraqi 
withdrawal. When Iraq refused to comply with the deadline 
multinational forces 
launched military action known as Operation Desert Storm. 
However, the collective military operation in the Gulf 
leaves a lot to ponder about. This was the second time in the 
history of the United Nations that the use of force was 
authorised. If we draw a parallel with the earlier Korean 
operation we will find a number of discrepancies in the two 
operations, yet both the operations are erroneously called 
UN action. In the Korean War, a multinational UN force was 
formed with 16 member countries participating, but in the 
Gulf no UN force was constituted though about 28 countries 
sent their forces or ships to the region. In Korea the Security 
Council created a unified command and authorised the use of 
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UN flag. In the Gulf neither it created unified command nor 
authorised the use of UN flag. In the Korean War a UN force 
was in action, while in the Gulf War, the Council delegated 
authority to a force that was neither under its control nor 
accountable to it. It should be remembered that under the 
Charter it is the Security Council that has been bestowed 
with the collective responsibility of preserving peace in the 
world. And it is only the Security Council that is permitted 
to use armed force against a delict state. It may, of course, 
take aid from member states, but it can not be deemed to 
have abdicated its obligation to the US or any other powerful 
nation of the world. During the whole Desert Operation the 
US hijacked the Security Council. It had ordered the naval 
blockade even before the Security Council authorised any 
such action. It was the US which lobbied to get the Security 
Council authorize the use of force which was essentially in 
its own interest. It was because of the economic and 
strategic significance of the Gulf region that the US wanted 
to dominate the area by checking the influence of any 
regional power. The Security Council was not even kept 
informed of what was happening in the Gulf, nor could it 
meet during the six weeks of the war. In fact, the UN during 
the Gulf War was reduced to being a hapless witness to its 
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own delegated authority being extended beyond the letter 
and spirit of its resolutions. People all over the world were 
left to wonder whether the real aim of the US led coalition 
forces was total destruction of Iraq's military and nuclear 
capability or the liberation of Kuwait as was mandated by 
resolution 678. The Secretary General had rightly said that 
the Gulf War was a US rather than a UN war. 
The Security Council action with regard to post Gulf 
War Iraq such as the legitimization of US and UK 
intervention in certain parts of Iraqi territory' and 
imposition of severe economic sanctions and its prolongation 
which severely affects the innocent people is contrary to all 
norms of law and morality and humanity. For much of 
Council's action there is no potential source of authorization 
in the Charter. All these only on the behest of its most 
influential and perhaps tyrannous member the United States. 
Gulf War exposed the weakness of the Security Council, that 
it can not function in accordance with the Chapter provisions 
not only in a case of disagreement among its permanent 
members but also in an era of increased cooperation, unless 
9. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5,1991. 
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and until agreements under Article 43 is concluded. In the 
cases of former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda the 
decisions were taken under Chapter VII in totally different 
situations. In all the cases the Council had failed miserably. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina a solution could be reached only 
after several million people were killed. This was due to the 
Security Council's procrastination to take action. If action 
were taken in the beginning the tragedy might have been 
minimized. In Somalia and Rwanda Council's effort to 
provide humanitarian assistance to the starving people could 
not deliver the goods. This was due to the blurring of 
Council's powers of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
In the recent Kosovo crisis the Security Council has 
been most inactive. It did nothing except issuing symbolic 
statements condemning the actions of Yugoslav Government 
and KLA. Due to the possible negative vote of Russia on any 
Security Council resolution attracting enforcement action the 
US thought it better to bypass the UN. The action taken by 
NATO was in blatant violation of the Charter provisions. 
Though under Article 53 enforcement measures can be 
implemented by a regional agency, but it can be done only 
with the prior approval of the Security Council. It is only the 
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Security Council Which can determine whether the 
enforcement action under Chapter VII is required in any 
situation or not. 
Thus the Security Council has failed to utilize its 
powers in the letter and spirit of the Charter. In all the cases 
where military operation is approved whether it is Korea or 
Gulf, or Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda, it acted on the 
basis of distorted interpretation of the various articles of the 
Charter. The only area where the Security Council can boast 
of some success is Peacekeeping Operations for which there 
is no explicit provision in the Charter. Most of the 
peacekeeping operations after the end of Cold War has been 
launched to calm the internal disturbances like civil wars 
within the states. However, one thing should be kept in mind 
that the UN has been created to deal with inter-state 
conflicts and not intra-state conflicts and civil wars. The 
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic 
affairs enshrined in the Charter reinforce the structural 
limitation in dealing with the intra-state conflicts and civil 
wars.'" By definition internal civil wars cannot be intruded 
upon by the Security Council without violating the Charter. 
10 Articles 2(4) and 2(7) 
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Also, though most of the operations are started with 
humanitarian assistance, sometimes they become peace-
enforcement operations which is a sharp deviation from the 
earlier practice and is not tenable under the twin principles 
of impartiality and non-coercion on which the previous 
operations were based. 
There exists no real legitimacy or constitutional 
authority for almost all peacekeeping operations authorised 
by the Security Council since 1991. The Council in 
principle, has been operating beyond the Charter and in 
substantive contradiction of Articles 2(4) and 2(7). Besides, 
to deploy military forces, fully armed or otherwise, would 
need the authority under Chapter VII. It is a distortion to 
describe peacekeeping and specially peace enforcing 
operations, as being authorised under Chapter Six-and-a-
half. The extrapolation of Chapter VI for traditional 
peacekeeping operations has some rationale, but little 
justification exists to seek legitimacy in the Charter for 
something that it did not cater for, and under Article 2 
specially prohibits. 
CONCLUSION 
The present international situation is completely different 
from that the Charter had envisaged at the time of its inception 
more than half a century ago. Historical circumstances of 1945 
have undergone a metamorphic change specially during the past 
on decade. Cold war has ended, and with this an era of 
cooperation between the two opposite blocks has ushered in. 
Berlin Wall, a symbol of post war East-West rivalry has been 
dismantled. Socialism has uprooted not only from its mother 
country but from the whole of Eastern Europe. Disintegration 
of Soviet Union had made the world unipolar. America has 
emerged as the only superpower acting like a world policeman. 
It has established its overlordship in international affairs and 
has turned the Security Council into a mere instrument of its 
foreign policy implementation. America's role in the Gulf War 
and Kosovo can be cited as an instance of this development. 
The size and composition of the Security Council still 
reflects the geopolitical realities of the post-World War II era, 
when the Allied Powers, who were the victors of the war, 
sought to establish their domination over the world order 
through the newly created United Nations. They became the 
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permanent members of the Security Council and bestowed upon 
them the right of veto to save their vested interests. The 
inclusion of non permanent members into the Council was 
essentially a token gesture to prove the Council's democratic 
bonafides. Though in 1965 the size of the Security Council was 
increased from eleven to fifteen, only the member of non 
permanent members was increased. Permanent membership 
remained with the old five who wanted to maintain their 
hegemony at any cost. This structure hardly fits the prevailing 
in the situation. Also the existing pattern of representation in 
the Security Council has become extremely lopsided in view of 
the radical changes and coming together of East and West of 
Europe. The Europeans and others at present have seven seats, 
four permanent and three non-permanent. Large regions of the 
world is underrepresented. No permanent representation from 
Africa and Latin America. China is the sole representative of 
Asia, the largest continent from the point of area and 
population. Economically powerful countries such as Japan and 
Germany are excluded from permanent representation. Such a 
decision making structure fundamentally defeats the purposes 
of fostering global cooperation and representation. Also the 
system where a single veto can override any initiative is a farce. 
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So there is a need to reform the Security Council and 
expand it to become it more representative and democratic and 
to enable it to reflect the present day world realities. Some 
other states should also be given permanent membership. While 
doing this factors like military power, economic muscle, 
population, size, financial support and participation in UN 
activities and above all equitable geographical distribution of 
seats should be kept in view. Various proposals have been put 
forward in this regard. Secretary General Boutros Ghali in his 
"Agenda for Peace" supported the expansion of the Security 
Council with Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and Nigeria as 
permanent members. The open-ended Working Group appointed 
by the General Assembly in 1993 to consider this question and 
which is still working reported that there was a convergence of 
views that the membership of the Security Council should be 
enlarged. But it has not yet become able to present a consensus 
report on the scope and nature of enlargement. The much talked 
about proposal in this regard is the Razali formula. Razali 
Ismail of Malaysia who was the President of General Assembly 
in 1997 presented a draft resolution to the Assembly in which 
he proposed that the Security Council should be expanded to 
twenty-four with the addition of five permanent and four non-
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permanent members. Of the five permanent to be inducted two 
would be from the industrialised countries and three from the 
developing countries one each from Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. Unlike the present permanent members these new 
permanent members would not have veto power. It should be 
remembered that it is the veto power that distinguishes the 
current five permanent members. If the veto power is withheld 
from the new permanent members it would lead to a kind of 
apartheid in the Security Council. They must enjoy the same 
power and privileges as the original permanent five. 
Alternatively and preferably rather than deny the new comers 
the power of veto the just course would be to take away the 
veto power from all members of the Security Council. Under 
the Razali plan the present five would still maintain their 
hegemony over this body and this would not be a reform in the 
true sense of the term. The power of veto is an unjust, unwieldy 
and undemocratic aberration that should have been abolished 
long before. 
There appears to be consensus that Security Council 
should be enlarged, although the opinion on the nature of 
enlargement is divided. Japan and Germany demand permanent 
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membership on the basis of their economic clout. They are the 
second and third largest contributor to the UN budget after the 
US which alone contributes 25% of the total budget. Countries 
from Asia, Africa and Latin America demand that existing 
European basis of permanent membership be addressed. India, 
Brazil and Nigeria are also aspiring for permanent membership 
in the Security Council. They feel that there is much wisdom in 
Boutros Ghali's suggestion that the five new permanent 
members include them besides Japan and Germany. Some 
western countries want the Council expanded selectively, 
Germany and Japan taken on board and then the door closed. It 
may, however, be noted that the Council is a political rather 
than an economic organ. That being the case, the wealth of a 
country should not be the only criterion in considering the 
issue of enlargement and the Council should not be turned into 
"a club of the rich or a board of directors of a company". The 
reform process would not be considered a success if an 
enlarged Council failed to enhance the representation of 
developing countries and redress the imbalance between 
developed and developing countries. 
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India is very much justified in aspiring a permanent seat 
in the Security Council. There is no doubt that India can not 
match the level of contributions by Germany and Japan in terms 
of financial help to the UN peacekeeping missions to get 
Security Council permanent seat in lieu, but India can more 
than match them in its contribution in providing trained 
soldiers for UN peacekeeping missions. Advancing UN 
objective should not be considered a small contribution. In the 
past India has always been cooperating with the UN in most of 
its peacekeeping operations. As a founder member of the UN 
and the second most populous country after China and the 
largest democracy in the world and also as an Asian nation and 
regional power that has been continuously rendering moral and 
material support to the UN, India has more than legitimate 
claim to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
The Charter assigns the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security and confers upon it wide powers to enable it to 
perform its duties. But the Council has not proved as an 
effective instrument for maintaining world peace as was hoped 
in 1945. The sudden onset of breach between Western Powers 
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and the Soviet Union in the very first year of the Organisation 
ended in a stalemate and throughout the Cold War period the 
Council remained impotent. The most far reaching effect of this 
breach was the non-agreement between them on the principle of 
providing forces to the Security Council. The result was that no 
agreement could be reached between the member states and the 
Security Council which prevented the availability of forces at 
its disposal as was provided under Article 43. Due to this non-
availability of forces the Security Council has not been able to 
take collective security measures in accordance with provisions 
of Article 42. Forces were made available by the participating 
states in Korean operation only voluntarily. Also the 
operational control of Korean action was in US hand which 
took the full advantage of Soviet Union's absence in the 
Council to advance its own interest. 
The same happened in the Gulf War though in a very 
different situation. This time the military action became 
possible not because of the absence of a veto wielding 
permanent member, but because of the changed international 
scenario in which no permanent member of the Security 
Council could dare to veto the proposed American resolution. 
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The Korean formula was again adopted in the Gulf. Action was 
not taken under Article 42 due to the same old difficulty of 
non-availability of forces at the disposal of the Security 
Council. Whatever the resolution was passed by the Security 
Council was vigorously misused by the only remaining super 
powers. In fact in the post cold war phase, US has acquired 
such a preeminent position that the objective effect of Council 
resolution was to provide something of a cover for American 
action. The whole Operation Dessert Storm was carried out by 
the multinational forces under the direction and control of US 
authorities. Security General Perez De Cuellar himself termed 
the Gulf War a US rather than UN action. Thus it is obvious 
that both the military action in Korea and Gulf were dominated 
by the US. In the present unipolar world it is more easy for US 
to misuse the Security Council when it musters automatic 
majority support without any veto. 
During the past one decade the Security Council faced 
unique problems of peace and security. In the post cold war era 
the focus of the problem has shifted from inter-state conflicts 
to intra-state conflicts and civil wars. The machinery which 
was primarily equipped to deal with inter-state conflicts has to 
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deal with unsolved ethnic, linguistic and religious problems as 
well as problems related to the democratisation and protection 
of human rights in all parts of the world. The Security Council 
applied Chapter Vll giving it different connotation for the 
solution of these problems. But the reality is that the Charter 
prohibits it to involve in such situations. The principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic jurisdiction 
imposes restriction on its authority. Distorted interpretation of 
internal situation within a state can not help the Council to 
legitimise the use of force under Chapter VII. 
The extra Charter mechanism of peacekeeping operation 
which was developed to deal with serious problems of peace is 
being increasingly used in the post cold war period. It is 
surprising that the device which was developed out of stalemate 
in the Security Council was found very valuable in an era of 
increased cooperation between East and West. While only 15 
peacekeeping operations was established in a span of forty 
years, as compared to this about 35 operations were set up in 
the last one decade. The success record of the Security Council 
in this field is also not discouraging. But the peacekeeping 
operations in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda brought more 
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damage than the credit to the Council image. In these cases 
peacekeeping operations were turned into peace-enforcement 
operations which was a deviation from the earlier practice and 
is not tenable as it violated the twin principles of impartiality 
and non-coercion on which the previous operations were based. 
From the analysis it becomes clear that in the emerging 
new world order the Charter provisions relating to the Security 
Council requires thorough revision. Previously the Council was 
almost impotent because of stalemate between the two 
superpowers and now because of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as a deterrent power and the emergence of the US as 
preponderant power, the will of the Security Council became 
synonymous with the national interest of the US. It can lead to 
serious aberration in international system unless restrained by 
institutional checks and balances. 
It is to this end that the Security Council must be 
democratised to enhance its representativeness, credibility, 
legitimacy, authority and transparency. Rubber stamping the 
operational decisions taken in Washington will not serve the 
purpose. It must be authorised to raise a permanent security 
force of its own to avoid misuse of its mandate by the powerful 
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nations. For this purpose agreements under Article 43 should be 
concluded, as a compromise formula on the principle of 
governing the forces is very much possible in this increased era 
of cooperation. The concept of peacekeeping operations with 
all its manifestations should be incorporated in the Charter. 
The authority of Security Council to deal with serious 
humanitarian an other situations within a state should be 
defined. Military Staff Committee should be permanently 
activated. Secretary General and Secretariat should be given 
freehand to manage the operations on day-to-day basis. The 
Security Council should give emphasis to preventive diplomacy 
rather than post conflict solution. It should also give priority to 
pacific settlement under Chapter VI instead sanctions under 
Chapter VII. Military measures should be used as a threat and 
only in extreme cases it should be applied. Economic sanctions 
should be used as an instrument of political pressure rather 
than as penal punishment with a view that the general public do 
not suffer much due to the lack of basic human necessities. 
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